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I. INNOVATION AND PROCESS IN THE MAKING OF M)DERN AlERICA
1
The National Style and the Constitution
The Concept of a National Style
A national character reflects a collective personality. To describe
and communicate character and personality requires a creative act, suffused
by the private insights of an individual. A national style is a more
manageable notion. It defines how the collective national personality
deals with its environment, how it goes about solving or fails to solve
the flow of problems with which the round of national life and changes
on the world scene confront it. A national style can thus be related
directly to the way a nation performs in concrete situations, without
fully separating out the mysterious webs of human motive, of paradox,
and of process which lie beyond.
The American national style takes its shape from the way the nation
has come to deal with certain inescapable dilemmas which are universally
the substance of organized human life. Among the diemmas which
Americans, like others, have had to face are these: a consciousness of
both good and evil in themselves and in others; a compulsion to pursue
individual advantage and a need to share the values and destiny of a
larger comunity; an awareness of the uniqueness of particular circum-
stance and a compulsion to generalize; an instinct for order and continuity
in social organization and the requirement of change and innovation in
order to survive.
In finding the balances and compromises necessary to live with
these dilemmas men do not generally work out consistent values,
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institutions, or patterns of action. Neither individuals nor societies
appear to be intrinsically well-integrated units. They somehow rock along
contentiously in patterns of apparently irrational balance.
In consequence, when judged by norms of logical consistency, nations
appear to behave paradoxically. Americans, for example, have often
appeared to be at the same time the most idealistic and the most material-
istic of peoples. They have appeared to be given simultaneously to extreme
empiricism in dealing with reality and to applying peculiarly spacious ab-
stractions to particular circumstances; to priding themselves on efficient
administration while performing most effectively in convulsive response
to acute crisis. They have appeared to elevate the individual uniquely
in social life, values, and politics and at the same time to maintain
bureaucratic structures which weigh heavily on him, a political
system peculiarly suspicious of personal power, and a set of social
conventions which appear to exact a high degree of conformity. But,
since the performance of any nation may be described in terms of paradox,
it is the content of a.particular national style rather than the presence
of paradox within it which deserves attention.
The initial content of the American style was determined by the
American links to Britain-notably, to nonconformist Britain of the
seventeenth century. The imperatives and opportunities of a wild but
ample land early asserted themselves, -however, transforming initially
transplanted attitudes and institutions. In the eighteenth century the
colonies could produce men as peculiarly American as Benjamin Franklin,
Thomas Jefferson, and Eli 1hitney; and foreign travellers could begin
their catalogue of American traits, many of which remain recognizable
down to the present. But a truly distinctive American style did not
emerge until the surge over the Appalachians began in earnest after
1815 and the generation of Founding Fathers passed from the scene;
and it did not reach its maturity until the latter decades of the nine-
teenth century, when the habits and manners of an expansive frontier
society were fully interwoven with those decreed by the process of
large-scale industrialisation accompanied by massive flows of immigra-
tion.
The nation that was founded in the late eighteenth century was
formed, then, by a society in transition, a society still strongly
marked by the British connection but also touched in overy dimension
by features unique to a North American life which had been working
their effect for a century and a half.
Idealism and Spcial Interest: Dual Origins of a Folitical Style
In public affairs the performance of the American nation begins
with the Declaration of Independence. That assertion of nationhood
in terms of transcendent conceptions of political and social organization
fixed in the United States the most powerful and persistent element
in its national style--a commitment to strive toward certain ideal
goals in political and social organisation and, somehow, to express
responsibility for the pursuit of those goals on the world scene. But
agreement to conduct war against a colonial power and the successful
conduct of such a war are limited political acts even when accompanied
by the statement of a national creed. They leave much still to be settled.
The nation first confronted its abiding problems as a political community
with the making of the Constitution.
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The debates on the Constitution-at the Convention and in the
states-were a unique occasion in American life. A whole generation
of leaders and, to a lesser degree, the whole electorate were forced to
consider explicitly and to reconcile formally the conflicting presupposi-
tions of democratic political life when applied to a scattered group of
communities mainly engaged in agriculture and living on the fringe of an
empty continent.
In one sense this was no new experience for Anglo-Saxons or, indeed,
for Americans, who had been living with written constitutions in one form
or another since the joint stock company left its mark on certain of the
colonial charters, who had been vigorously operating a colonial system
which left considerable scope for the development of democratic politics,
and whose system of law hLd been transplanted successfully from its already
substantial British base. The conflicting imperatives of liberty and order,
of individual freedom and the protection of property, of local and national
loyalties were fa-miliar themes to Americans of the 1780's. The generation
that made the American Constitution had been struggling actively to find
an appropriate formula for government in America for at least thirty years--
say, since the Albany Plan of 1754. From one perspective the Constitution
can be regarded simply as a limited step forward in a typically Anglo-
Saxon sequencs of experimental development which flowed on with the
evolution of the two-party system, the powers of the Supreme Court, and
much beyond.
On the whole, however, it is mora illuminating to regard the making
and acceptance of the Constitution Qs a radical innovation, a major adjust-
ment of a society to its problems. In the backWash of a successful
revolution, confronting a succession of internal and external problems
1-5
which threatened the unity and viability of the new nation, the men at
the Philadelphia Convention were forced to do more than conduct a limited
pragmatic exercise in problem solving. The problem they faced could not
be solved by the enunciation of high principle, by minor innovation in
an on-going system or by some combination of the two, They had to structure
formally the relationship between political ideals and political reality,
Their deliberations were marked by an almost total lack of conventional
political rhetoric.
Men of both the Enlightenment and the world of practical American
politics conscious to a remarkable degree of their mission in the context
of the world's political history, they examined explicitly the conflicts
they aimed to reconcile: an irreversible comitment (willingly or
grudgingly acknowledged) to the democratic process, and fear for the
unwisdom of the popular judgment and for its disrespect of property rights;
a need to make a defensible nation with a free trading market, and an
awareness of the power of state interests and the concessions they
could exact; a need to centralize executive power, and an acute aware-
ness of the inability of man to handle much power with grace. The
American political leadership gathered at Philadelphia, a generation
peculiarly comfortable with abstract thought, acknowledged the dilemas
implicit in the concept of unified democratic America and did not hesitate
to reveal their ccmpremises with the purity of democratic ideals,
But it was not their willingness to compromise that gave their
deliberations a special character; for compromise was not new either
in local politics or in the conduct of national affairs under the Articles
of ConZederation. It was, rather, the opennss and clarity with which
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they acknowledged and articulated an American version of the general
human dilemas in the political organisation of society.
The Founding Fathers were not, of course, infallible, Although
they were men acutely aware of sin and special interest, they were,
for example, overidealistic about the possibilities of choosing a
president above party. But their brief but thorough exposure of the roots
of the American political problem yielded a remarkably secure and workable
structure; and the day-to-day operation of American politics has continued
ever since to evolve in the spirit of reconciled idealism and special
interest out of which the Constitution was made. American politicians
have not been judged on an absolute moral scale. They have been judged
by their ability simultaneously to project the common values and goals
of the community and to move toward them a little while building majority
coalitions which combined the special interests and the larger loyalties
of their constituencies. On the domestic scene compromise is not judged
appeasement unless it transcends a subtle and scarcely definable boundary
in common law and human behavior.
Innovation and Process in American Politics
Thus the subtle business of democratic politics was permitted
by the Constitution to become one of the implicit connon-law processes
by which American society did its work. The language of American political
oratory which came to be conventional was not designed to expose the nature
of the political process so much as to associate particular political
figures and positions with the nation's powerful half-true unifying ideals.
It is mainly to the phrases of the Declaration of Independence rather than to
those of the Constitution that political orators habitually turn; although
the canons of the Constitution, too, have often been invoked as a cloak of
legitimacy for special pleading.
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But despite active debate on the substance of the Constitution
and despite controversial interpretation by the Courts, the Constitution-
as a concept, taken as a whole-was quickly placed on a pedestal and at
a distance, surrounded with a hase of sanctity which has tended to conceal
the doubts about humanity, some bordering on the verge of cynicism, which
it incorporates and vhich have helped to make it workable.
The transcendent idea of the Constitution has thus served to hold
domestic political struggle within safe bounds; ihile its substance has
offered an agreed working vocabulary for political commnication and
debate.
In the 1780's, the United States needed to take a large step
markedly discontinuous with its current position. The framework of
politics built up out of local, colonial, state, and national government
under the Articles of Confederation did not work; and it probably could
not be made to work with minor modification if national unity were to
be maintained against internal and external centripedal forces. The
problem demanded gross innovation, and the innovation was successfully
accomplished.
Having survived the stormy first twelve years of the Constitution's
operation; having accepted the inevetability of two-party strife, including
the new dimension it gave to the already heavy responsibilities of the
presidency; having accepted the role of the Supreme Court asserted by
John Marshall; having come through the great European upheavals and the
War of 1812 with an enhanced sense of nationhood; Americans turned away
from their transient mood of intense political introversion and devoted
themselves to operating vigorously within the new institutional framework,
Its complex origins faded into the mists. Truly fundamental constitutional
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issues were raised only by the problems leading to the Civil War; and
these were kept from dominating the national political scene until well
along in the 1850's. The rest was piecemeal adaptation in common law
or by formal amendment, around a set of problems many new in content
but essentially familiar in their essence,
Despite a continuity with developments before and after the Convention,
the making of the Constitution was the product of a unique set of circum-
stances and, indeed, of a unique transitional generation of Americans.
Like other successful innovations it permitted men to turn from the
searching problems of design to the energetic operation of process0
2The National Interest and Washington's Farewell Address
The National Interest in an Arena of Nation States
Despite its many changeisie shibe' tle mierId -arena in which
raations must perform has always had one historical continuity: the interests
of the units within it have regularly clashed, and each national unit
has retained for itself the ultimate right and capacity to use military
force to pursue or to protect its own interests. Each nation as it
came into the inherently competitive arena as a distinct unit has been
forced, therefore, to define its interests and to build a military and
foreign policy on that definition.
How shall territorial integrity be assured? The national prosperity?
The nation's political, cultural, and religious dispositions? What active
objectives, if any%--territorial or ideological, political or economic.--
should be pursued beyond the nation's borders? From time to time these
questions have been explicitly answered by national leaders. And, from
day to day, by what was done or not done, the flow of a nation's military
and foreign policy has provided detailed implicit responses to these
questions which may or may not have been consonant with enunciated
concepts of the national interest.
The United States, newly released from colonial status, its Constitution
formulated and accepted, was plunged immediately into a setting of major
war in the world arena which permitted no delay in defining its interests
and taking a dayuto-day operating position in military and foreign affairs.
Idealism and Power: The Dual Origins of a National Style in Foreign Affairs
The special character of the United States as a national community
raised a problem in foreign and military policy rooted in a dualism
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similar to that with which the Founding Fathers wrestled in making
the Constitution: How should the sense of ideological comiutment and
mission built into American nationhood be related to the abiding
imperatives of special national interest and national power? How should
the new democracy, unique in its local geography and its distance from
the seats of power as well as in its political organization and conception,
deal with the conventional interests of a nation-state living in a world
of competing sovereignties?
This was not a wholly new question even in 1788. First thoughts on
a distinctively American interest had been stirred during the third
quarter of the eighteenth century as the sense of conunal identity
grew and the colonies sought to define a new status fosr themselves
within the British Empire. The Revolution itself had been fought
partly as a colonial revolt in the name of independence and freedom,
partly through a wholly conventional balance-.of-power alliance with
France; and the Constitution had been drawn up and accepted in part
because of external threats to the nation's physical integrity and
to its ability to protect its economic interests in conventional
diplomatic negotiation.
Against this background the nation faced a peculiarly searching
test in defining its relation to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars, mingling as they did the worlds of national power and political
concept. Despite American remoteness from the major theaters of conflict,
these wars pervaded both the American economy and American political life,
bringing with them disruption and trouble, from Citizen Genit and the Alien
and Sedition Acts to the Embargo and the War of 1812.
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What was the American interest in the outcome of these wars? Should
that interest be determined by an assessment of their ideological content?
By memories of past assistance from the French? By revulsion from the
excesses of the French Revolution and a continued sense of racial and
cultural connection with the British Isles? By the impact of the
belligerents' actions on special economic or regional interests? Or
was there a distinctive American national interest that transcended
trans-Atlantic ties of race, ideology, gratitude, or memory--and even
short-run economic advantage?
Washington's Resolution
In his Farewell Address Washington spoke of these matters in the
context of a general theme which embraced domestic as well as foreign
policy. In the early portion of his statement he considered the
dangers of party faction trlthin the United States and, particularly,
the danger of developing parties rooted in competing regional interests.
He saw this danger compounded if domestic party strife were to converge
with distinctive foreign policy positions, with each party tied in
sentiment and interest to a major European power--a real enough danger
in the 1790's.
WashingtonIs objective was to strengthen the sense of nationhood
and the barely achieved unity afforded by the Constitutional system.
His method was to define on the domestic scene an area of national
interest beyond region and party, and to define a distinctive American
interest in relation to the world. He sought to limit the sphere in
which Americans would act abroad in terms of the essentially universal
ideals out of which the nation was constructed.
In his military assessment Vashington asserted that, in the short
run, the American nation could be protected by its own strength combined,
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as opportunity required and offered, with that of other powers whose
interests temporarily converged with those of the United States; and he
sensed that in the long run the rise in American military potential,
relative to others, if translated into a reasonably substantial defensive
force at readiness, with a well-trained professional group at its core,
could cope with whatever threats might arise.
Washington did not deny or ignore the reality of the American commit-
ment to a distinctive set of values in political and social life. He spoke
movingly of the nation's attachment to liberty. But he counselled that
the nation's ideological commitment was likely to be fruitful only
to the extent that the nation exploited the military possibility of a
security achieved and maintained without taking up fixed positions in
the European power struggle, working out its ideological destiny within
its own expanding borders.,
Innovation and Process in Foreign Policy
Washington's formulation of the national interest ranks with the
making of the Constitution as a moment when the various strands in
a major American problem were articulated in explicit relationship
to one another at a high political level. His injunction dominated
American foreign policy for almost precisely a century; but over that
period the inner structure of his thought, and the military and political
assumptions which gave them a validity in the world arena of the nineteenth
century, were carefully re-examined by only a few. Accepting isolation
in Washington's sense as a working formula, the nation from Jefferson's
administration forward devoted itself to the process of building and
consolidating a continental structure. The United States managed to
acquire the requisite territory and to neutralize the Hemisphere from
any increase in major power influence at remarkably little diplomatic
or military cost. And all this was done, step by step, with shrewdness
and skill.
The cumulative myth of American isolation was, however, ouite
different from Washington's prescription for the way American foreign
policy should evolve. P gap emerged between the concept of a virtuous
isolated America uniquely free of wicked balance of power politics and
the way American relations to the world were actually conducted. The
nation practiced balance of power politics abroad just as it did at
home in party politics conducted on a continental basis; and when
military force was used in the nineteenth century it was used for
relatively clear and limited political and geographic ends, not for
unlimited crusade in the pursuit of ideal absolutes.
Down to the end of the nineteenth century, however, the rgyths
about the foundations for isolation could live in reasonable comfort
with an effective military and foreign policy just as myths about
the Constitution did not interfere with the generation of lively and
successful democratic processes.
3The Stages of Growth and the American Sequence
in the Nineteenth Century
The Era of Industrialization
The formation of the United States in the 1780's coincides almost
exactly with the moment when the first of the world's industrial revo-
lutions gathered momentum--in Great Britain. Since then, and without
significant pause, as one people after another has chosen to accept the
benefits and to face the costs of applying to its resources a technology
rooted in modern science, the transformation of old agricultural societies
has proceeded. When the difficult calculus has been assessed, men have
chosen the strains and potentialities of economic growth rather than the
real satisfactions but limited productivity of traditional societies.
From Britain the process first spread out across the Channel and
the Atlantic to Western Europe and the United States. In the last
quarter of the nineteenth century it spread to Japan and Russia, and
in the twentieth century towbhole southern half of the world as well
as to those vast areas in Eastern Europe and China which had failed
to revolutionize themselves so as to permit absorption of modern tech-
nology in the previ ous century.
In the past hundred and seventy years the sequence of economic
growth has substantially-not exclusively, but substantially--determined
the shape of the world arena of power, the relative status within it of
the various nation states, and the central problems with which politicians
at home and diplomats and soldiers abroad have been confronted. Thus the
evolution of national life in the United States, the grand issues of
American domestic social and political strategy, and the changing
agenda of the American national interest abroad can all be usefully.-
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if partially-defined in terms of the seauence of economic growth.
Economic growth engages not merely the pursuit of private advantage,
but the whole range of human motives, for growth is the economic conseouence
of changes in all parts of a society, not merely its economy. Men have
done the things necessary to make economies grow in order to express their
individuality in its widest sense, to elevate the status of their clan
or social class, and to achieve dignity and power for the nation-as
well as to make money. To look at societies in terms of their stages of
growth, as this book systematically does, is to look at whole societies
and whole men from one arbitrary perspective; but it is a perspective
peculiarly relevant to public life, to diplomacy, and to military affairs.
Five Stages of Growth
Before turning to the adventure of American growth in the nineteenth
century, it may be useful, then, to summarize in general the stages through
which modern societies have passed on the road to high levels of mass
consumption. 2
The traditional society. The traditional society is based on
production methods of limited efficiency, usually in agriculture but
sometimes pastoral. Acreage may be expanded, some innovations may be
introduced, productivity may rise with, for example, the improvement
of irrigation works; but the central fact about the traditional society
is that there is a limit to the level of attainable output, a ceiling
imposed by the fact that the potentialities which flow from modern
science and technology are either not available or are not applied
for other reasons.
Neither in the longer past nor in recent times have traditional
societies and their economies been static. The area and volume of trade
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within them and between them has fluctuated, for example, with the degree
of political and social turbulence, the efficacy of central rule, the
upkeep of the roads. Population has risen and fallen, not only with the
sequence of the harvests but also with the incidence of war and plague.
Varying degrees of manufacture have developed; but, as in agriculture,
the level of prodtictivity has been limited by the inaccessibility of modern
science and its applications. Generally speaking, traditional societies
have been hierarchical in social structure, with relatively narrow
scope for vertical mobility, and with family and clan connections playing
a large role in social organisation. Political power has been centered
regionally in the hands of those owning or controlling the land, who
maintained fluctuating but usually profound influence over such central
political power as existed.
The Pre-Conditions for Take-Off Into Sustained Economic Growth
The take-off is the watershed when, at last, a traditional society
buildsregular growth into its institutions and methods; but it takes a
long time for a traditional society to prepare itself--to create the pre-
conditions--for this decisive transition. The pre-conditions for take-off
were initially developed within Western Europe of the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries as the insights of modern science, given order
and dramatic impact by Newton, began to be translated into new production
methods in both agriculture and industry. Among the Western European
states, Britain, favored by geography, trading possibilities, and social
and political structure, was the first to take off.
The more general case in modern history has seen the stage of pre-
conditions begin with some intrusion by more advanced societies which
shocked the traditional society and began its undoing but also set in
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motion ideas and sentiments which initiated the process of modernization.
Then the idea that economic progress is possible spreads. Education
begins to broaden and change to suit the needs of modern economic activity.
New types of enterprising men come forward willing to mobilize savings and
to take risks in pursuit of profit. Banks and other institutions for mobiliz-
ing capital appear. Investment increases in transport, communications, and
raw materials in which other nations may bahe an economic interest. The
scope of comerce, internal and external, widens. And, here and there,
modern manufacturing enterprise appears. But all this activity proceeds
at a limited pace within an economy and a society still mainly characterized
by traditional low-productivity methods, by the old social structure and
values, and by the regionally based political institutions that developed
in conjunction with them.
In many instances the traditional society has persisted side by side
with modern economic activities conducted for limited economic purposes
by a colonial or quasi-colonial power. Politically, the building of an
effective centralized national state in opposition to the traditional
landed regional interests, the colonial power, or both-was a decisive
aspect of the pre-conditions period, and, almost universally, a necessary
condition for take-off.
The Take-Off
In the take-off the old blocks and resistances to steady growth
set up by the traditional society are finally by-passed or overcome.
The forces making for economic progress, which had hitherto yielded
limited bursts and enclaves of modern activity, expand and come to
dominate the society. Economic growth becomes its normal condition,
and the society expands as if governed by compound interest.
In Britain and the well-endowed parts of the world populated sub-
stantially from Britain (the United States, Canada, etc.) the proximate
stimulus to take-off was mainly, but not wholly, technological. In the
more general case the take-off awaited not only the build-up of adequate
transport facilities and a mitnimum technological basis for growth, but
also the emergence to. political power of a group prepared to regard the
modernization of the economy as serious high order business.
During the take-off the rate of effective investment and savings
may rise from, say, 5 per cent of the national income to 10 per cent or
more, although where heavy social overhead capital investment is required
to create the technical preconditions for take-off the investment rate in
e F.4- pre-conditions period could be higher thai 5 per cent as, for example,
in Canads before the 1890's and Argentina before 191. In such cases
capital imports usually formed a high proportion of total investment
in the preconditions period.
Key new industries expand rapidly, yielding profits a large proportion
of which are reinvested in now plants; and in turn the new industries
stimulate through their rapidly expanding requirement for factory workers,
the srrices to support them, and other manufactured goods a further
exparPO in urban areas and in other modern industrial plants. As agri-
culture is comercialied, new techniques spread to the countryside as
well, as increasing nunbers of farmers become persuaded that the new
methods are more productive than the old, and they acauiesce in the deep
changes they bring to ways of life. A new class of businessman, usally
private, sometimes public servants, emerges and directs the enlargirg
flow of investment. The economy exploits hitherto unused natural resouros
and methods of production. In a decade or two both the basic structure
3-5
3-6
of the economy and the social and political structure of the society
are transformed in such a way that a steady rate of economic growth can
be regularly sustained.
Maturity
There follows a long interval of sustained if fluctuating progresso
Some 10 to 20 per cent of the national income is steadily invested, permitting
output regularly and perceptibly to outstrip the increase in population.
Progresd becomes the normal condition, the normal expectation. The make-up
of the .economy changes increasingly as techniques improve, new industries
accelerate, and older industries level off. The economy finds its place
in the international econosy. Goods formerly imported are produced at
home; new import requirements develop, and new export commodities to
match them. The society makes such terms as it will with the recuirements
of modern efficient production, balancing off the new against the older
values and institutions or revising the latter in such ways as to support
rather than to retard the growth process. The old culture is not destroyed;
it merely adapts itself to the imperatives of regular industrial growth.
Some sixty years after take-off begins (say, forty years after the
end of take-off) maturity is attained. The economy, focussed during the
take-off on a relatively narrow complex of industry and technology has
extended its range into spore refined and technologically often more complex
processes. For example, there may be a shift in focus from the coal, iron,
and heavy engineering industries of the railway phase to machine tools,
chemicals, and electrical equipment, the transition through which Germany,
Britain, France, and the United States had passed by the end of the
nineteenth century or shortly thereafter.
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The maturing of the industrial system can be defined in more general
terms as the stage in which an economy demonstrates the capacity to move
beyond the original industries which powered its take-off and to absorb
and to apply efficiently over virtually the whole range of its resources
the most advanced fruits of the currently modern technology. This is the
stage in which an economy demonstrates that it has the technological and
entrepreneurial skills to produce not everything but anything that it
chooses to produce. It may lack, like contemporary Sweden and Switzerlind,
for example, the raw materials or other supply conditions required to
produce a given type of output economically; but its dependence is a
matter of economic choice or political priority rather than a techno-
logical or institutional necessity.
Empirically, the case for, roughly, a sixty-year interval between
take-off and maturity is reasonably goodt for Britain, from the 1780's to
the Crystal Palace Exposition of 1851; the United States, 1840-1900;
Germany, 1850-1914; Japan, 1880 to Pearl Harbor; Russian, 1890 to its
first nuclear explosion in 1949. Analytically, the explanation for some
such interval lies probably in the powerful arithmetic of compound interest
applied to the capital stock combined with the consequences for a society's
capacity to absorb modern technology of three successive generations living
under a regime where growth is the normal condition. But, clearly, no
dogmatism is justified about the exact length of the interval from take-off
to maturity.
Durable Consumers Goods and Services
As societies moved into maturity under conditions of twentieth century
technology two things happened: real income per head rose to a point where a
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large number of persons gained comand over consumption which transcended
basic food, shelter, and clothing and the structure of the working force
changed in ways which increased not only the proportion of the population
in white and blue collar jobs who are aware of and anxious to acquire the
consumption fruits of a mature economy. The sewing machine and then the
various electric-powered household gadgets were gradually diffused,
Yistorically, however, the decisive element has been the cheap automobile
which permitted extended metropolitan areas to develop beyond the orbit
of the street car and the bicycle, with all that followed in terms of
the content and expectations of suburban life.
For the United States the turning point was, perhaps, Henry Ford's
moving assembly line of 1913-14; but it was in the 1920's and again in
the postwar decade 1946-56 that this stage of growth was pressed
virtually to its logical conclusion. In the 1950's Western Europe
and Japan appear to have fully entered this phase, accounting substantially
for a momentum in their economies quite unexpected in the immediate
postwar years. The Soviet Union is technically ready for this stage,
and, by every sign, its citizens hunger for it; but Communist leaders
remain committed to tap off disoroportionate resources for military,
foreign policy, and investment purposes, in part because they would
face grave political and social problems of adjustment if the stage
of durable consumers goods were wholehcartedly launched in Russia.
Beyond, it is imposuible to prediot, except perhaps to observe
that Americans, at least, have behaved in the past decade as if, after
a point, diminishing relative marginal utility set in for durable consumers
goods; and they have chosen, at the margin, larger families, leisure,
and services.
The Nature of the American Case
In terms of the process of economic growth, the United States
belongs among a small group of lucky nations, notably, Canada, Australia,
3
and New Zealand. The luck of this group has consisted in two related
facts, one technical and the other cultural. Technically, the United
States enjoyed a balance between population and natural resources
(including fertile land) which permitted a relatively high standard of
welfare for each inhabitant even in pre-industrial days. Culturally,
these nations, building substantially on foundations derived from a
Britain already In transition towards modernization, have not had to
overcome to the same degree as the older societies which moved into
industrialization the heavy weight of low-productivity, labor-intensive
agriculture, feudal land structures, social organization, and values,
and the powerful regional political interests which have systematically
obstructed the process of modernization in so many parts of the world.
Despite the ease with which the transition to industrialization
could be made from the capitalist agricultural and commercial base of
eighteenth century America, the national experience was not wholly free
of certain more universal problems which underdeveloped societies have
confronted before take-off was launched. The Federalist coalition-
with its mixture of fears for national safety and its vision of a
unified secure national market and Industrialization--bears a family
resemblance to those coalitions of soldiers and merchants that in many
societies have created the national political base required for economic
growth; and, although Jefferson's vision of a commonwealth of independent
farmers extending out over a great fertile continent was uniauely American,
the resistance to the concept and implications of industrialization by
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agricultural groups has been a familiar feature of the pre-conditions
period in many societies. And, again, although slavery on the American
scene was a unique problem, many other societies have experienced struggle
between those cormmitted to industrialization and to the values of a
modern society against those whose way of life and political influence
in the nation hinged on the perpetuation, if not the extension, of a
more traditional agricultural system and the structure of classes and
values that went with it.
Moreover, the United States was, to a degree, delayed in its industriali-
zation by the very fact that rich .and was available in abundance for a
relatively small population. Urban labor was scarce and commanded a wage
rate that had to compete against what a man could produce with free
reasonably fertile land. From the late eighteenth century forward, relatively
high American wages established a premium on labor-saving machinery, from
the late eighteenth century forward, wherever industrial processes were
set in motion; but they also set a high threshold which had to be surmounted
before industry could take firm hold. Nevertheless, in the end, the existence
of a vast and fertile continent and the process of industrialization
powerfully converged.
Completion of Pre-Conditions and Take-Off
The convergence did not come fully into play until the second decade
of the American take-off in the 1850's. In that remarkable interval the
railway network was thrown out to the Middle West, binding the two northern
regions of the nation togethor, laying the basis for modern iron, coal, and
heavy engineering industries, and providing the pull to roatch the push of
European hunger and high food prices in bringing the flood of immigrants
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across the Atlantic. Before that time the Pmerican economy had shifted
the focus of enterprise almost rhythmically between the exploitation of the
land and the creation of the pre-conditions for industrial growth.
In the 1790's, in resoonse to European needs and high orices, the
production and exoort of foodstuffs and raw materials expanded and early
experiments with modern industry came to little, overwhelmed by the attractive-
ness of agricultural and commercial alternatives and inadequacies in management,
technical skill, and the wcrking force. In the first fifteen years of the
new century the fortunes of agriculture and trade were rendered erratic by
Napoleon's Blockade, Jefferson's Embargo, and the ITar of 1812; but the
vicissitudes of war gave American industry a protected market to try its
hand in substitution for British manufactured imports. With the arrival
of peace, the industrial war babies mainly collapsed, and there followed
the first of the three pre-Civil War surges into new land: 1816 to 1818;
the push of the 1830's for new cotton acreage and to exploit the regions
made accessible to the East by the Erie Canal; then the 1850's, with
the line filling out from Texas to the Dakotas and the excitement of
California and gold heightening the pressure to complete the continental
structure.
Meanwhile, industrialisation began slowly to acquire a solid American
base. In the 1820's there was built on the sturdy foundation provided by
Francis Cabot Lowell 's resilient var baby a viable modern cotton textile
industry in New England. Around that industry there occurred a general
regional industrial revolution, in much the same way that Britain's cotton
textile developments of 1783-1802 yielded a generalized take-off. This
momentum was maintained in the 1830's; and, in the 18h0's, with eastern
capital less drawn to the western lands and public improvements of the
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previous decade, the Northeast laid down its railway network and expanded
industry on a wider basis. From this eastern base, the westward leap was
made in the 1850's, with the railways not only bringing back to the coast
the products of the prairie states and not only creating the framework for
a national market but also setting in motion a steady requirement for a
heavy industrial output. Although a long road lay ahead, the American
take-off was completed by the eve of the Civil War.
As the economic transformations of 1815-60 were driven forward, they
reinforced changes in the whole cast of American life. The vision of
America as a land of equal opportunity assumed new dimensions as horizons
of land and of industrial growth expanded. And the lifting of horizons
extended to public schools and libraries, to Emerson's audiences, -to a nation's
"magnificent image" of its destiny which embraced but transcended the material
tasks at hand. The political process shifted into the hands of men of a
new generation, as the initial constitutional controversies gave way to
bread and butter matters, and issues of the locus of power raised by the
vast process of extensions tariffs, credit, public improvements.
Industry acquired a less secure base in the South, and that region
did not fully share in the spread of popular education and in the
distinctively American cultural currents in the North; but the South was
also a confident, prosperous, and expanding empire in the 1850's.
The Drive to Maturity
Like the Napoleonic Wars--which struck Britain at a comparable stage
of economic growth--the Civil War, even excluding its destructive impact on
the South, almost certainly reduced the rate of American economic development
below the level it would otherwise have attained in the 1860's. The demands
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of the military in the field stimulated meat-packing, the woolen industry,
and certain kinds of metal-working trades; but railway building was temporarily
slowed down and with it the industries railway construction directly and
indirectly sustained. 4
After the Civil lar the South, in a state of chaos, had slowly to re-
form its structure and gradually to make the pre-conditions for a regional
take-off which was solidly begun only some seventy years after Appomatox.
But the nation as a whole moved on after 1865 with accelerated momentum.
The railways were pushed out to the Pacific, and the railway era was brought
towards its close in two waves: the first wave of the early 1870's completed
the skeletal structure of the transcontinental railway system; and the
second, of the early 1880's, rounded it out with double tracking and
feeder lines.
Iron, coal, and hcavy engineering had led the way in the first phase
of American industrialization, responding to the stimulus of massive railway
construction. As industrialization proceeded, steel launched its great
expansion, and railway steel remained an important category of use;
but the emphasis was on larger, more efficient, and cheaper rolling stock,
and on steam engines rather than on rails. And the mass-produced lighter
engineering products came into their own: agricultural equipment, the type-
writer, and those two almost universal harbingers of the consumers durable
revolution--the sewing machine and the bicycle, Above all, with the rail-
ways laid, the nation became a unified continental market with powerful
incentives in it to organize production and distribution in vast centr-alized
units. American enterprise moved into industries using a wider range of
technology, a different and more skilled working force.
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Much in this industrial surge was based on radical improvements in
the metal-working machine tool, which comes as close to being a correct
symbol for tho second phase of American industrial growth. as the railway
is for the first. And, by the 1890's, the electricity, automobile, and
chemical industries, which were to play an extremely important role in
the third ohase, were commercially in being.
As the nineteenth century ends, then, the majestic are of geograhical
extension and industrial growth had filled out the continent and brought the
American economy to a stage of maturity. The full existing range of modern
technology was in the nation's 'rrasp and was being voraciously applied.
It was the many-faceted drama of these material developments that had
absorbed the national energies, served as a backdroo to its military and
foreign policy, and shaped a national style which, although distinctive,
was still linked to the nation's pre-industrial history.
I.'
Lincoln and Civil War
The Break in Continui
American growth, with its contrepuntal themes of geogrephical extension
end industrial exprnsion, unfolded in remrkable continuity, pres' nting to
Americans for r century a flow of exciting problems each in itself unique
but susceptible to solution by familiar and increasingly well-established
processes,
In the conflict over slavery, however, the nation faced a problem where
even substential modification of familinr process could not work. The
forces of geography, economics, and American history in its widest sense
decreed that the slave South would hAve to bec'me a minority region Ps the
nation extended to the West Coast. Feeling at stake the loss of a distinc-
tive way of life, the South preferred to risk going down in the manner to
which it hrd become accustomed rr ther than accept the future it believed
implicit in Lincoln's victory.
There is ambiguity in the events leading to the Civil War which makes
its inevitability still debetable. Could, for exemple, the North have so
behaved as to have mede it psychologically and politically possible for the
South to accept a limitation of slavery within its existing area? Could
the South have made better assessments of the underlying attachment of the
North to unity and of the North's military potentirl when mobilized end
thus assessed more accurately its likely fate in a military show-down?
But however temperate the North might have been, however willing to continue
to suppress the conflict between the principle of slavery and the principle
of majority rule in the new territories end, perhaps, it was impossible for
any American, North or South, to predict persansively how the North would
react when it confronted the brutal fact of national disunity at Fort
Sumter. In any case, after a decade of experiment with formulae, no one
had defined in 1860 a politicelly viable extension of the secuence of com-
promises over slavery which had begun in the negotiation of lenguage for
the Declaration of Independence and had run through the Constitutional
Convention down to the Missouri Compromist of 1850.
Thus Lincoln, like the Founding Fathers, faced a problem of gross
discontinuity, the necessity for radical innovrtion which could be mo
longer postponed; and, like them and like Washington in the Farewell Address,
he proved capable of articulating in powerful abstractions the dilemma
which the ne tion confronted and the solution he proposed.
The Shape of the Dilema
There were two issues: national unity and the status of the Negro in
American society. Lincoln evoked and held with remarkable firmness to a
particuler view of their connection. He was for national unity and against
slavery; but he refused to permit himself the indulgence of identifying the
two issues. He was prepared openly to compromise on the moral issue of
slavery in the interests of national unity; and he did not let himself be-
lieve that the Negro's status in American life could be brought into con-
formity with Americnn social values by the simple fact of victory in w:.r.
Emancipation was, indeed, brought about as a by-product of the war and its
conduct; but Lincoln knew that the nation confronted a long and painful
evolutionary process to which Northern victory in the war might contribute
but which it did not guarantee. In short, Lincoln denied himself the
emotional luxury of a crusade,
Since the Constitutional Convention there has been no major political
figure other than Lincoln who manipulated and balanced with such clarity
the mixture of conflicting abstrect gotis on which Americrn life has been
built. And, in all its consequences for his own time and later, in this
lay his genius.
Among other things Lincoln was from his youth a thoroughly professional
American politician. He rose to eminence and power on the slavery issue,
to which he brought every quality of his spirit, his perception, and his
ambition. The position he devised was extremely powerful politically
beceause it was his insistent separation of unity from abolition oand his,
priority for the former which held the border states in the Union and made
victory vestly easier if, indeed, it did not make it possible at all.
The ultimate power of Lincoln's crticula tion of the meaning of the
Civil Wer erose, however, not merely from his sturdy separation of the
constitutional issue of unity from the moral issue of slavery. His posi-
tion gained its final stature from the special ideological dimension he
gave to the concept of unity. He knew thrt in mary panrts of the nation
the question of unity was tied up with special interests of great political
power--for example, the new Wesfs determination to keep the route to New
Orleans within the Union. Those interests and pressures he fully exploited.
But he did not stop there. While evposing the moral blemish implicit in
the history and status of the Negro in Americe, from his First Inaugural
onward Lincoln reaffirmed the concept of the United States as a nation
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whose survival in unity had a trnnscendent meaning. He recommitted the
nation to continuity with its old sense of an on-going mission, a special
evolving process imperfect but ultimately governed by moral nnd religious
values.
The Resumption of Process
The nation could not sustain the tension ?nd balance of Lincoln's
position nny ore than it sustained the mood ,nd terms of the Constitutional
Convention. The conflicts briefly synthesized to produce a Constitution,
fell back into the arena of national politics, to be refought and compro-
mised again and again. Sinilarly, the interests and passions briefly
synthesized by Lincoln fell out into their component prrts. The painful
sequence of the Rec-%nstruction end its failure was played out; and the
status of the Negro in terms of ideal Americ'n values was left very slowly
to evolve, case by case, in experimental processes. Nevertheless, the
crisis of redical innovetion was passed; viable rules for American
political life hnd been made and accepted; the Union was preserved; the
nation could, without unacceptable cost, lapse back to its instinctive
operating style.
But an awareness of the possibility of failure, of tragedy, and of
grrndeur in Americnn life was somehow, somewhere, to a degree, left be-
hind beneeth the surface of the triumphant drive to continentl unity and
industrial maturity; an awareness thvt the comforting, successful routines
of progress could And might again be broken; and awareness that the real
moral issues behind the convenient nttionr. process of compromise migyht again
have to be confronted.
II. The National Interest and Natioal Stle in
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II. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL STYLE IN VAR AND DIPLOMACY
Power and Ideolog in Nineteenth Century Diplomacy
American diplomacy in the nineteenth century reflected accurately
the three major elements which shaped the nation's contours and were
synthesized in Washington's counsel: the commitment to nationhood in
terms of democratic ideals; the Constitutional framework for the compromise
of regional and other special interests; and the initial absorption of
national energies and purposes in the process of growth within a fertile,
empty continent. Out of these commitments and interests, the nation in
the nineteenth century fashioned for the conduct of its diplomacy a
thoroughly workable process capable of a rationale the conflicts. of which
with the nation's moral conwitments were at least livable. This process
unfolded in a sporadic series of negotiations and pronouncements which
were 'closely linked to the problems and possibilities which emerged from
the arena of power in which the nation found itself.
The Nineteenth Centu A rena
In the nineteenth century a considerable area of the relations between
national states was conducted on the basis of international law and common
law understandings quite independent of the force that could be brought to
bear by one country against another. Despite important exceptions, notably
in colonial- areas, the rights of persons to travel, the rights of nationals
when in foreign countries, and the conduct of international trade and
capital flows were widely ruled by precedents for which there was
international consensus and respect.
In the major issues of diplomacy, however, the interplay of force and
potential force was never for from the surface of things, constituting the
framework within which diplomacy proceeded. The pattern of world power
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was determined by the fact that Britain emerged in 1815 as the sole nation
to have moved beyond its take-off into sustained industrial growth. In the
early nineteenth century, at the peak of its power, Britain did not directly
dominate the world; but it dominated the seas and the maritime fringes
of the great continents; and its paramount role in trade, shipping, and
the flows of international capital re-inforced the influence of its flexible
naval strength. The inner reaches of the continents were either preo-occupied
with the processes of transformation towards modern status, as in Europe,
or still caught up in essentially traditional societies, as in Asia, the
Middle East, and Afri"s. A limited British hegemony was the basis of the
century of respite from major international war which f ollowed 1815. But
in the course of the nineteenth century increased effective power was being
generated in Franco, Germany, Rt:sia, and Japan; many limited engagements
were fought or barely avoided; and at no time from 1787 forward was the
United States freed of an environment of active or latent major power
conflict.
This fact was recognized and accept( d from the beginning by those
charged with American foreign affairs. The working rule of American
diplomacy came to be to exploit major power conflicts in order to
advance direct American interests. Victory in the War of Independence
itself hinged on an American alliance with France which was a by-product of
Anglo--French power conflict. And after the nation was formed, the success
of its diplomacy continued to depend on a systematic exploitation of the
continuing power struggle among the great European states.
Scavenging on the Fringe of the World Arena
Once, at least, in the War of 1812, American scavenging on the fringe
of the big arena met only limited success at best. But it yielded
good results in the whole series of Anglo-Amrican negotiations from Jay's
Treaty of 1794 to the Alaska boundiry arbitration of 1903. Anglo-American
tension developed from time to time, even as late as the Veneszuela Boundary
Dispute of 1895-1896; but the underlying security interests of Britain and
the military potential of the United States, if ultimately challenged,
defined a fairly spacious working area for diplomats.
A United States virtually unarmed (exept for the distracted Civil
War years) could bargain on a basis of equality with a Britain controlling
the seas, due to the vulnerability of Canada and the growing sense that,
militarily as well as economically, the maintenance of the British world
position required a United States that was not actively hostile and which
was potentially at least a counterforce to Britain's continental rivals.
Britain's strength was 'sufficient to prevent any superior power or power
bloc from crystallizing in Europe against it, but it was not sufficient to
conduct a second active front in the Western Hemisphere; and, as the century
wore on, and the weight of Germany was progressively felt in the diplomacy
of the Old World, Canning's concept of the New World's balancing role, enun-
ciated during the negotiations leading to the Monroe Doctrine, took on a
new vitality in British minds.
The United States benefited in other directions from the military
preoccupations of European powers. As nearly as one can reconstruct
Napoleon's thought, as war was resumed in 1803 after the brief Peace
of Amiena, Jefferson was offered the Louisiana Territory by the French
to avoid its occupation by the British; and Seward was offered Alaska because
the Russians, with memories of the Crimean War, wished an American buffer
between Siberia and British Canada. The ease with which the American
continent was consolidated, with substantial recourse to arms only in the
Mexican War and against the Indians, the easy acceptance by the world's
powers of the Monroe Doctrine, and even the possibility of conducting
the Civil War without dangerous interference from other nations, hinged
on a fortunate relationship between American interests and the interplay
of military power on the world scene during the nineteenth century.
The naticaal tendency to exploit in its own interest and without
the use of American force the possibilities opened by the interplay of
power on the world scene was also evident in the one area beyond the
Western Hemisphere where American interests became seriously engaged
in the nineteonth century--the Far East. In China, where the nation
developed considerable commercial interests after 1815, American diplomacy
moved in behind the British victory in the Anglo-Chinese 'War of 1839-18t42
to negotiate in 18h4, in the treaty of Wanghia, a favorable commercial
arrangement arrangement including explicit extraterritorial rights.
Caleb Cushing combined a degree of threat with his diplomacy, but
the Chinese, resigned after their defeat by Britain to the disturbing
fact of enlarged trade with the outside world, were mainly concerned to
avoid excessive unilateral rights accruing to any one power.
Commodore Perry's show of force initiated the opening of Japan to
trade in the treaty of 1854; but the opening was extremely narrow until
Townsend Harris, in the wake of the major European powers, negotiated
the commercial treaty and convention (1857-1858), arguing along the
following linest 5
Harris, unaccompanied by force, secured this treaty
by pointing out emphaticaly to the Japanese: (1)
that the Government of the United States prohibited
the acquisition of territory in the Far East--it would
not even admit into the Union countries, like Hawaii,
which had requested admission; (2) that Great Britain and
Russia, converging on Asia south and north might seize
Japanese territory as a base of operations; (3) that
Japan might best protect her menaced homeland by
'going western' and training herself tuader American
tutelage to meet the European powers in their own
manner; she should therefore give up the policy of
exclusion, admit all foreigners freely to her trade,
and preserve her own independence and integrity by
playing off their rivalries against each other....
These were not the representations of a naive or innocent power.
The Role of Idealism
The acceptance of power politics and the reality within it of an
American national interest did not end the problem of reconciling American
diplomacy and American ideals even among those most professionally concerned.
There was, for example, the famous muted duel between Monroe and John
Cuincy Adams.
As multiple pressures converged on the American goverment for a fresh
definition of the American position within the Western Hemisphere, the
President (and Calhoun) were tempted to lean, in part at least, on an
ideological identification with the newly independent Latin American
states and on a kind of liberation doctrine with respect to Oreece and
other current victims of the Holy Alliance. Looking south within the
Hemisphere, Adams took a dim view of the nrospects for democracy in
states with so powerful a feudal and clerical heritage. Looking east
out over the seas, he counseled that the nation should accept the existence
of two systems of states, one American, the other European, applying to its
ideological sympathies that self-discipline it was seeking to imoose on the
European powers within the estern Hemisphere. Although traces of ideo-
logical thought and impulse can be found in the language of the Monroe
Doctrine, Adams won,6 confirming the spirit of Washington's Farewell .Pddress,
and setting the framework for American diplomacy down to the 1890's.
America in its view of the world did not abandon its old sense of
mission and destiny. It used that conception as a rationale for a
purposeful, evn ruthless, extension of American power over the face
of the continent; and it preserved something of the conviction that,
in building and maintaining an America more or less loyal to the principles
on which it was founded, the nation was performing an act of international,
if, indeed, not of religious, significance. And from Franklin's encourage-
ment by the French view of the universal meaning of the American Revolution,
down through the Manchester workingmen's message to Lincoln, to the flow of
hopeful immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe as the nineteenth
century ended this conception was not without substance.
During its first century the nation generally accepted its good
fortune as a natural gift, without understanding fully its foundation
in the peculiar structure of the world arena of military power and the
American relation to it. After 1815 in support of foreign policy only
the Mexican Var called for the expenditure of blood, and only Alaska,
for substantial treasure. Popular illusions could persist.
However, these illusions were not generally shared by tmerican
officials charged with American foreign policy in the nineteenth century.
The Presidents and Secretaries of State who consolidated the continental
structure and made the Monroe Doctrine stick were knowledgeable men.
It was no accident that the American Secretaries of State included some
of the ablest and shrewdest political minds the nation produced: Jay,
Jeffer'son, Randolph, Marshall, Madison, Ionroe, John Quincy Adams, Clay,
Van Buren, Webster, Calhoun, Buchanan, Seward, Hamilton Fish, and Blaine.
The issues of American diplomacy in the nineteenth century were often of
first-rate domestic political importance, touching vital and self-evident
national and regional interests, determining the geographical contours
of the nation and its status in the Western misphr. They were taken
seriously and generally handled with skill.
On the great continental and heispheric issues the national diplomatic
tradition was, then, purposeful and thoroughly profeseional; and within that
tradition there developed operating methods wihich geared into the living
machinery of American political life.
6The Making of the Professional Diplomatic Tradition
Diplomacy in a FederalD
From the earliest moves in American diplomacy there became evident certain
persistent characteristics of the national style in foreign affairs, a style
deriving from a government of diffused authority, serving a nation to which
diplomacy was permitted to be third order business. A contemporary American
Secretary of State finds mch familiar---and, for the most part, painfully
familiar-in the problems confronted by Livingston, Jay, Jefferson, Randolph,
and Pickering from 1775 to 1800.
The Department of State emerged in stages from a comittee of the Conti-
nental Congress-the Committee of Secret Correspondence (1775-1777), after
1777 the Committee for Foreign Affairs. That committee was by no means
accorded a monopoly et Congressional responsibility for foreign affairs:
"During the years 1779 and 1780, at least fifteen different special committees
were elected to carry out functions which pertained wholly to the field of
foreign affairs. The result was a constant tug of war at home between the
radical and conservative factions of these committees, with a corresponding
diversity of instructions, which made for uncertainty of policy abroad." 7
The situation was somewhat improved by the creation in 1780 of the post of
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, first held by Robert Livingston. The day-to-day
conduct of military affairs had long since been delegated to Washington before
a Congressional Committee was prepared to surrender its operating prerogatives
in foreign policy.
Although Livingston moved with vigor to establish some order in the
nation's diplomacy and in his department's relation to Congress, he was a
harrassed man: "The principal defect in the situation in which Livingston
found himself was the interference of Congress. The duties of the Secretary
had never been clearly defined and he was never given a free hand in the conduct
of foreign relations. Congress passed resolutions directing the policy
which foreign ministers were to pursue, and even dealt directly with foreign
representatives in Philadelphia. Special committees were constantly appointed
which infringed upon the powers supposedly delegated to the Secretary." 8
Even so self-disciplined an eighteenth century gentleman as John Jay
was moved to visions of (tempered) violence when he contemplated Congress
from his post in Madrid in 1780. "I would throw stones, too, with all my
heart," he wrote, "if I thought they would hit only the committee without
injuring the members of it. Till now I have received but one letter from
them, and that was not worth a farthing, though it conveyed a draft for one
hundred thousand pounds sterling on the bank of hope. One good private
correspondent would be worth twenty standing committees, made of the wisest
heads in America, for the purpose of intelligence." 9 When, in 1784, Jay took
over from Livingston, his prestige and ability brought a somewhat better
balance into the relations between the Secretary and Congress; and the adoption
of the Constitution gave Jefferson and his successors in the post of Secretary
of State a standing at least superficially more reassuring than that of
agent for a Congressional committee.
Jefferson's central problem was different from that of Livingston
and Jay, but not less familiar in the story of American diplomacy. The
Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton, sought to make foreign policy. Hamil-
ton's influence with the President was so great that Jefferson finally
insisted on resigning. Hamilton not only inaugurated the tradition in the
American Cabinet of under-cutting the Secretary of State but he also
introduced the British to the engaging possibility of receiving confidential
information and advice from one department of the Ameriean government on how
to deal with another.
In somewhat different ways Randolph and Pickering each learned another
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perennial lessen of American diplomacy--that, in the end, the Secretary of
State is the President's instrument and must expect over-riding interventions
in small and in large matters. Contrary to his advice, Randolph saw Jay
chosen to conduct the treaty negotiations with Britain, and his rude and
hasty denunciation by Washington for alleged misconduct led to his resignation;
and the contentious Pickering was fired by Adams to clear the way for peace-
making with France.
Lastly, an unending theme of life in the Department of State makes an
early appearance. As early as 1782, Livingston discovered that his expenses
exceeded his salary by 75 per cent. In the annals of the Department of State
those Secretaries capable of getting through the Congress the increases in
pay and allowances that systematically lagged behind costs of living have
a special place of honor.
The Scale of theDplomatic Operation
The ease with which American interests could be protected in the world
arena of the nineteenth century was reflected in the scale of American
diplomatic operations. Two clerks worked for Livingston, a Chief Clerk
and his seven subordinates served John Quincy Adams, and there was a staff
of under 100 in the Department of State as late as the turn of the century.
As the century wore on, the number of missions abroad increased and
with it the number of incoming and outgoing messages* The typewriter
superseded the painfully transcribed and copied dispatch, wireless superseded
for mary purposes sea-pouch; but there was a true continuity in the Department
of State's business. For the most part it handled a steady flow of two-e.ay
communications concerning the commercial and other private problems in which
American citizens traveling or conducting business abroad became involved;
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and it noted and filed the endless flow of dispatches forwarded by those on
foreign service, describing the state of- things in the parts of the world to
which they were assigned. Rules and precedents grew up or were adapted
from the corpus of received diplomatic practice and applied by the Department
to these situations.
The nature of this routine diplomatic business is dramatised by the
traditional role of the Chief Clerk (later Assistant Secretary), the ranking
permanent officer of the Department down into the twentieth century.
He kept records, knew the precedents and procedures, superintended the
drafting of replies, and, at his best, was himself an expert in precise
diplomatic drafting. Two Chief Clerks, 1-villiam Hunter and Alvey Adee,
spanned between them the years 1829-192-, Ades taking over in 1886; Hunter
served the Department of State for fifty-seven years of his life; Adee, for
fifty-four. They were the masters of the routine business of foreign affairs,
the keepers of precedent, the indispensable technical advisers to the flow
of men brought in from politics or elsewhere to manage the Department for
relatively short periods. Each found himself for short periods in de facto
control of the Department, and Adee played a minor role in the drafting
of the Open Door notes; but these men, and those they symbolise, were not
makers of foreign policy. Although they often had their own views,10 they
were devoted technicians in the process of day-to-day dealings between
sovereign states; and they were, above all, the personalised memory of
the nation in these matters.
Down to the First World War (and even to 1939) the great acts of foreign
policy--the issues which get into the books on diplomatic history--were so
few and far between that they were handled personally by the Secretary of
State, usually in intimate consultation with the President, or directly-
handled by the President himself. At the most, each administration is associated
with only two or three such major diplomatic affairs, usually in the form of a
negotiated treaty but twice (the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door) a uniM
laterally enunciated statement of American policy. In government parlance,
the Secretary of State (if not the President himself) could be the desk officer
on major matters, such was their occasional character; and the sequence of
American diplomacy in the nineteenth century is marked by long passages in
which able Secretaries of State, such as Henry Clay and Edward Livingston,
found no task worthy of their talents.
The Social Origin of the Diplomatic
Under such circumstances the average among those drawn into the professional
vork of foreign affairs was unlikely to represent the highest levels of ability
or vigor in American life. The professional's day--tomday jobs were basically
clerical or social in character. The diplomatic officer was one who preferred
a career off the beaten track 6f major national concern; and many men were
apparently strongly influenced to enter the Foreign Service by a desire to
live abroad for a time. Down to the Root reforms of 1905-*1906, appointments
were generally a highly political affair, emphasising the casual dilettante
character of the Department of State's routine work.
The diaries of Joseph Grew catch the mood of the transitional days,
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After a post-graduate period
of travel and big game hunting abroad, Grew's boyhood taste for the sea matured
in a desire to join the Foreign Service. In addition, Grew appears to have
perceived that foreign affairs would grow in importance over the span of his
career. His appointment was brought about by the intervention of the President:
* . . . Then Alford Cooley, Assistant Attorney General and a friend
of my family, who was close to President Theodore Roosevelt and a
member of his celebrated 'Tennis Cabinet,' spoke to the President
of my ambitions. The reply was always the same: 'Too much political
pressure. I can't do it.' One day Cooley had a brilliant thought. Ie
went out for a hike with the President and told him of my adventure
with the tiger in China. Mr. Roosevelt listened with interest and
finally pulled out his notebook, saying: 'By Jove, I'll have to do
something for that young man,' and the very next day, March 1, 1906,
my appointment as Third Secretary of the Embassy in Mexico City was
announced. That tiger-shooting was the only examination I ever took,
and what fun I had some twenty years later mhen, as Chairman of the
Examining Board for the Foreign Service, I used to say to the candi-
datest 'You gentlemen have a very easy time entering the Service.
All you have to do is answer a few questions. I had to shoot a tiger.'
When later I saw President Roosevelt in Washington in 1906 he
said: 'I have put you in the Service because I believe in you, but
I can't reconnend it as a permanent career. There is no career;
it's all politics. I will keep you there as long as I am President
but my successor will in all Probability throw you out to make way
for political henchmen, and then where will you be?' I replied:
'Mr. President, I'll take the chance. We must develop a career.
As a great nation with steadily expanding E!rests abroad we must,
if only as a simple business proposition, develop and maintain a
professional service, Otherwise we shall be steadily handicapped
in competition with other nations.'11
The texture of life and work in the American Foreign Service at this stage
is illustrated in these further entries from Grew's diaries:
. . . . One summer afternoon. . .in the good old times when our
chanceries generally closed at one oclock for the day, a colleague
from another post wandered into the Chancery in Berlin and found me
alone, hard at work. His amasement was quite genuine. 'What on
earth are you doing?' he asked. 'Oh,' said I rather shamefacedly,
'I'm getting up a resume of all the military cases involving
Americans of German birth since the beginning of the Empire, so
as to be able to show by graphs the percentage of cases in which we
have been able to get our naturalised citizens out of the German
Army and the particular circumstances which have brought failure
or success. It may be useful as a future guide.' INy colleague
regarded me with real pity. 'Cut it out,' he said (how well I
remember his words because they certainly cut me at the time),
'work won't get you anywhere. Only politics count in our service.
Better enjoy yourself while you're in it.' That was the guiding
spirit in those days. 1 2
But the music, dancing and dining were not the only form of
sport of those halcyon days. Ve played tennis daily on the courts
at Ghexireh, and another form of sport once led me, unconsciously,
into a situation of gravest danger. In the small native villages
were erected towers of dried mud which served to attract multitudes
of wild pigeons and were so constructed that the natives could
collect and use the guano for fertilising their fields. But among
the wild birds were many domestic pigeons which belonged to the
villagers and were carefully protected. It was a usual form of
sport among the officers of the resident British regiments to
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organise shooting parties to these villages and occasionally I
was included. I did not know, however, that acute opposition
to these shoots had been gradually mounting among the natives
who resented the fact that their domestic pigeons, difficult
sometimes to distinguish from the wild ones, were killed and
towards the end of my assignment in -Cairo this feeling had
approached the boiling point. It must have been but a few
weeks before our final departure from Egypt that I joined one
of these shooting parties to a village called Denshawi. No
outward sign of mutiny among the natives was then visible,
but my horror was great when a few weeks later, in France, I
read of the historic and terrible a1ensh Incident" in which
the villagers mobbed just such a shooting party as those I had
so recently participated in, kiled a British captain, and, as I
remember it, either killed or seriously injured several other
officers* Lord Cromer was absent at the time and Findlay was
in charge. His responsibility was great, for he had to make an
example of the murderers or risk further disturbances. I think
that four men were hanged and four flogged, alternately, on a
scaffold erected in the village where the assault had taken
place. It was a grim reprisal and it excited grim repercussions
in England. Upon the wisdom of the sentence, I do not presume
to pass judgment. Presumably the officers knew something of the
risk they were incurring in carrying on those shoots, and perhaps,
I, albeit unwittingly, had shared in a provocation which never
ought to have been permitted. It was --- years before I could
forget the shock of that terrible news*
Such was the fragile but still manageable world in which at the turn of
the century American diplomacy operated as an increasingly fascinated observer
but as a narrowly limited participant.
The Silent Observer
Professional American diplomacy evolved at two levels; one the level
of consular business, the other that of major power negotiation. With
respect to the latter, the American diplomat was in a peculiar position;
for he had to relate a narrow agenda of American interests such as boundaries,
navigation rights, fisheries, and the Indians, to the endless and complex
interplay of the balance of power struggle in Europe.
In 1794 John Quincy Adams defined the role of the American diplomat as
follows: "It is our duty to remain the peaceful and silent though sorrowful
spectators of the European scene." 1 5 Sorrowful or not, the American
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representative abroad had to become the detached analyst of a set of relation-
ships which it was the interest of his nation intermittently to exploit while
avoiding sustained involvement. The diplomacy of the major powers was a matter
of knowledge and concern to only a handful of Americans; nevertheless it was
the matrix within which the major continental and hemispheric interests of
the United States had to be pursued. The flow of American diplomacy was
generally "peaceful and silent;" but when, on relatively rare occasion, a
major issue of diplomacy did arise, it moved quickly into the highest level
of politics within the Executive Branch and the Senate, spilling over
from time to time into the still less orderly arena of party politics and
public opinion.
The skills demanded of the American diplomat were, then, skills untypical
of the American style as it was formed in the course of the nineteenth century;
for his profession demanded patience, detached observation, reflection, restraint,
and a cosmopolitan outlook. The good American diplomat could be neither a
moralist nor an activist. In the eighteenth century, when many American
leaders were still intimately bound up with the culture and manners of
Europe. American with such skills emerged rather naturally from the center
of affairs; but as time passed, the man of diplomacy became increasingly
untypical, a transition symbolized by the shift of the Adamses--from John
to Henry-from the center to the margins of American life. Nevertheless,
American life had the resource, variety, and resilience to man an effective
diplomacy over the century and a quarter after independence of Britain was
asserted.
7Military Force in an Isolated Democracy
The Sporadic Seqence of Miita Affairs
In the nineteenth century setting of world power, the initial concept
of the national interest applied to diplomacy yielded a series of deceptively
easy achievements. The United States. expanded to the Pacific, settled con-
venient boundaries with Canada and, in the end, with Mexico as well; and
acquired Alaska. It progressively diminished the power and influence of
European states in the Wetern Hemisphere and it maintained a status of
commercial equality in Japan and ChIna ith the exercise of minimum national
effort. Moreover, the nation fought and survived the Civil War, which left
its diplomatic position in the world enhanced despite the French adventure
in Mexico and the British temptations to intervene.
Applied to military affairs, the same concept of the national interest
yielded a somewhat different and mare uneasy result. A very small military
establishment is much larger than an ample Department of State, and a small
war has a larger impact on the national consciousness than a most substantial
diplomatic affair. Thus the nation had some 21,000 men on active duty in
the militarily somnolent year 1850, more Americans than the Department of
State employed at the peak of its post World War II responsibilities; and
the Mexican War was a major event for the nation and its political life
whereas the Monroe Dotrine was enunciated with scarcely a ripple of public
interest or concern.
Inevitably, a sporadic applioction of military force left a somewhat
deeper set of marks on the nation than a not less irregular flow of diplomacy,
Out of the nineteenth century there emerged and persisted a striking
degree 6f consistency in the military performance of American society.
War came with the nation unprepared, against a long background of neglect
for its military apparatus; severe and bloody reverses were suffered in the
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early stages, but as the struggle proceeded the nation learned the peculiar
tasks of the particular war and mobilized the resources, energies, and talents
necessary to see it through to victory in the field; and in the end victory
was complete--except in the War of 1812, when Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo
and Jackson's victory at New Orleans permitted an end of hostilities without
elaborate soul-searching as to the meaning and purpose of the enterprise
and the character of its results.
Tocqueville's judgment on the military performance of democratic societies
fitted well the Azierican case:16
I am therefore of the opinion that when a democratic people
engages in a war after a long peace, it incurs much more risk
of defeat than ary other nation; but it ought not easily to be
cast down by its reverses, for the chances of success for such
an army are increased by. the duration of the war. When a war
has at length, by its long continuance, roused the whole commnity
from thei' peaceful occupations and ruined their minor undertakings,
the same passions that made them attach so much importance to the
maintenance of peace will be turned to ar.w I 1ar, after it has de-
stroyed all modes of speculation, becomes itself the great and sole
speculation, to which all the ardent and ambitious desires that
equality engenders are exclusively directed. Hence it is that the
selfsame democratic nations that are so reluctant to engage in
hostilities sometimes -perform prodigious achievements when once
they have taken the field.
From Valley Forge through. Bull Run down to Cuba and beyond, the United
States paid heavily in the first instance for its unpreparedness; but in the
end victory was aehieved. Then the nation turned to its postwar tasks with
civil instruments; the military machine was ruthlessly cut back, excepting a
small hard core of professional soldiers shunted off the main paths of American
life. The ardent and ambitious, looking back on war as a transient period of
misery, adventure, or both, but not vitally linked to the main tasks of the
society, turned wholeheartedly to the roles of civil life.
The Rationale for Military-Policy
In the nineteenth century there was a crude rationality in the American
pattern of acutely disjointed military performance. The s elf-evident national
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taskswere to establish an independent nation, confirm its external status,
extend its boundaries to the Pacific, and settle the issue and the terms of
national unity when that unity was challenged.
The Revolutionary ar, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil
War all arose from the consolidation of the nation and its physical extension
on this continent; and each of those major military engagements appeared as
a once-for-all adventure. After the Revolution there was certainly scepticism
in Europe of the viability of the new loosely struatured, democratic American
nation, and there was a recurrent eagerness to exploit its schisms and poten-
tial sources of fragmentation. But there was no serious thought of returning
the United States to colonial status. The War of 1812 confirmed this view,
and it reconciled the United States to the continued British presence in
Canada. The war with Mexico fixed the southern Aerican border and opened the
way to the Pacific; and by 1865 it was evident that the issue of the nation's
continental integrity would not again be raised in the foreseeable future.
In 1865 Sherman, one of the great comnanders of the century, took his
headquarters to St. Louis not merely to escape the pressures and intrigues
of peacetime Washington but also to be closer to his only foreseeable field
of operations--against the Indian tribes.
It was natural, then, that after fighting the first major modern war
in the 18601s the United States should dismantle its military machine once
again and maintain an establishment adequate merely for. dealing with the last
groups of resistant Indians. In one sense, with the boundaries firm, the
way cleared for the transcontinental railways, and the South back in the
Union, the causes of .war over the previous century of American experience
had been eliminated by 1865.
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More than that, the United States had fought its two major wars over
issues where total victory was meaningful-u'colonial status or independence;
two nations or one. At one level of the nationts rememered history there
was reason for its tendency to regard war as an instrument for settling
issues once and for all.
Put another way, so long as the nation took the view of its relationship
to the Eurasian power balance enunciated in Washington's Farewell Address,
and given form and structure in the Monroe Doctrine, there was no truly
persuasive basis for a substantial American military establishment; for
that view assumed that the power struggle would continue indecisively
in Eurasia, leaving British control of the seas intact; that potential
American strength, retaliatory power, and common interests would render
the British non-aggressive; and that, therefore, with the balance so
peculiarly favorable, the nation could enjoy not only a series of easy
diplomatic victories but also could do so wile maintaining no substantial
professional force and no adequately trained militia in being. Vho, indeed,
was there to fight under such assumptions?
Those who counseled the nation to maintain a more substantial permanent
military establishment thus faced a difficult problem in advocacy. Of course,
it could be--and was-f-argued that human nature had not changed and that war would
come again as it had in the past; that the United States lived in a world of
competing national states and that force in being was required to protect
American interests.
Colonel Richard Delafield argued on the eve of the Civil War: ". it
requires
/ -no stretch of the imagination to look forward to a combination of the
powers of those antagonistic forms of government to attempt to check the
growing influence that constantly, though slowly, tends to crush the ruling
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principle, and with it involve the governors, nobles, aristocracy, and monarchs
in ruin. Their self-preservation must always cause them to look with anxiety
and apprehension to our growth, and ere it becomes all powerful to combine
in some way to protect themselves...."7 Eiut despite the resonance of
Delafield's image in American folklore, it took a very great stretch of the
imagination to accept any such danger as sufficiently real and urgent to
justify substantial current expenditures out of taxation. Although the
ideological trend in Europe after 1815 fluctuated; the trend was strongly
in favor of democratic principle. The particular form of danger to the
United States postulated by Delafieldo--wan ideologically motivated hostile
coalition-&waned; on the other hand, Americans found it difficult to grasp
the nature of the power equilibrium on which the nation's good fortune rested,
and the role of British strength within it. Down to Captain Mahan no American
military man developed even a reasonably clear concept of the strategic
assumptions with respect to Eurasia on which the American position was based
and on which a rational military policy could be built. The general grounds
for maintaining a "respectable defensive posture" were too abstract and remote
to persuade Congress to allocate the requisite resources in the face of
alternative urgent claims.
On several occasions, in the immediate aftermath of war and, with memories
of unpreparedness and its costs still fresh, Congress exhibited an apparent
willingness to maintain a national military force, usually along lines
consonant with Washington's five-point program of 1783; that is, a limited
but well-prepared professional standing army and navy, a militia organized
efficiently on the basis of a national plan, the maintenance of adequate
stockpiles of military stores, the maintenance of appropriate military
instruction, and provision for the manufacture of selected military production, 1 8
Iut the impulse quickly subsided with no specific enemy in mind; and the
nation's forces were cut back radically.
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Military and Civil Power
There was another dimension to the problem of maintaining American
military force in being; namely, that the American political tradition was
hostile to a substantial regular establishment. Degrees of fear, suspicion,
and dislike of standing armies arose from multiple sources. The cumulative
lessons and prejudices derived from the struggle for liberty and the earlier
difficulties over the quartering of British troops in colonial America.
A substantial national military establishment would evidently strengthen
the power of the federal over the state establishments; and so the state
authorities fought and won the battle over the Militia Act of 1792, leaving
the reserve forces of the nation under diffuse control and indifferently
trained and organized. The values and organisation of the professional military
appeared at times to clash with those to which the majority of Americans were
committed; and, as the nation expanded its industry and trade, military out-
lays and the concept of war itself clashed with the vision of endless
material progress which took on reality as American growth unfolded. Hunting-
ton puts this position sharply as follows: 1 9
Jeffersonian hostility to the military had been largely
confined to the limited institution of the standing army as a
threat to republican government. Jacksonian hostility had
broadened this to opposition to a military easte as the enemy
of popular democracy. Business pacifism now expanded it still
further so that the conflict was no longer one of institutions
or of social groups but the fundamental struggle of two entirely
different ways of life.
Huntington's view, taken by itself, proves too much. It is true that
excepting perhaps in the ante-bellum South, no substantial group in the
United States has found in military life much positive attraction for the
long pull. The nation was committed to civil values and goals, and it wished
to minimise its military concerns and outlays. On the other hand, when it
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confronted a problem believed to require force for its resolution, the nation
did not draw back. The nation's performance was better attuned to reality
then to its articulated ideology. In both principle and in fact it steadily
recognised the need to provide for the national security. It successfully
provided the facilities and, in the widest sense, the incentives to create
and maintain an adequate corps of professional military men; it went to war
when the national interest was judged to require the use of force; and both
sides saw through a bloody Civil 1'ar in which great issues appeared to be
involved.
The nation exh?44ed, it is true, an eagerness to minimise its military
outlays in times of peace; but why should it have done otherwise under the
fortunate strategic circumstances of the nineteenth century? Upton, of
course, was correct even within that century in arguing that the nation's
intersar carelessness with its military establishment was costly; but it was
most costly in the one case where avoidance. of cost was most difficult.--
namely, in the Civil War. Put another way, Delafield, Upton,- and the other
nineteenth century Americans who argued the case for preparedness seem
important only from a twentieth century perspective. Although they correctly
sensed, without supplying a satisfactory rationale, that continued loyalty
to the persistent pattern of the nation's military performance would in time
prove dangerous, they could be ignored in their own day without excessive cost.
Politics or Geopolitics?
Was American military policy in the nineteenth centnry determined by
an unfortunate political attitude towards military force and the professional
military? Or was it that, having mistaken geopolitical luck for virtue, having
accepted Vashington's conclusion without steadily asking whether his transient
assumptions still held, the nation carried forward into the twentieth century
inappropriate attitudes and policies that were reasonably sensible in the
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nineteenth? On the whole, the latter seem the more persuasive conclusion,
On the whole, the anti-military bias in the national tradition had
greater effect on the form of the nation's military organisation than on its
scale and discontinuity. For example, it certainly affected to a degree the
character and distribution of authority within the Militia Act, the terms on
which appointments to the military and naval academies were ultimately granted,
and the organization of the war and navy departments. But even here it is
difficult to disentangle suspicion of the military from competition between
Congress and the Executive Branch, and between state and federal political
interests. What one can say with conviction is that the nation's military
organization in the nineteenth century was profoundly influenced by the abiding
suspicion of any substantial concentration of authority over military force
whether exercised by civilians in the Executive Branch or by the professional
military themselves.
Whatever justification there may have been for American military and
diplomatic policy in the nineteenth century, it is clear that a dangerous
gap emerged between the public comprehension of the nation 'a problems and
performance on the one hand, and what the nation, in fact, faced and did.
The desperately difficult incompetent, and costly early phases of American
wars were forgotten or their memory suporessed. The nath of the skillful
amateur turning with success from plough, factory, or office to field of
combat was encouraged. The extraordinary difficulties of ashington and
his successors in maintaining an adequate force of militia or recruits
steadily in the field were set aside; and the low level of the nation's
peacetime military establishment was taken to reflect the high virtue of
democracy in contrast with the military preoccupation of the decadent rival
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autocracies of Europe. Above all, the underlying circumtances that prevented
major Eurasian military force from impinging on vital American interests were
neither widely examined nor understood.
8The Making of the Military Tradition
The Milita in American Life
Although in both substance and professional style there is a real
continuity in the American diplomatic tradition from Franklin and John Adams
to Cleveland and Olney, that tradition caught up the lives of only a handful
of Americans, for many of whom diplomacy represented merely a transient
or partial interest and concern. The professional military tradition is a
different matter. It was institutionalised at West Point and Annapolis and,
before the century was over, at Leavenworth and Newport. It touched, if it
did not dominate, the consciousness of many more Americans through the real
if dilute ties of the regulars to the state militia; and it suffused the
full-time career of a good many men and structured the lives of their families. 2 0
It was closer/the nation's consciousness than diplomacy if for no other reason
than that war brings many nor-professionals under arms whereas knowledge of
diplomacy remains vicarious for all but the professional and a consciousness
of diplomacy and its functions is confined to a few.
Not many Americans have passed through boyhood without identifying
themselves at one time or another with passages and figures from the
nation's military saga; there can have been few who dreamed their dreams
of glory as Secretary of State.
Superficially, however, the American soldier would seem as much a stranger
to the national style as the diplomat. The American professional military
tradition was created in a society whieh concerned itself only sporadically
with war, against an undertow of persistent national prejudices. From its
colonial origins, American society had built into its political structure and
prevailing sentiment a powerful hostility to a standing army. The normal
workings of the American political system placed the military in a position of
extreme weakness in relation to the civil authorities, who depleted its
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resources (and corrupted its militia) in peace and meddled with its plans
and operations in war. In a wider sense, too, one would expect the predominant
values of American society, with their extreme emphasis on personal achievement,
to work against the development of a stable and competent corps of professional
military men. But despite his untypical role in American society the pro-
fessional American soldier conformed neither in his quality nor in his
relations to civil life to Tocqueville's prognosiss 21
. . . When a military spirit forsakes a people, the profession
of arms immediately ceases to be held in honor; and military men
fall to the lowest rank of the public servants; they are little
esteemed and no longer understood. The reverse of what takes
place in aristocratic ages then occurs; the men who enter the
army are no longer those of the highest, but of the lowest
class. Military ambition is indulged only when no other is
possible. Hence arises a circle of cause and consequence from
which it is difficult to escape: the best part of the nation
shuns the military profession because that profession is not
honored, and the profession is not honored because the nation
has ceased to follow it.
It is then no matter of surprise that democratic armies
are often restless, ill-tempered, and dissatisfied with their
lot, although their physical condition is commonly far better
and their discipline less strict than in other countries. The
soldier feels that he occupies an inferior position, and his
wounded pride either stimulates his taste for hostilities
that would render his services necessary or gives him a desire
for revolution, during which he may hope to win by force of
arms the political influence and personal importance now
denied him.
The fortunes of the American military have varied mercurially in
the course of American history; and military life has been generally con-
ducted well off the main paths of the national experience, under a code of
conduct sharply distinguished from that of civil life. And one can find
(notably in the post-Civil War decades) much evidence of professional military
disabuse with the nation's values and performance, articulated on grounds that
include but transcend the nation's casual treatment of the soldier and his
profession.22 Nevertheless, the American military have been neither and
incompetent nor an alienated group in the society; and they very early
developed a distinct set of operational traditions which reflected general
characteristics of the national style. Fromi its beginning, American society
was sufficiently flexible to generate a professional military class of com-
petence and sufficiently pervasive to imprint its traditions with distinctively
American strengths and weaknesses.
To understand this paradox it is necessary to modify somewhat the concepts
created by the nation's overly pacific image of its values and evolution and
by the professional military's occasionally excessive self-pity and sense of
isolation.
The Links between the Soldier and his Societ
The United States was created by a long successful war. Its first Presi-
dent was a soldier sensitive to the long-run security requirements of the nation
and a steady advocate of a national military acadery. The first quarter century
of the nation's life was conducted against a background of war and the threat
of war. The Military Academy at West Point was founded in 1802, the Naval
Academy at Annapolis in 1845. The unity of the nation was confirmed by a
major war; and its western frontier was extended by Indian warfare which
hardly ceased for three centuries. Soldiering was a reality and a thinkable
career to every American generation in the nineteenth century. There was
always an ample supply of applicants for entrance who met standards which
altered and developed over the years but by and large represented at each
period a reasonable rigor.
Yet it is true that in many ways the existence of a corps of professional
soldiers in American society was an anomaly. First, the prejudice against a
substantial standing army as a danger to the democratic state went deep,
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Second, the United States was a society without a formal stable aristocracy;
and the European concept of a professional military career, ancillary to
inherited social status, did not easily fit the American scene except to a
degree in the ante-bellum South. Third, the major challenges of American life
lay in the material development of the continent. In pursuing a military career?
men were, in a sense, turning from the obvious and predominarnt paths of interest,
challenge, and reward in the society. Fourth, military life as a social struc-
ture had built into it values alien to the prevailing cast of American life--
an hierarchical claso structure, discipline, and overriding loyalty to the
national interest as opposed to the interests of the individual, his family,
and his state or region. Although many Americans, in diverse walks of life,
dedicated their working lives to values and objectives which transcended
material advantage, still "Duty, Honor, Country" were not conventional touch-
stones for day-to-day life in growing America of the nineteenth century; and
promotion by seniority violated the American notion that men should rise as
fast as their individual talents and energies peritted.
Why, then, did men enter the armed services over the long period when
they were not only in a backwater in American life but also in one where
the prevailing values appeared to run substantially counter to those which
dominated: the society itself?
The data available for firm judgment are by no means satisfactory. There
are, however, certain clues which suggest that individual men were drawn into
professional military services for widely differing reasons. The following
elements, in various mixtures and proportions, certainly played a part,
Before the Civil War and to some extent even after 1865, despite methods
of Congressional appointment to the service academies which guaranteed a high
degree of regional representation in the armed forces, the Southern United
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States, with its traditional aristocratic structure and explicit respect
for the soldier and his classic virtues, furnished to the American military
services a disproportionate number of professionals. Elsewhere, the fact that
West Point and Annapolis offered full-scale scholarship and expenses for its
students lent an attraction to young men who could perceive no superior method
for getting an education and rising to professional status in a society.
For some, a professional military training was regarded, initially at least,
as a channel for vertical mobility either in or out of the military profession-
although in many cases undoubtedly the service academies indoctrinated their
students deeply in the positive values of national military service as a
career. Moreover, despite the normally peaceful life of the country, the
military affairs in its past remained an important and romantic part of
its history; and undoubtedly a certain number of young men with a natural bent
for military affairs, inspited by the recurrence of military adventure in
American life, sought to become permanent professional officers simply because
they wanted to become soldiers. And this bent was sometimes reinforced by
a more intimate connection with military life. There has been an element
of inbreeding in the American armed services. In the period 1842-1899
something just under 10 per cent of the cadets entering West Point were
themselves sons of army officers; and many, in addition, must have undertaken
military careers under less direct family influence than that of the parent.
Another factor in American history, difficult to assess, may have made
the military career more attractive than the peacetime status of the
professional soldier would suggest. Despite the formal prejudices against
the American military incorporated abstractly into basic American political
ideology, the American people have exhibited a high if somewhat sporadic
respect for their military leaders; or, put another way, the nation has
appeared to attach a reasonably high political value to military service.
In arguing the irrationality of Anglo-Saxon prejudice against standing
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armies as a menace to liberty, Upton, somewhat overstating his case,
pointed out that the United States had behaved somewhat paradoxically: 2 3
Our own people, no less than the Romans, are fond of
rewarding our military heros. The Revolution made Washington
President for two terms; the War of 1812 elevated Jackson and
Harrison to the same office, the first for two terms, the latter
for one; the Mexican War raised Taylor and Pierce to the Presidency,
each for one term; the rebellion has already made Grant President
for two terms, Hayes for one term, while the present Chief Magis-
trate, Garfield, owes his high office as much to his fame as a
soldier as to his reputation as a statesman.
Long wars do not reward the highest commanders only. After
the Revolution Knox, Dearborn, and Armstrong rose to the office of
Secretary of War; Hamilton was Secretary of the Treasury; while
Monroe, first Secretary of State, was finally elected President
for two terms. During the Rebellion nearly 150 regular officers
rose to the grade of brigadier and major general who, but for
the four years' struggle, would have been unknown outside of
the military profession.
Since the war, distinguished officers of volunteers have
filled nearly every office in the gift of the people. They have
been elected chief magistrates of their States, and today on
both floors of Congress they are conspicuous alike for their
numbers and influence.
After Upton's day (1880) there have been four more presidents whose
political position derived in some part from a military past (Harrison,
McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eisenhower).
The choice of men touched by military experience for the office of
President and for other high offices in the federal government is, in
fact, a natural outcome of the relation between American society and the
federal government. Historically, the national government was a distant,
even minor element in the life of the society. Excepting times of war,
Washington did not generally concern itself with issues central to the
affairs of men in their daily life. The great challenges and risks, the
points in the society where power was focussed, lay outside the federal
government. Nevertheless, the federal government existed and with it the
office of the President. When Americans turned to choose their President,
they found in military achievement--or even in a military connection devoid
of ascertainable scandal--values and loyalties which symbolized well the
accepted concept of the national government and its limited but over-
riding functions. The military were professionally attached to the nation
as no other major group in the society. In war they incorporated the national
purpose and supplied leadership at periods of heightened national conscious-
ness. As the nation lapsed back to local tasks, it was altogether reasonable
that professional politicians should recruit their presidential candidates-
and other high national officials--from among those associated in some
measure with national rather than more parochial symbols of success; and
to this qualification the soldier often added political availability--that
is, a record of few views on divisive political issues.
In short, a man entering the profession of soldier in the United
States at a time of apparent peace need not have felt that his life would
necessarily be spent wholly as a garrison soldier or peacetime sailor;
nor need he feel that he be denied, in the course of his career periods
of major responsibility and even civil respect and authority.
And there were other less exalted but perhaps more substantial ways
in which the life of the professional military was linked to the nation
as a whole.
As Henry Adams pointed out, "American scientific engineering. .
owed its efficiency and almost existence to the military school at
West Point established in 1 802 ."24 It was not until 1860 that a super-
intendent of the United States Military was appointed who was not a member
of the corps of engineers. The development of competent engineering tra-ir4dg
linked the American military to the society as a whole in several wayse,
First, a good many of the instructors from the Academy went out to
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other universities as the teaching of engineering spread in the United
States. Second, American Army engineers even in peacetime were drawn
into major national enterprises--the building of railroads, roads, bridges
and the clearing of rivers.25 Quite aside from controlling the menace of
the Indian on the frontiers, the American Army in peace was thus directly
involved in the physical extension of the country.
Finally, a great many of the ablest graduates of West Point went off
to make their fortunes in civil life, Both Grant and Sherman returned to
the Union Army in 1861 from civil life; and, West Point engineers (including
McClellan) played a role in the great railway boom which preceded the Civil
War,
The American Armyl'then, was quite closely linked at a number of specific
points to the life of the nation. This is somewhat less true of the American
Navy. The sailor performed functions at which the average American was less
prepared to declare himself an expert than those of the soldier; the
existence of a navy seemed lest of a political threat than a standing army;
and the peacetime function of an American navy required a less esoteric
rationale in the nineteenth century than that of a substantial American
standing army. All in all, the professional life of the American navy
was permitted to develop in a pattern at once somewhat more remote from
the main stream of the nation's life and somewhat less subject to mercurial
political pressures.
But the professional sailor, as well as the soldier, was ultimately
linked to the society by profound human ties which in their ultimate
impact on the professional's outlook may have been more influential than
proximate connections or the lack of them. The American military pro.
fessional was, after all, the son of middle class (or, at least, land-
owning) parents. By the time he entered firmly upon a military career his
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attitudes toward his society and values were largely formed in the common
matrix of American culture. His brothers and sisters pursued more con-
ventional lives in American society with which the professional military
man never wholly lost touch. The military professional may have chosen a
somewhat odd career by the standards of his youthful contemporaries, but
he was not part of a distinctive social caste.
Despite certain differences between the two services, Elting Morison's
conclusions about the social constitution and outlook of the Navy in 1900
26
can be generalized:
"Our officers in 1900 . . . were gathered together from all parts
of the country and from every social class. Inclination, poverty, and
the haphazard selective methods of congressional appointment all
combined to recruit a heterogeneous collection of young men.
Certain factors united to bind them together--common undergraduate
memories, naval traditions, similar training, the problems, techniques,
and standards of the profession, the .apathy and occasional suspicion
of the nation which they served, But their diverse origins and
temperaments and their allegiance, as a group, to the democratic
process prevented them . . . from developing that peculiar pro-
fessional attitude and philosophy of which they are often accused."
It is possible, then, to account for the presence among the American
professional military of a reasonable sample of able and even talented
men drawn to the services by motives by and large in harmony with those
of the society as a whole--with, however, a special link between the
regional culture of the South and the values of a military career. It is
possible to account for the maintenanoe of a professional military corps
in the United States without assuming that its members were systematically
hostile or alienated from the society as a whole,
The Traininof Ian for War
But there is a second question. How, did the American military make
with as much grace as they did the transition from decision-making at the
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at the relatively routine level of peacetime military affairs to the
expanded stage of war, where in scale and importance, decisions were
of a quite different dimension? How, for example, did the nation breed
between 1783 and 1861 the distinguished professionals of the North and the
South in the Civil War?
There are three separable elements in this transition. First, of its
nature, a military training is designed to prepara men for this transition
War is studied in terms of principles and procedures whicb govern the making
of decisions designed equally to apply to large situations and to small;
and even peacetime military life afforded a chance for men to experience
responsibility and to display their abilities to make decisions in terms
of principle. Second, the hierarchical structure of military command,
even under the confusions and diffused responsibilities of war, often
permitted men of mediocre executive talent to perform reasonably well-
since, to a degree, the most searching decision could be passed upward,
if necessary, Third, military training is designed purposefully to develop
qualities of character necessary for responsible executive leadership where
such qualities inherently exist. The taking of responsibl% accountable
decisions in terms of known principles but in circumstances where the
meaning and significance of all tha facts can never ba complete and whol.y
clear is one of the most searching of human experiences. At best a military
training is designed not merely to simplify that experience by reducing
a maximum number of choices to bureaucratic rule but also to prepare men
to take the steps in the dark which leadership under active changing
circumstances always demands, Fourth, so far as the nineteenth century
was concerned, the Mexican War, brief and limited as it was, served
as a significant operational test far many of the young professionals
later to bear major responsibility in the Civil War,
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The American military was, then, made up of men pu'suing a somewhat
unorthodox profession, under unconon conditions, subject to extreme
irregularity in status and function within American society; but their
entrance into the profession can largely be accounted for by motivations
and values consonant with American life, and their life's work interwove
with that of the society as a whole at many points.
The Texture of Military Life
Like other military establishments the American vacillated between
long periods of relative inactivity, under relatively undhanging
circumstances, and periods of great activity when the military were con-
fronted with new and rapidly changing problems and activities. A recent
observer has remarked: 2 7
It is not to exaggerate to point out that the ideal
professional soldier has been seen in the past as a civil
servant technician who in peacetime would isolate himself
from civil society 30 as not to contaminate it; and who in
wartime would reverse roles overnight and supply sensitive
leadership, at home and abroad, not only for military opera-
tions but for many civilian sectors of life. Of course, with
the end of hostilities, a moment difficult to define, he is
again expected to revert to his former status.
In periods of peace the army and navy were a small disciplined bureaucracy.
Their operating tasks were only mildly challenging.-although the best
professionals found interest and challenge in these losser tasks; but the
predominant mood of the ablest was certainly that of men biding their
time against a day when they might be called upon to exercise their
profession on the large stage of war. The recurrent obsession of the
American military in peacetime was the struggle with Congress for money,
As a social organization, the professional military consisted of men
who by and large knew one another as part of a small family, driven close
together by the nature of their special tasks and standards and by their
partial divorce from the main currents of a society which denied them funds,
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prestige, and serious attention. Writing of the texture of life in the
period 1904-1916, Colonel R.E. Dupuy describes some of the essential
social characteristics of the post-Civil Var army although his account
is already touched by certain twentieth century developments: 2 8
Class Conscious was this army; the hierarchy of rank and
comand a living thing--from the Chief of Staff down to the
most junior corporal who every impressed his first upon a
slothful recruit and from Mrs. General to Judy O'Gractr, the
corporal's wife. It was a class-consciousness that embodied
a healthy professional and coamanal pride.
We should look well upon this aspect of military life at
the beginning of the century for unless one can understand it,
this attitude of RHIP--"rank has its privileges"---can be mis-
understood by those outside the circle, and abused by some of
those within. Here was a deep-rooted condition which would with-
stand the buffets, the ridicule and the hatred of the people who
did not understand, until a very few years ago . . . .
What of the officer--the leader of this aggregation of
professional soldiers--whose trade, as Kipling has it, was
parade? In 1904 the officer corps--a cross section of our
citizenry-was a formalized group, governed by a rigid
etiquette and century-old customs of the service. Its
segments were West Pointers, men from the ranks, men from
civil life, and men who had come in from the Volunteers
and the militia after the Spanish-American War and the
Philippine Insurrection. The pattern was fixed; imutable
some would say. . . .
One thing all these officers had in commons they were in
uniform because they wanted to be in the Army; it was their
chosen profession . . . .
Rectitude was one common characteristic possessed by this
corps of officers. The corps was governed by a code--partly
written, partly unwritten-some of whose principles reached
back through the ages since the profession began and which
may be expressed very simply. An officer and a gentleman was
punished by dismissal from the service. So read the Draconian
Articles of War. There was no quibbling; no sliding scale of
punishment. Read it:
"Art. 95--Any officer or cadet who is convicted
of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
shall be dismissed from the service."
II
This concept of honor by no means meant wearing a halo. Nor
did it mean that every individual who took that solemn oath "to uphold
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies
both foreign and domestic" was by that act endowed with this precious
characteristic. Individuals from time to time fell short of the
standard; the group itself did not.
Some of these officers-graduates of the U.S. Military Academy--
had had this quality instilled in them by virtue of their four-year
stern novitiate, governed by the precept of Sylvanus Thayer: 'A
cadet does not lie, cheat or steal.' Others had attained it first
through background and upbringing, retained it later by virtue of
the unseen pressure on the West Point leaven on the Army.
Newton D. Baker, our World War I Secretary of War, expressed
this essential quality in language explicit and crystal clear: '@.. Nen
may be inexact and even untruthful in ordinary matters and suffer is
a consequence only the disesteem of their associates or the incon-
venience of unfavorable litigation, but the inexact or untruthful
soldier trifles with the lives of his fellow men and with the honor
of his government.'
The very fact that this corps of officers lived in a close
24-hour-a-day contact---socially and professionallyu--made this code
a living thing, not just a posture assumed during an eight-hour
job and to be cast aside in leisure moments. Its expression cropped
out in a thousand different ways, of which perhaps one example suffices:
The officer's word was his bond. He did not-.-except for the initial
act of accepting his commission and during the process of military
justice (an inheritance from the common law)-take- oath or make
affidavit. He certified that such and such was the case when
necessary. That was sufficient . . . .
Garrison life was pleasant, on the whole. Once in a while came
field maneuvers---and always, of course, there was small--arms firing.
But the mess, the bar, the club, with occasional trips to tovn, took
up the bachelor's spare time. The married officer had his own home
life. Both met on the frequent social occasions, garrison dances
and card parties-ingrown affairs, one might call them.
The officers' mess was a formal association, with its own
quite rigid rules of decorum. The seating of the senior officer
present governed the opening of the evening meal; officers arriving
late made stiff, formal apology to him before taking their chairs.
Blues--or, in summer, whites--were vorn; the officers of the day and
guard alone might be excused for appearing in service olive drab; one
appeared in civilian clothing only if he were hurrying off post on
leave, or returning therefrom. The mess was a man's world, too, for
although all officers on the post were members, ladies were accommo-
dated only in a side room, and this but in emergency....
Among the officers of the garrison there was, of course, the
normal cordiality to be expected in any group of gentlemen. There
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were also, for all these men were human, the other crose currents
and frictions of human relationships. And no matter how cordial
the relationship, even if the senior did socially call the junior
by his first name, rarely indeed would the junior call any officer
of captain's grade or higher by his. In the first place, there was
a wide disparity of age between captains and lieutenants; in the
second, it wasn't done. And while the senior might call his sub"
ordinate "Jack" or "Bill" off duty, it was "Mr. Soandso," for the
lieutenants and the rank for the others, on official occasions . . . a
Here at homie, while big business spread, skyscrapers rose, and
dynamos hummed, the Army drowsed in its isolation. Dot-and-dash
telegraph was spanning land and see, a national road system was
evolving, to knit together an aggregation of American villages, towns
and cities into an articulated whole. Automobile*-building was be-
coming a national industry. But hitching posts still dotted the
streets of Arrmy posts, and garrison business moved on foot or be-
hind clopping hooves.
From time to time the soldier did emerge, but it was momentary
and quickly forgotten. The San Francisco earthquake, Mississippi
floods, great forest fires, strikes, in turn brought it out to save,
salvage and bring order. And, of course, the Army Engineers and
ledical Corps were building the Panama Canal. Goethals and Gorgas-
Walter Reed-were household names. * o o
Although there were modifications in the military tradition and round
of life over the sweep of the nation's history, Dupuy catches many of the
persistent characteristics of life in the American Army.
The society of the professional Navy was even more constricted and
more sharply distinguished from normal civil patterns than that of the
Army. At sea naval life vas marked by a unique degree of authority
and discipline; and naval careers were built around the goal of command
at sea. Ashore, the naval establishments were limited to a few locations
along the coasts. In times of peace there was none of the intermingling
of service life with the expansion of the West and the building of the
railroads. Despite the absorption of the ablest post-Civil War naval
officers with the problems posed by the new age of steam, steel, and
engineering, there was no naval equivalent to the Army Engineers as a link
to the nation's great domestic enterprises. In times of war the Navy had
never expanded on the scale of the Army and, down to 1941, never had to
confront the problem of mobilizing and training enormous drafts of civilians
drawn from the full range of American civil life.
The American Military Style
These partially isolated social groups, sporadically charged with
massive problems of operation, developed characteristics which accurately
reflected the operating style of the society of which they were part.
These persistent general characteristics can usefully be grouped under
the failiar military headings of personnel, intelligence, operations,
and supply.
There is, of course, a conflict between the standards by which men
rise in a relatively stable bureaucracy and those which justified promotion
and responsibility in the heat of war itself. In the Civil War the North
experienced protracted difficulties in sorting out from its professional
officers those leaders capable of organizing the region's human and material
potential and driving the North to victory. In the South a corps of first-.
class men found their way to responsibility at a much earlier stage, under
Jefferson Davis' (West Point) hand. Although subject to normal human error
in judgment--as well as political interference-f-the military establishment
seems to have been capable of selecting under peacetime circumstances, often
without the opportunity to test men in battle, those with qualities capable
of sustaining the field responsibilities of major war.
In war, as in other high executive circumstances, the real contribution
of men must be measured in terms of a few key decisions taken correctly or
incorrectly, under great pressure, where the selection of one alternative
rather than another profoundly affects the future course of events. The
normal flow of day.to-day decisions may be made well or badly but their
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impact on events is cushioned by the narrow range of their impact or by
the ingrained power and weight of the bureaucratic machine through which
they must be put into effect. The decisive problem of personnel in war is
to find and to promote men who will have the capacity to make the right
choice at the few decisive moments when their choice will matter. Although
a margin of error in the Judgaent of human beings is natural in any
institution, it is generally true that the characteristics that make men
effective under large historic circumstances can be discerned under lesser
circumstances as well; for they hinge on persistent c(ualities of character
and judgment.
Be that as it may, it would appear that notably after the Civil War
the military establishment was able to rate the men coming forward under
a double standard: first, the formal standards of seniority and bureau-
cratic efficiency, by which promotions took place more or less automatically;
second, the standards of ultimate competence and reliability in the making
of command decisions under pressure. Somehow the American military
establishment did not permit itself to be so bemused by the routines of
peace and the requirements of orderly routine in a stagnant bureaucracy
as to lose sight of the human requirements for command under the dynamic
circumstances of war. The criteria of selection were, however, dominated
by the skills of field operations. In the nineteenth century there was
within the American military tradition virtually no general staff concept.
With respect to military intelligence, the American professionals
were notably weak, and there were historic roots for this weakness.
First, the American professional attached an overriding premium to
operating performance in the field. The engineers were the Army elite
corps through and beyond the nineteenth century.2 Itelligence, with
its requirement to study and to understand other foreign military organisation
and foreign societies, to collect and to sift painstaldngly elusive data,
was too bookish and reflective a task generally to draw into its service
first-class military men. In both the Army and the Navy an assignment
to intelligence was regarded as fae evidnbe of low standing in
the military hierarchy and dim- future prospects. hen men were assigned
to intelligence they generally sought, by whatever means were available, the
earliest possible return to command over troops. The American professional
who concerned himself seriously in intelligence was often a man of indepen-
dent means, drawn by the social attractiveness of attache posts abroad,
equipped with independent means-a rare bird indeed.
A second reason for the low estate of the American intelligence service
was the obscurity of the strategic intelligence function for the United States.
Throughout the nineteenth century the nature of a future engagement by
American ground forces was extremely unclear, Indians aside. To -a degree,
American military institutions and technology were influenced by what
professional soldiers and sailors learned abroad: Thayer, Dennis Mahan,
Delafield and McClellan, Upton, Sims, among others. But the first duty
of intelligence is to study the intentions and capabilities of enemies
and potential enemies; and, such were somewhat difficult to define. The
Navy could (and did) follow with reasonable competence the order of battle,
the technology, and the tactics, of the navies of the world; but where was
it to be expected that the Army would fight? The notion of an expeditionary
force in Europe, with all it implied for a direct American concern with the
European balance of power, was scarcely thought of until the First World
War was upon the nation. And down to 1898 there was, outside a narrow
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circle of Americans, no systematic concept of a military interest in
Asia. Lacking a clear concept of the national interest there was no
traditional enemy to watch.
During military engagements, of course, tactisal intelligence had
to be built up. In the Civil War both the North and the South created
reasonably competent intelligence units, collecting order of battle
information; although that war yielded some famous intelligence failures. 3 0
In general, whenever American troops have been engaged in the field, their
commanders, faced with a practical operational problem, did develop
working intelligence of passable quality; although American forces in
Europe relied heavily on allied intelligence sources and analysis in the
First World War and for most of the Second World War as well. It was not
until the Second World War and especially its aftermath that the problem
of a mature strategic intelligence system was fully faced by the United
States as a continuing problem and national responsibility.
It was on operations--the cormand of men in the field or of a ship
at sea--that the American military placed their greatest premium. In
this area the indoctrination of the American ground forces starting with
Dennis. Hart Mahan at West Point in the first half of the nineteenth
century, was generally up to standards of professional armies elsewhere,
Certainly Mahan's pupils ultimately performed with high professional
distinction by any standards, on both sides in the Civil War; and his
precepts may well have influenced directly many of the key command
decisions of the war. 3 1 D.H. Mahan drew heavily from the French
military schools and the Napoleonic example, following Sylvanus Thayer's
acceptance of the Lcole Polytechnique as a model for the Military Academy.
The American operational tradition did not, however, remain derivative,
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despite its evident French roots. Certain persistent ways of doing
things developed consonant with the Amerloan character, which have
persisted down to the present day. These centered around tie
concepts of attack, concentration of a massive thrust against the enemy's
main strength, and simplicity in operational concept.
To these essentially classical strategic concepts was added the
tactical canon of "celerity": the rarid movement of force to achieve
surprise. From ashington's retreat aweos New Jersey forward, American
troops in war had also to face, from time to tine the difficult problem
of retreat; but the ruling doctrine inculcated into the American ground
forces was that of rapid attack designed to strike the enemy's main
strength, while he was off balance. This concept has been systematically
associated with field operations in which speed of ovement and surprise
were developed. Celerity was the concept pounded into the American
professional soldier by the elder Mahan and practiced with success by
his students in the Mexican War. In the Civil War Jackson and Lee
on the one hand and Sherman on the other performed what were by
European standards extraordinary feats in the rapid movement of
force. And that concept carried forward beyond the nineteenth century.
On one major point the American military outlook and experience
somewhat shifted during the nineteenth century; that is, the terms
by which war is to be brought to a lme. Down to 1861 the American
ground force and naval tradition was, distinctly, one of limited
engagement for clear, limited purposes. The British main strength
was not destroyed in the Revolution; not even its main strength in
North America. Yorktown was a tidy tactical victory; but the objective
of war was American independence, not total victory in some technical
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military sense. And so also with the French navy in 1799, the Barbary
Pirates, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War. The thited States used
force for limited purposes and was prepared to make peace either when
those purposes were achieved or (as in the War of 1812) when they were
modified or abandoned. Even the warfare against the Indians, despite
its occasional massacres, was fought step-by-step, for limited stakes,
not as a once-for-all war of extermination. The Civil War, too, was a
limited war in Lincoln's mind and policy and In the terms of surrender
as softened by Grant and Sherman; but, still, it was fought out bitterly
around the concept of unconditional surrender. For most Southerners
it was an unmitigated defeat and, for the North, it had the illusory
feel of total victory.
Aside from its civil context, the War between the States was
distinctively different in its scale, objectives, and outcome than
anything the nation had known before. And it may well have helped
create a persistent strand of thought; naely, that the fully mobilized
power of the United States is capable of clean, definitive, and total
victory; that this dmands the destruction and surrender of the
enemy's main strength; and that such umembiguous victory should be sought,
once the enemy is engaged, quite independently of the political object
of the engagement.
On the whole, the notion of total military victory disassociated
from political objectives--the concept of force not proportioned to the
limited task it is designed to serve--is more foreign to the American
military tradition that is often supposed; but the Civil War--or, at least,
the popular image of its denonmment--may well have left a distinctive mark.
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American naval theories were affected by a somwhat similar
transition. The old American coastal fleet was, evidently, a force
to be used for limited purposes to attain limited ends. But when the
nation came to construct a major battle fleet, twards the end of the
nineteenth century, Captain Mahan equipped the navy with the concept
of total naval supremacy to be achieved and held by a clear balance of
strength in capital ships. The condept of clear-cut capital ship
supremacy, to be asserted against the enemy's main capital ship strength,
in an offensive show-down, came increasingly to dodnate formal naval
thought even when logic and the experience of the first half of the
twentieth century made convoying, anti-submarine patrol, and amphibious
operations the central tasks for an American Navy.
The American tradition in military supply was ompounded of two
elements in the experience of the nineteenth century: one recurrent,
the other a product of the Civil War. The recurrent element was the
tendency of Congress to starve the armed forces in times of peace
and to be tolerant of waste in times of war. Congressional open-
handedness during war with respect to finance seemed a form of conscience-
salving for failure to supply in peace the miniuma essentials for
training and maneuver of an adequate force at readiness. Since the
limits of the nation's resources were never approached (except perhaps
in the South during the Civil War) American military aomanders
developed, in reasonably good conscience, a reciprocal carelessness.
This was particularly evident in the Civil War which was the first
American engagement in which munitions (as opposed to men, food, uniforms,
blankets, and medical supplies) were a truly significant element in supply.
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The tendency of American cowmandere to behave a little like men
who have suddenly struck it rich, careless of their margins of supply,
corident that wastage as well as battle logses would be replaced proved
consistent with some striking innovations in supply. These reflected the
character of the Aerican economy and its eapital-intensive technology,
and sprang directly from the requirements of a rapid-moving offensive.
The Civil War was the first railroad war, in the sense that supplies
were moved by rail to th9 front line area on a large scale, and the
sequence of battle was shaped by the strategy of dergring rail routes
to the armies of the South.
The American military style---like American diplomacyw--took its
rise from an international setting and an international tradition.
Washington had been a British soldier in his time; Steuben strongly
left the imprint of Gerrian eighteenth century experience; and the cast
of West Point, in its formative stage (rather more than Lafayette)
reflected French thought and practice. In any case the Western military
tradition is as highly international as that of any of the more pacific
professions, drawing its rules of war and battle, its heroes, goats,,
and (usuall-y civilian) fools from the same lore, starting with the
organised bloodshed of the Oreeks and Persians. And this continuity
persisted throughout the nineteenth century, despite the operational
cast of the American professional's interests, and his generally scant
knowledge of history and the world beyond American shores. It persisted
mainly because the fundamental concepts taught American soldiers derived
from a common foundation of experience and doctrine; and to some extent
also because a relatively few men of influence--not ably, the two Mahans,
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Delafield, Upton, Luce, and Simem-aintained touch with the evolution
of military affairs outside the nation.
Despite the wide area of concept, organisation, and manners shared
between American and other military men there was much distinctive in
the American military tradition by the and of the nineteenth century.
After Washington, it was a tradition virtually devoid of high--level
strategic thought about the nation's military position in the world.
Captain Mahan, when he emerged, was not only unique; but both he and
the Navy agreed that he had probably chosen the wrong profession. Sim
spoke for generations of American military men--and, indeed, for the
whole society of which he was a part--when he wrote to. his wife con-
earning his assigrment to the Naval War College in 1911, following a
mild scandal: "It may even be that things will blow over to such an
extent that I may get some duty I would like better-something in closer
touch with practice and less on the theoretical side."32  The best
American military man was, M excellence an able engineer, with a firm
grasp on the basic principles of battle, a gift for applying them
effectively under the confused conditions of the field, a quality of
courage and resilience in the face of the unexpected problem, and a
special flair for the bold outflanking maneuver. Both symbolically
and, in fact he was a man of the age of railways and of gadgeteering
that immediately followed the railway age. The vicissitudes of Stephen
Luce in founding the Naval War College accurately catch the predominant
biases and interests of the post-Civil War naval man, the professional
in general, and of the nation."
It was the transition period of our navy, when we were
pressing from wooden ships to iron and steel; from sails to
steam; from simple engines to complicated machinery and
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electricity. The majority of officers on shre duty were
engaged with inspection of steel, powder, guns, engines. It
seemed as if every one was eager to be identified in some way
with the building of the new navy. 'Thn mental activity'
says Mahan referring to this perio4 'wa not directed toward
the management of ships in battle, to the planning of naval
campaigns, to the study of strategic and tactical problems nor
even to the secondary matters connected with warlil, operations
at sea.' It was therefore natural that the idea of going to
school was to most officers absurd.
But the predominant biases and interests were already undergoing change
in the 1880's; for the Naval War College was established just as the
new graduate schools took hold at Johns Hopkins and elsewbere.
III. An Interim Sumation
9
The National Style in the Nineteenth Cent
Having surveyed briefly certain key dimensions of the nation's
experience in the nineteenth century in both domestic and foreign
affairs, it is time to take stock of the national style that emerged.
The American Household
A national style--like the performance of a unioue human personality--
is likely to be the product of a variety of different elements rather than
deducible from any one element or factor. V.H . Auden- once described
T.S. Eliot n6t as a man but a householdt a high church archdeacon, a vise
and passionate -old peasant grandmther, and a young boy given to slightly
malicious practical jokes, all living, somehow, together. The performance
of nations is like that of individuals in that it combines discrete
fortuitous elements of heredity and environment, interacting, effectively
coming to terms vith problems (or failing to do so) in a recurrent
fashion, building up over time stable patterns of performance. To
understand the content of the American style in the nineteenth century
ond must, therefore, establish the nature of the American household.
Out of what basic elements did a distinctive American style
emerge, and what was their consequence? Essentially, the American
style of the nineteenth century emerged from the interaction of three
powerful and persistent elements in the nation's experience: a
nationalism and sense of community achieved by explicit commitment
to particular ideal concepts of social and political organisation: a
day-to-day life challenged and dominated by the extraordinarily rich
material potentials of the Ameriean scene; and a sequence of national
life the continuity and success of which appeared progressively to
validate the initial comuitments in the nation's culture and values,
permitting innovation to take the form of a sequence of relatively
minor, piecemeal, co Um se adaptations of a stable basic structure.
These components of the American style are now examined in turn
as they revealed themselves in the period between the Battle of New
Orleans and the Spanish American War, the era framed, if you like, b'
the insights of Tocqueville and Turner, John Ouincy Adams and Captain
Mahan.
The Unifying Function of American Ideals
Many great nations have linked their nationality to a sense of mission
which transcended their borders--in different ways and at different times,
the Chinese, Russians, Germans, British, French, and Spanish. The various
concepts of national mission have generally been associated with pride
in race, culture, cplative national achievement, effective power,
religion, and so -on. For limited periods the nationalism of seVeral
powers has been associated with a set of abstract ideas about how
societies should be organisedl for example, that of France and Russia
in their post -revolutionory phases. American nationalism is special--
in degree at leaste--because in both its domestic and external manifestations
it has been strongly oolored by the principles in terms of which
American independence was asserted and towards which American society
was subsequently to aspire,
In *ertain of the .loies the eaming to America itself was associated
with religious mission; and, down to the present, American nationalism
has been suffused with a sene of higher sanction for the particular
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condepts of social individualism, political democracy, and nrivate
enterprise which Americans evolved. As iebuhr has pointed out, the
Calvinist and De-st traditions converged in this matter, aermitting
Americans to derivei higher sanction from either divine or natural law.
It is particularly remarkable that the tvo great religious-
moral traditions which informed our early life-New England
Calvinism and Virginian Deism and Jeffersonianism--arrive at
remarkably similar conclusions about the meaning of our national
character and destiny. Calvinism may have held too pessimistic
views of human nature and too mechanical views of the providen-
tial ordering of human life. But when it assessed the signi-
ficance of the American experiment both its conceptions of Ameri-
can destiny and its appreciation of American virtue finally
arrived at condlusions strilkingly similar to those of Deism.
Whether our nation interprets its spiritual heritage through
Massachusetts or Virginia, we came into exitence with the
sense of being a "separated" nation, which God was using
to make a new beginning for mankind. We had renounced the
evils of European feudalism. We had escaped from the evils
of European religious bigotry. We had found broad spaces for
the satisfaction of human desires in place of the crowded
Europe. Whether, as in the case of the New England theocrats,
our forefathers thought of our "experiment" as primarily the
creation of a new and purer church, or, as in the case of
Jefferson and his coterie, they thought primarily of a new
political community, they believed in either case that re
had been called out by God to create a new humanity. We
were God's "American Israel".
The nation's communal rituals conventionally open with a prayer followed
by the salute to the flag. The Plymouth colony--with its special sense
of pilgrimage--has been elevated to a place in the common folldore cuite
disproportionate to its objective role in the making of Nw England the
nation.3 In the minds of Americans-and of others throughout the world--
the concept of the American nation retains a dimension of ideological
experiment and leadership.
The "liberty and justice for all" tovards which Americars were
committed took on a special importance and power. These goals were
the essential device for unifying a society otherwise fragmented by
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acute individualism, regionalism, and race. The nation lacked the
cement of hierarchical political and social institutions, a long history,
a common race, or even a conmon religion. But it fashioned unity out
of a mixture of seventeenth century Protestant values, the dreams of
the eighteenth century Enlightenment, and then, as time moved on, the
experiences and myths built upon them.
The commitment to govern by methods which left maximum individual
freedom and to organize social life on the principle of equality of
opportunity have not .only given content to American nationhood but, perhaps
more important, they have also served at all levels as the essential
solvent, the source of compromise, the common meeting place in a society
otherwise dedicated to the proposition that its affairs should be con-
ducted by vigorous conflict and competition among individual, group, and
regional interests. It is clear that conflict (rather than a conscious
consensus) has been the engine which drove the nation forward; but the
limits within which such conflict has been generally contained and the
content of the compromises painfully, even reluctantly, reached have
reflected an abiding and widely shared owmitment concerning the fmda-
mental character of American society.
The vagueness of conventional articulation of the national ideals
in itself served the important function of permitting a maximum sense
of association with the national ethos by group. whose more immediate
interests and even whose cultures widely diverged. Historically, American
values, like the nation's political institutions, have been federalized;
and, in the midst of the diversity of the continent, the narrow but
exalted area of national consensus has mattered greatly. From the
addresses of the President to the after-dinner speech of the most narrowly
Ifocussed special interest group, the artionlation of the societyte
common values and an evocation of the drama of isueoessful American
growth within their orbit have played a role which in older societies
is covered by the rituals of ancient legitimised tradition.
Shared values and a sense of participation in the - pecial adven-
ture of America have been more than a substitute for a conventional
patriotism. They have played an intimate human role as well. Americans,
living with the heavy weight placed on the individual by Protestant
theology and iri a society denied (like most other Protestant societies)
the cushioning effects of a medieval heritage, have had to fashion
alternative ways of mitigating the burdens of isolation and personally
answerable responsibility. There was sow truth in D.H. Lawrence s desig-
nation of American democracy as a negative creed: "Henceforth be masterless.
Som truth but not the whole truth; for men are lonely and need connections
beyond themselves.
From the beginning of the nation, American individualism meant, in
a sense, merely that the nation created a different strueture of "masters"
from that of the clans and the hierarchies, the clearly defined social
rituals, and the comforting failiar traditions of the Old World. Among
the nation's "masters" were a narrower but, perhaps, ume intense
family; a tendency overtly to conform to the vill and manners
of the political and social majority; a written Constitution ele-
vated to a peculiar sanctity; a Ratioalim associated with an
ambiguous but, in the end, meaningful i deeima ; a marellously complex




and compromise among like-minded equals, a variant of the English
concept of liberty. And, as Toconeville perceived, the heroic image
of the nation's adventure and an identification with it' were peculiarly
important instruments for unifying a society of detached individuals.
I readily admit that the Americans have no poets; I cannot
allow that- they have no poetic ideas. In Europe people talk
a great deal of the wilds of America, but the Americans
themselves never think about them; they are insensible t o the
wonders of inanimate nature and they may be said not to per-
ceive the mighty forests -that surround them till they fall
beneath the hatchet, Their eyes are fizad upon another
sight: the American people views its own march across these
wilds, draining swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling
solitudes, and subduing nature. This magnificent image of
themselves does not meet the gase of the Americans at intervals
only; it may be said to haunt every one of them in his toast
as well as his most important actions and to be always flitting
before his mind.
Since virtually all cultures create ideals of behavior to which
the individual cannot fully or regularly conform, there is nothing unicue
about the comitment of the American to values which he must, to a
degree, violate in order to live in the world as it is. In most societies,
the political and social life of the comnunity.-and its diplomnacy-Niare
not so directly tied to explicit moral purposes. Despite the early
defeat of theocracy in New England and the lack of an established
national church, there remains a sense in which we have continued to
identify chuzch and state. This identification bf nationhood with a
conmdtment to strive .for good purposes accounts for the 'moral overstrain"
which, as lVyrdal noted, remains a peculiarly powerful engine within
American sodiety. It led a less friendly fteign observer to conclude:
Americanism is not merely a wayth that clever propaganda
stuffs in t o people's heads but something every American
continually reinvents in his gropings. It is at one and
the same time a great external reality rising up at the
entrance to the port of New York across from the Statue
of Liberty and the daily product of anxious liberties.
9-7
The Operator's Way with Ideas
Counter-poised against the society's active counitment to great
ideal goals was the character of American life in the nineteenth century:
a life of hard, absorbing, material punnits executed substantial.ly
on the basis of individual initiative and conducted to individual
advantage.
The nation was extremely rich in land and other natural resources
in relation to its population. It was enormous in scale relative to
means of communication in the nation's formative period. It presented
for more than two and one-half centuries the challenge and possibility
of an open frontier; and, for a full three centuries, the American
environment made economically attractive to Americans as well as
foreigners a virtually unobstructed flow of inmigration. In this
setting individual effort and competence yielded high returns in
economic welfare, the attainment and expansion of which attracted
the bulk of the society's talent and energies.
The attraction of eoonomic life was, however, negative as well
as positive. In the nineteenth century.sand notably after the Civil
War--the society's internal structure and relations to the outside
world were such that positions in neither church nor state represented
roles of great national prestige and authority, let alone of affluence.
Men came to seek in the adventure of the American eoonomy--in the test
of the market---not only material advantage but also the sense of power,
achievement, and status elsewhere granted by a more heterogeneous scale
of values.
In addition, the mobility of American life, the lack of stable
connection with family and place, heightened the attraction and psychological
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importance of individual achievement. And th'e divorce of the indivi-
dual from a Sen.s of direct cOnnection with 'a stable, structured
community wa further increased by the flow of inmigrants. The problems
and pace oif adjustment varied, of. course, *ith each wave, source, and
social class of immigration as well as with the region and comunity
within which the immigrant settled. Despite great variation, however,
between the hunpy forties and 1914 each wave of immigration faced a
pattern of adjustment to the prevalent values and culture of the nation
which was, by and large, accomplished by generational stages. In this
process of adjustment the demonstration by the individual of effective
performance in 'the market place or local forum played a substantial role.
Thus the man vho could solve urgent material problems, organise and
operate profitably a productive enterprise, deal effectively with the
day-to--day compromises and accoumodations of local social and political
life rose in status; the American scene bame to be dominated by his
operational cast of mind, a cast. of mind biased towards the assessment
by individuals of concrete, particular problems, empirical in -method,
pragmatic in solutions.
But men have a need and instinot to generalise their' experience, to
organise, somehow, the chaos around them; and when Americans, busy with
the limited practical chores of building a new continental society,
reached out for larger abstractions they tended to balloon out concepts
derived from personal practical experience. They generalised vhat they
intimately knew. Toquevill. described how it came about that a nation
of individualist empiricists were powerfully drawn to a particular use
of highly abstract conoeptss
The Americans are mauch more addicted to the use of general
ideas than the English and entertain a much greater relish
for them.... He mho inhabits a democratic country sees
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around him on every hand m'in' differing but little frds
owe another; he cannot turn his mind to any one portion
of mankind without expanding and :dilating his thoutht
till it embraces the whole. All the. truths that are
applicable to himself appear to his equally and similarly
applicable to each of his fellow citisens and fell** men.
Having contracted 'the habit of generaliuing his ideas in
the study which engages him most and interests him mast,
he transfeft the same habit to all his pursuits; and thus it
is that the craving to discover general laws in everything,
to .include a great number of objects under the saa formula,
and to explain a mass of facts by a single cause becomes an
ardent and' sometimes an undiscerning passion in the human
mind.... When I repudiate the traditions of rank, professions,
and birth, uhen I escape from the authority of example to seek
out, by the single effort of my reason, the path to be folowed4
I am inclined to derive the motives of my opinions from human
nature itself, and this leads. me necessarily, and almost uncon-
sciously, to adopt a great number of very general notions....
len who live in ages of ecuality have a great deal of curiosity
and little leisure; their life is so practical, so confused,
so excited, so active, that but.little time remain to. them
for thought. Such men are prone 'to general ideas because
they are thereby spared the trouble of studying particulars;
they contain, in a little time, a great return. If, then,
on a brief and inattentive investigation, they think they
discern a comon relation between certain .objects, inquiry
is not pushed any further; and without saining in detail
how far these several objects agree or differ, they are
hastily arranged under one formula, in order -to pass to
another subject.
The American mind, deiroted to arduous practical tasks, came, then,
also to be equipped with an arsenal. of general concepts-often
legitimate but partial insights--not rigorously related to each other
or to the bodies of fact they were meant to illuminate.
On balance there was little in American life--its content and its
values-that encour-aged the care and contemplation required to array
the intermediate structure of abstractions, test them for internal
consistency, and to make orderly patterns of thought. Regions, towns,
and fimilies, did, it is true, eihibit something of the Buddenbrooks
dynamies---that is, a third generation (symbolically or in fact) born
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to both money and social status, turning to the life of the mind or
spirit. But such enclaves of reflective leisure could not hold up
for long in the vortex of American life, Even in the older more stable
sections of the East Coast the proportion of first-rate talent that
could be drawn and held in intellectual pursuits-as against the claims
of business and finance, railroads and the "est, shipping or the law--
remained small, down to and beyond the First World War.
The national style reinforced itself, moreover, by coming to
suffuse the widening process of public education. The principle of
free public education was fought through in the North during% the pre-
Civil War decades; and the new elementary schools reflected a bias
towards practical, usable thought, as did the high schools which carried
the educational revolution forward from about 1870. Ins sense the
gospel of education for pradtical purposes had been written into national
law by the Morrill Act of 1862, which in itself, set in motion a reinforcing
process in the land grant colleges. This process did not achieve a
simple triumph for the vocational conception. In secondary schools the
idea of education in the. classics gained ground in the 1890's; and
spreading out from the universities of the East Coast were transatlantic
intellectual currents and conceptions which, in the end, mingled biology
iith the pursuit of animal husbandry--symbolically and in fact. And
it was the mingling of these strands that was distinctive in American
education.
When American institutions of higher leirning moved towards
maturity, at the 6lose of the nineteenth century, the architects of
the new graduate schools were instinctively drawn to German university
models. The Germans--rho had left an imprint on American education
earlier in the 6entufyw.placed a high premium on facts and their ordering
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by precise rules of evidence. Their concept of orofessional hard-working
scholarship harmonised with the instincts of a nation of empiricists
entering into an age of industrialism and specialisation. The nineteenth
century Germans, when they cawme to generalize in the social sciences vere,
like Americans, prone to broad concepts only loosely linked to the bodies
of fact they so painstakingly compiled. On the whole, Americans oufled
up short of the cosmic level of German abstractions, mainly steering
clear of universal systems; but a family resemblance remained. In a
substantial part of the nations intellectual life -Americans continued
"to explain a mass of facts by a single cause."
The dominant, if changing, mode of advanced education in America
came to be a.spedialized empiricism, the fragmented results of which
were bound into unity, if et all, by vague high order generalizations.
American intellectual and scientific life produced many knowledgable
mien; a riumber of creative insights; and, at its best, figures of
wisdom, with great sensibility about the nature of the physical world or
about how human life is really conducted. But it yielded few general
thedretical structures of distinction.
In both its dimensions-a dovation to the ordering of fact in
terms of 16f-order abstraction and a certain vague disorder at high
levels of abstraction--the Aumrican intellectual style of the nine-
teenth centu-y keflected the operator's biases and fitted his needs.
The American manner of dealing with ideas in relation to reality
in the nineteenth century, was by no means unique; but it was distinjetive.
The nation steadily remained a part of the Western European intellectual
and philosophical tradition; but, out loose from the surviving medieval
traditions and institutions of V1estern Europe, devoted overwhelmingly
to building a rich modern society out of an empty continent, nineteenth
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century America developed an empiricism r*ore acute and energetic
thin that of its. contemporaries.
Continuit. Sudoess, and the Ad Hoc Formula
Hdw in the nineteenth century was the gap bridged between a
heightened, freliance on idealism to define and maintain a sense of
nation and couwmnity and a heightened reliance on the vigorous inter-
play of individual, regional, and .roup interests to do the 'day's work?
H0* wais the gap bridged between a conentration of effort on particular
chores perceived in terms of low-order abstraction and the rich but
somewhat disarderly kit-bag of higher abstractions into which Americans
reached "for their general organising principles?
The answer -appears to be that the nation built its style around
the task of solving problems. Americans were content to leave implicit
the moral and philosophic ambiguities which flowed from the method of
compromised conflict and experiment. Relatively little attention in
formal thought or articulation was given to the comon law formulae
which emerged from these ardent living processes because of two
massive facts: first, the extraordinary continuity of the American
experience over the nineteenth century; second, that as a national
tociety the United States was a distinct success. Men are more inclined
to examine with intellectual refinement a complex system of which they
are a part which is confronted with radically new- problems or which is
failing, than a going concern. And when towards the elbse of the nine-
teenth century some Americans beome more reflective and articulate
about their society, they tended to elevate "life, experience, process,
growth, function" over '~logic, abstraction, deduction, mathematics,
and mechanics."hl Holes' dictua embraced more of the national style
than the laws "The -life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience."
9-13
The Dimensions of Continuity
The continuity and -success of the national experience had a number
of distinct dimensions which converged to produce the result.
First, of course, was the frontier. From the earliest stages of
the Massachusetts and Vitginia colonies down to the twentieth century--
that is, for almost three centuries--the existenee of an accessible and
productive frontier gave a special'reality to the individualistic values
of the society, strongly coloring its institutions, from the family to,
politics, and its culture. The frontier was a long historical process,
not a piece of real estate; and American economic, political, and social
life consisted in good part of the interplay and balancing of interests
between the frontier areas and the more stable communities and institutions
that mofid in behind the frontier. Certain political patterns are con-
tinuous from one end of American history to the other--for example, the
conflicts of interest between soft-money indebted farmers and hard-money
urban -roperty owners; between those who sought the state's intervention
on behalf of public improvements and those who sought lower taxes.
American* became expert at living with such conflicts and working con-
stracitively with them in their many variants, More than that, the con-
cept of the frontier, its existence somewhere to the West, imparted
a continuing sense of promise, possibility, and adventure to those
who lived their lives out in more ordered urban settings in the East.
Despite the expanding frontier, however, the task of maintaining
unity was, in one sense, osed as time went on. The scale of the nation
was roughly matched and then outmatched by the development of communica-
tions capable of binding the regions together and giving them unity.
In terms of the central problem of achieving and maintaining nationhood
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among a group of regions with power distinctive interests atd attitudes,
the working techniques of federalism proved essentially viable with, 'as'
it were, only gadual modification.
Similarly, the initial tour do fore of generating effective (even
if birely effective) national action from a dispersed and locally oriented
population--in the .1770's and 1780's---was somehow maintained despite the
increase and phyical spread of the population, the impact of diverse
inmdgrations, and the emergence or sharpening of class groupings as
industrialisation and urbanisation proceeded. The attachment of American
nationalism to certain overriding principles of social and political
organization served adequately as a rallying point for nationhood,
surviving the crueiai test of civil war. The .structure -of private
social groupings continued to ramify and to weave a highly individual-
istic and mobile population into a firm social fabric; for those groupings
came to share a widening area of common values. Above all, the canny
insights of the Founding Fathers yielded a constitutional structure which,
when supplemented by the intermediation of a two-party system, a Supreme
Court, and an Anglo-American system of law, weathered the gross changes
in the scale and character of American society in the nineteenth century.
The maintenance of national unity was eased by the degree of vertical
mobility American society continued to offer. Social mobility in the
urban industrial settings which increasingly characterized the nation
as the century drew to a close was, of course, a quite different phenomenon
from that form of social mobility which consists mainly in the possibility
of acquiring cheaply an agricultural homestead. Nevertheless, Americans
made the transition from on to the other without ceasing to envisage
as possible for themelves--and especially for their children--a marked
rise in social and economic status on the basis of individual capabilities
and performance. The nation's evolution steadily eonfirmed and re-
confirmed the central unifying concept of equality of opportunity
in a sufficiently maningful way to maintain loyalty to the nation's
social system,
Both the adjustment to conflicting regional and group interests
within the continental society and the process of social mobility were
enormously aided by the sustained growth and high outout per head
which marked the history of the modern American economy. The growing
economy not only gave reality to the concept of progress but also
permitted men to achieve compromises in which they shared increasing
comunal wealth without the bitter, corrosive conflicts which come
about when men feel they can rise only at the expense of someone
else's decline. In one. sense it was precisely because the land to the
est was more easily colonized by men from the North than from the
South, and popular sovereignty would evidently work in the North's
favor that the Civil War ensued: the South did, indeed, feel that the
nation's extension to the West Coast could only be at the expense of
decline or loss of its way of life. The great exception here reinforces
the general rule.
Above all, the cast of American values and institutions and the
tendency to adapt them by cumulative experiment rather than to change
them radically was progressively strengthened by the image of the
gathering success of the American adventure, whether it was judged on
economic grounds, on grounds of political workability, or in terms, even,
of international status. The nation, founded in defiance of a major
power, living for a time at bay in both a military and a political sense,
came early in its history to feel that its initial concept of a transcendent
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ideological destiny was justified by its own performance in relation to
the turn of events in the world outside.
A aor Limitation
How, then, did the national style solve for Americans the inescapable
moral and philosophical problems of social organization? The moral issue
was solved by an-incessant process of -coupomised conflict and evolution-
ary adaptation taking place within a continuous framework of institutions,
hammered out of a colonial life and a revolution rooted in inherited
British values.' The philosophical issue was solved by dealing vigorously
with concrete problems as they arose and permitting economic, political,
and social processes to unfold in the wake of a sequence of apparently
ad hoe solutions. With certain notable exceptions, the accidents of
history and the American environment made it possible in the nineteenth
century for these processes of extension- to be conducted by incremental
mdification arrived at by widespread debate and experiment. The whole
'acaphony of Amrican. articulation about politics, social values,
economics, and ethics had a real importance in keeping alive the nation's
unifying values; but more significant for how the nation actually worked
were the subtly balanced concepts left implieit in the working processes
of 6 society blessed for most of its life by the possibility of solving
its essential problems in relative continuity with its past experience.
American ideals had a living place within these working processes of
conflict and negotiation, but a place more compromised and less innocent
than conventional modes of articulation would allow.
The intellectual content of a process is immensely complex. It
involves many factors interacting over time. The normal forms of
rigorous logical exposition can grip only elements within the process
I
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and are likely to give them a more rigid and static mast than, in fact,
they have; the number of unknomns is likely to be greater than the
number of equations that can usefully be formulated. Men successfully
operate processes by accumulating experience, feeling, and judgment,
by sensing recurrent patterns rather than by isolating clear-cut logical
connections of cause and effect. This is how good captains of sailing
vessels have worked, good politicians, good businessmen. This was the
typical American style in operating and developing the nation's society
in the nineteenth century.
Its success, however, was dependent on two conditions which are, to
a degree, alternative. First, the problems confronted must be in
their essende relatively familiar, and thus capable of solution by
only moderately radical innovation on the basis of existing principles
or institutions. Second, there must be sufticient time for the experi.
mental exploration of possible solutions and the osmotic process of-
accepting change. The more the time permitted, the greater the workability
of a technique of problem-solving by empirical experiment.
It was, therefore in the less radical orders of innovation-in
science, industry, and politics--that the nation excelled. Or, put
another way, the American style which emerged from the nineteenth
century was least effective when it confronted issues which required
prompt and radical innovation.
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The Watershed of the 1870's
On July 12, 1893, in his famous paper read before the American
Historical Association at Chicago, Frederick Turner announced that
"the frontier is gone, and with its going has closed the first period
of Ameiean history." On April 11, 1898 a reluctant President Mcfinley,
responding to forces against which he was unprepared to set his face,
sent a message to Congress which btarted war with Spain and launched
the tbited States into explicit status as a world poer. On September
14, 1901 Theodore Roosevelt, one of the architects of the Spanish
American War, succeeded McKinley as President, opening an era in which
the powers of the national government came to play a progressively
expanded role in relation to the American economy and to American
society as a whole. Short of revolution or major war, history rarely
affords a turning point more clear cut, both at the time and in retrospect,
than that which occurred in American society in the decade climaxed
by Roosevelt Is fortuitous accession to the Presidency.
The notion of the watershed of the 1890's is, however, like most
such benchmarks in history, both legitimate and illegitimate. It is
legitimito in the sense that the deudnant condeption in American foreign
and domestic policy shifted at about the turn of the century, Self-
reinforcing trends were set in motion that created new institutions and
policies and irreversibly altered the character of the old; and, perhaps
most important, the war with Spain and the temperament and character of
the new President helped to create an image of the nation-of its
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domestic character, of its relation to the world, and of its future
path of evolution--perceptibly different fromn that of the nineteenth
century.
The concept of a turning point in the 1890's is illegitimate in
the sense that the forces which yielded the Spanish-Amrican War and
the progressive domestic policies of Roosevelt and Taft and of Filson's
first term had been gethering strength since about the time of the
end of the Civil War. Precision of dating fades away on close examina-
tion of the .trend of affairs at horm and abroad in the 1870's and the
1880's. In the first years of the twentieth century, the processes
at wo'rk over the previous three decades clearly accelerated; but they
were not new, nor were they created by the Snanish-Amerlean War and
Theodore Roosevelt.4
The purpose of the next four chapters is to consider the under.
lying forces at work in American society and in its world setting which
in the latter decades of the nineteenth century were altering the
choices open to Americans and the nature' of the problems they perceived
as urgent; and then to suggest the initial impact of these changes on the
components of the national style.
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The Chagin Settin of Natioal Life
Some Arithmetic of Economic Matrt
At the turn of the century, the output of producers goods was
increasing at a rate of about 11 pWr cent per annum, leading the way
in economic growth; and iron, steel, and their products almost doubled
in value during the 1890's. In 1900 the United States was producing
as much steel as Britain and Germany combined and accounted for about
30 per cent of the world's total industrial output. American exports
of grain were declining rapidly as the requirements of American cities,
swollen with the tide of indigration, competed against the demands of
Western Europe, thus opening an opportunity for profitable railway
building and grain exports in other parts of the world. American
manufactured exports had gone from about 35 per cent to 55 per cent
of the total over the three decades preceding 1900; but more important,
exports of finished manufacturers had begun .to gather momntum in the
1890's. American foreign trade, moreover, was shifting away from the
old predominance of Europe towards inre&sed exehanges with Asia,
Latin Amtrica, and a Canada moving rapidly along in its takewoff.
American not' capital imports were at a low Level, with the flow shortly
to reverse its direction; and the proportion of Americans living in urban
areas (8,000 inhabitants or more) had moved from a fifth to about a third
since 1870. But, again more significant, in the 1890's the trolley car
had begun subuwbanisation in earnest, a process that was to restructure
the character of American society over the next half century.
The Final Shift in Balance
The attainment of industrial maturity which these developments
reflect changed irreversibly the balance of the nation's life; and it
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is in the light of this basic shift in balance that the ending of the
frontier is to be understood.
The process by which American society evolved has long been seen
as a series of stages which, as Turner pointed out from Loria, recapi-
tulated in quasi-geological layers the stages of European developmnt.M
"The United States lies like a huge page in the history of
society. Line by line as re read this continental page
from Vest to East we find the record of social evolution.
It begins with the Indian and the hunger; it goes on to tell
of the disintegration of savagery by the entrance of the
trader, the pathfinder of civilisation; we read the annals.
of the pastoral stage in ranch life; the exploitation of the
soil by the raising of unrotated crops, of corn and 1heat in
sparsely settled farming conmnities, the intensive culture
of the denser farm settlement; and finally the manufacturing
organization with city and factory systems."
Down into the twentieth century, all these layers of economic
activity-and the regional social structures and cultures that tended
to accompany them--could be found within the United States; but during
the nineteenth century,- although none was eliminated, the balance among
them altered. I-ile there were still fresh territories'-to be opened in
the Vest, industry could expand, cities could grow, the immigrants
could pour in; but there could still be maintained in the nation's
life a wholesome sort of balance between the old primitive Jeffersonian
activities and those decreed by the foreseeable emergence of an America
more nearly conforming to Hamilton's image of an industrial society.
On one vies, the significance of the end of the frontier was extremely
limited: it merely decreed som acceleration in the shift of balance
from rural to urban life already long under way. Despite the rise of
the urban proportion in the population to about a third, the nation
in 1900 was still rural in its pri Minant cast, including its image
of itself.
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On the other hand, with the end of the frontier,. the time vhen
the "manufacturing organization with city and factory systems" Vould
dominate all the rest, including agrioultuwe, became suddenly fore-
seeable. The process which had first oceurred on a regional basis in
the northeast and which had then gradually moved west was finally to
overtake--once and for all--the nation as a whole. The changing
character of American life and the power of the trend. bringing
about those changes could be read in census returns much earlier
than those for 1890; but once Turner pointed out what the Superinten-
dent of the Census for 1890 had said, men were forced increasingly to
look at their circumstances in terms of where the lines of projection
pointed rather than in terms of a famliar balance from the past. The
and of the frontier in the 1890's was a psychological rather than a
physical or economic fact.
It is in this general setting, of a nation having moved from its
take-off into industrial maturity, in which the pace of modernization
was rapidly altering the old proportioning between urban and rural life,
that the familiar issues of the post-Civil War period are to be viewed-
issues arising from the passing of the frontier, the scale and organization
of the railway system, the scale and concentration of industry, and the
status and efforts to organize industrial labor.65
The Fuergence of Industrial Bureawacy
A major and pervasive consequence of the transition to maturity
was the emergence of large-scale industrial units. The building of a
continental railroad net immediately after the Civil Var created a
the
unified continental market; and/rate wars of the 1870's and 1880's
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led to the consolidation of the railroads into massive groupings. In the
1880's a group of innovators in the consumption goods industries built
up nationwide organizations to purchase supplies and to distribute their
products--Swift in meat-packing, Duke in Tobacco, Pillsbury in flour.
Simultaneously, the M"cCormick Harvester organization and the Singer
Sewing Mhien Company emrgg leading the way in consumers durables
on a mass production and distribution basis. Under pressure from over-
production and excess capacity, as well as from the inducements of the
continental conunmications net, national combinations were created also
in the oil, sugar, and earn products industries. And then, in a surge
of consolidation, the great present day corporations were created in
the producers goods sectors between 1898 and 1902; notably, in steel,
copper, and coal.
In two decades the organization of American industrial and con-
mercial life was transformed. Americans worked increasingly not in
firms run by single men or single families but in great bureaucracies
strucoured functionally. Their distant chiefs became the vicea-presidents
in charge of such functions as production, purchasing, manufacture, sales,
and finance.
As Chandler concludes:
"...the sudden growth of huge, departmentalized, centralized
business structures affected the nature and scope of men's
activities on all levels of business operations. The entre-
preneurs who created these great enterprises, by integrating
purchasing or production of raw materials, manufacturing, and
marketing, under one corporate roof, developed much broader
horizons than had their predecessors. They continued to watch
and adjust to changes in the nature and location of markets
and raw materials, and the development of manufacturing pro-
cesses. They snent less time in supervising a single function,
and more on coordinating the activities of the over-all industrial
process. In this work, they became adept at analyzing and acting
on voluminous daily, weekly, and monthly reports. Such men as
Rockefeller, Dukes, Swift, Frick, George Westinghouse, Piere DuPont,
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Andrew Preston, Hugh Chisholm, and (harles E. Coffin began
to control their business as rmach through statistics as through
personal contacts."
Following the pattern of life and work first created in American
society by the long-range railroads of the 1850's,men found themselves
in narrow specialized functions with sucoessful or unsuccessful perfor-
mance defined in terms of generally inflexible bureaucratic rules.
The emergence of large-scale industry posed marw problems uhich
began to engage Americans in the latter decades of the nineteenth
century and which were to preoccupy political life in the fifteen
years before 1917: the rise of the American Federation of Labor; the
implementation of the Sherman Act; the creation of a banking system
to match the new, mature, interacting continental markat; the creation
of national regulatory commissions; and, in general, the effort to free
the political process from the disproportionate control and influence
quickly achieved by the new concentrations of economic power. But equally
fundamental was the fact that the bureaucratization of the economy
drastically and permanently altered the setting within which an in-
creasing proportion of Americans could express their individuality
at work,
The Turn in Farmers' Affairs
There was a chronic tendency of farm prices to fall from about
the end of the Civil War to the mid-1890's. Under such circumstances
the farmer reacted with particular sensitivity to monopolistic railway
rates and to real or believed monopoly elements in the prices of things
he bought. Thus the farmer launched as early as the 1870's the counter-
attack on large-scale industry--beginning the long process of reconciling
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modern industry with older values and aspirations Americans have
sought to retain in the society. In that effort the farmer was joined
increasingly by men representing business and labor in the East, creating,
as early as 1890, a political environment which yielded the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.h8
The position of the American farmer continued to reflect world-wide
phenomena. The decisive stage of the American take-off had been
launched by the reversal of world prices in the 1840's. European
population then came to outstrip world grain outout at existing prices;
and the cotton price rose as well. The rise of prices made the wheat
fields of the Middle West exceedingly attractive, as well as the further
extension of cotton culture to Texas and beyond; and the railway boom
of the 1850's followed, drawing, in a sense, hungry Europeans to create
the possibility of American exports to feed those left behind.
After the Civil War the full potentialities of American grain exoort
were developed, shipping rates fell radically as the age of steel and
steam won out on the sea as in land transport, and agricultural prices
on a world basis rapidly fell, notably in grain. For twenty years the
American farmer lived under a regime of falling prices, not quite
bankrupt like many of his fellows in Western Europe, mitigating the
effeot of falling prices on profits by the increased use of farm machinery
and fertilizer, but uneasy, with a sense that the sarket prices and the
currency and banking systems were systematically dering him the legitimate
fruits of his labor and enterprise.
Down to about the summer of 1896 the American farmer was something




point in the world economy similar to the turning point of fifty years
earlier. Once again the demand for foodstuffs (and certain key raw
materials') outstripped existing supplies at the existing level of prices;
farm prices rose, launching, notably in Canada, Russia, and Argentina a
process similar to the opening up of the American Pest a half century
earlier. In the quarter century that followed, the trends in prices,
interest rates, and income distribution were quite radically reversed
from what they had been over the previous several decades.
Thus, although the spread of industrialisation was a relatively con-
tinuous process, there was a significant reversal of the trends in the
world economy as the nineteenth century came to an end. That reversal
was to have the effect of making the American farmer once again a reason-
ably contented and conservative fellow down to about 1920. On the other
hand, rising costs of living denied the industrial worker any significant
rise in real wages. The reversal of trends within the world economy in
the 1890's thus helped create the tensions which began to yield after
the turn of the century the first clear outlines of the welfare state.
The International Connections of the American Econ
It was the potentialities of the British cotton market in the 1790's
which furnished the incentive for a mechanical cotton-picking machine
to which Eli Whitney responded, thereby helping to create the southern
empire based on a slavery that might otherwise have withered. The
vicissitudes of American industry in' its early stages were tied to
fluctuations in the British connection; and it was from Britain th at
Lowell derived his machines to launch industrialisation firmly in Mew
England. The post--815 surges vestward into new cotton lands reflected
the interplay of American supply and British demand; British capital
played a large part in the developwent of the West in the 1830's and
again in the 1850's. And the vicissitudes of the post-Civil Var grain
farmer were only slightly less tied to the international economy than
those of the antebellum cotton farmer had been.
As American industrialization proceede4, even more profound structural
links developed between phases of growth in the United States and in
Europe. The pull (and, in some parts of Europe, the nush) of local
economic conditions helped determine the scale and rhythm of the
flow of imigrants to the United States. . The American take-off was
completed, a good deal of the new farm land put to work, the railways
pushed to the Pacific, and the basic modern industries initially manned
with a substantial and essential contribution from the imigrant labor
which began to flow with new momentum in the 18 40's from Ireland and
Northwest Europe and from Southern and Eastern Europe in the century's
latter decades. The rhythm of the imigration flow helped determine the
character of the world's investment and the pace of national growth rates.
Specifically, a close link emerged between surges in immigration and surges
in American construction of producers durable goods. 'oreover, there
was a tendency for surges in construction to follow those in imigration
and industi-ial investment as if the society had somehow to slow down
the pace of its industrial growth in order to build minimum housing
and other urban overheads for its enlarging city populations. In
Britain expanded capital exports paralleled periods of surge in immigra-&
tion to the United States, and investment at hom expanded when Americans
were balancing up their economy with construction.
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the American connections
with the world trading area widened out to the less developed areas outside
Europe both as markets and as sources of essential American imports, The
11B8
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intimacy of the European connection remained, however, despite the
virtual ending of American dependence on opital imports. The gap
that had existed since Washington's day between the nation's economic
links to the world and those it was prepared to acknowledge in the
world of military power and diplomacy thus persisted.
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Tys of Aggression and the Emergin World Arena
The Breakdown of the Settlement of 1815
As the nineteenth century moved towards its close, the surface
of relative peace among the major powers which had marked the era since
1815 iemained, and the popular habits of mind and expectations that
vent with it; but tension rose in the chancelleries as new forces
began to emerge and clash in the international arena In Furope the
mid-wentury conception that colonial connections would wither away
gave way to a new concern to hold or to acquire colonies. Germany,
having asserted itself in Central and estern Europe in the years
before 1871 and then having settled down to the tasks of industrializa-
tion, exhibited a new ambitious forcefulness in the 1890's, while Japan
moved out from the islands to stake its first claims on the mainland.
A few men at least in Britain, France, and the United States began
to examine the world power balance afresh; and outlays on armaments
everywhere increased.
The frictions and clashes among the powers towards the close of the
nineteenth century are conventionally grouped under the heading of
"imperialism"; and, under the influence of Hobson, Lenin, and others
they have come to be associated with changes in the world's economic
structure and the motives of those charged with economic policy. A
relationship does exist between the economic stages of societies and
military aggression; but it is a somewhat different relationship from
that usually implied. To explain the changes at work in the world
arena during the latter decades of the nineteenth century and to lay
the basis for analysing the era of chronic military struggle which
was to follow, it is useful to distinguish sharply three kinds of
aggression which can be related to the stages of growth.
Colonies
The first form of aggression to consider within- this framework
is that connected with colonialism. Both ends of the colonial
problem are likely to involve some bloodshed; that is, both the initial
intrusion of a more advanced society on a traditional society and the
moment when the colonial area, moving through the preconditions towards
modernity and growth, forces a withdrawal of the metropolitan power.
Colonialism arose in part because from the fifteenth century on
a world arena of power existed in which the European nation states
competed for trade, for bases of military advantage, and for what
was then military potential: bullion, naval stores, and the like. In
large part, however, colonies were initially established not to execute
a major objective of national policy but to fill a vacuum; that is, to
organize a traditional society incapable of self.organization (or
unwilling to organize itself) for modern import and export activity.
Normal trade between equals would have fulfilled the initial motivation
of the intruding power, and in many cases normal trade would have been
tidier, more rational, and less costly. In the four centuries preceding
1900, however, the native societies of America, Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East were structured and motivated neither to do business with
Western Europe nor to protect themselves against estern European arms;
and so they were taken over and organised.
Colonies were founded often because some economic group wanted to
expand its purchases or sales, encountered both difficulty in arranging
the conditions for efficient business and gross military weakness, and
persuaded its government to take responsibility for organizing a suitable
i
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political framework to ensure, at little cost, the benefits of expanded
trade,
But once colonial responsibility was accepted by the nation concerned,
the whole affair was transformed. It moved from the essentially peaceful
terrain of business to the area of national prestige and oower where
more primitive and general national interests and motives held sway.
Two specific consequences flowed from this transfer. First,
certain non-colonial powers came, as a matter of prestige and style,
to desire colonial possessions as a symbol of their coming of age.
Nothing in the capital markets of the Atlantic world or in their trading
patterns justified much ado about colonies, on strictly economic grounds,
from, say, 1873 to 1914. A bit more could be said for certain colonial
positions on military or strategic grounds. But the competition occurred
essentially because competitive nationalism was the rule of the world
arena and colonies were an accepted symbol of status and oower within
that arena.
The second consequence of shifting colonies from a limited economic
to major symbolic status was that withdrawal became a matter of national
prestige and, therefore, extremely difficult. Almost without exception,
colonial positions were acquired at relatively little cost and at the
behest of limited interests vhich *ould not have commanded national
supoort if much blood and treasure had been initially required for the
enterprise. The exit from imperial status, with a few exceptions, took
the form of bitter warfare or was accompanied by major, political and
diplomatic crisis. The experience of colonial administration created not
merely ties of economic advantage but also human memories of cumlative
effoit, achievement, and status--as well as of n'tional power and prestige...
extraordinarily painful to sever.
The ability of a colony to f orce the withdrawal of the metropolitan
power was also related to the dynamics of colonial rule. Although
imperial powers usually set up administrations and pursued policies
which did not optimise the developuent of the preconditions for take-off,
they could not avoid bringing about transformations in thought, knowledge,
institutions, and the supply of social overhead capital which moved the
colonial society along that Path; and they often included modernization
of a sort as one object of colonial policy.
In any case, the reality of the effective power that went with an
ability to wield modern technology was demonstrated, and the more thoughtful
local people drew appropriate conclusions. Ports, doeks, roads, and
railways were built, and a centralized tax s ystem was imposed. Some
col6nials were drawn into the minimum modern economic activities which
were necessary to conduct trade and to produce both what the colonial
power wished to exoort and what could profitably be sold in the expanding
urban and commercialized agricultural markets. Some modern goods and
services were diffused sufficiently in the colonial society to alter
the local conception of an attainable level of consumption, and the
opportunity for a western education was opened to a few. Sooner or
later a concept of nationalism, transcending the old ties to clan or
region, inevitably crystallized around an accumulating resentment of
colonial rule.
In the end, out of such seu.mmodernised settings there emerged
local coalitions which generated political and in some cases military
pressure capable of forcing withdrawal; but the coalitions and policies
apropriate for achieving independence were rarely capable of meeting
the subsequent needs for completing the preconditions and launching the
take-off into economic growth.
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In the late nineteenth century most of the colonial areas were
still traditional societies or not far advanced in the preconditions
stage, and, except for sporadic gestures of defiance, they were not
yet prepared seriously to contest colonial rule. The pattern of
colonialism was still spreading as Britain was joined by other major
powers anxious to assert their sense of enhanced authority by acquiring
hegemony over the traditional societies which still remained unattached
to metropolitan states. Thus the major powers confronted each other
in the Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa.
Local and Regional Aggression
The political process likely to precede or accomparg the early
stage of take-off can be directly linked to a numerous second category
of wars in modern times--local or regional aggkession.
Before an economy can take off into sustained growth an effective
national government must be formed. That goverrnent must be capable of
organizing the nation as a unified market, of creating and maintaining
a tax and fiscal system which diverts resources into modern uses, and,
in general, of leading the way through the whole spectrum of national
policy from tariffs to education and public health towards a modernisa-
tion of the economy and the society of which it is a part.
Such governments have usually had to be formed in the face of
opposition from powerful political and social groups rooted in
regionally based agriculture. These regibnally based groups were, in
the normal. case, finally overthrown by a coalition whose elements shared
only one solid common conviction: namely, that they had a stake in the
creation of an independent modern state. Historically, the coalitions
(essentially similar to those which forced the colonial withdrawal) have
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often had a political (or military) wing and On economic wing, each
wing representing somewhat different motives and objectives in the
formation of the new or modernised nation. In Germany there was the
coalition of Junkers and the Western men of comerce and industry; in
Japan the samurai and the grain merchants; in post-1 8 6 1 Russia the
counercial middle class and the more enterprising civil servant and
soldiers.
Once the new modern state is established and the economy develops
some momentum, nationalism can be turned in any one of several directions,
It can be turned outward to avenge real or believed past humiliations
suffered on the world scene or to exploit real or believed opportunities
for national aggrandizement which appear for the first time as realistic
possibilities. It can be turned inward and focussed on the political
consolidation of the victory won by the national over the regionally
based power. Or it can be turned to the tasks of economic, social,
and political modernisation which have been obstructed by the old
regionally based, usually aristocratic societal structure, by the former
colonial power, or by both in coalition. Thus, once modern nationhood
is established, different elements in the coalition may press to exert
the power of the newly trimphant nationalist political sentiment in
different directions; the soldiers may look abroad, the professional
politicians to driving home the triumph of the center over region, the
merchants to economic development, the intellectuals to social, political,
and legal refarm.
The cost of policq in newly created or newly modernized states
hinges greatly, then, on the balance of power which emerges within the
coalition and on the degree to which there is a balance between
alternative objectives of nationalism.
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Historically, it has proved extremely tempting to divert a part
of the energies of the new nationalism to external objectives, notably
if such objectives seemed to be accessible at little real cost or riska
Such early aggressive exercises have been generally limited in objective,
aimed at territories close to the new nation's own borders rather than
directly at the balance of Eurasian power: thus, Bismarokts neat military
operations against Drnmark, Austria, and France from 1864-1871; the
Japanese acquisition of substantial political control in Korea in
1895; and the Russian drive through Vanchuria to Vladivostok, which
lead on to the test of strength with resurgent Japan in 1904-05.
Nationalist ventures in local aggression often have substantial
political support, in part because an ebullient nationalism is widespread
irrespective !of social interests and in part because special interests
believe they will directly benefit from the new territorial acquisitions.
In addition, iC course, an externally directed "bloody shirt" policy
can help maintain cohesion in a society where the concrete tasks of
modernisation raise difficult and schismatic domestic issues which the
leader of the coalition would seek to evade if possible.
The early limited external adventures associated with late preconditions
or early take-off periods apoear generally to have given way to a phase
of absorption in the adventure of modernising the economr and the society
as a whole. The next dangerous age comes with the approach of
economie maturity.
The New and Precarious Power Balance in Eurasia
It is the differential timing of the approach to economic maturity
that best illuminates those changes in the world arena of power in the
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late nineteenth century which disrupted the settlement of 1815 and set
the stage for the great .struggles of the twentieth century,
The nineteenth century arena of effective power that Britain held
in balance consisted mainly of Western and Central Europe and the
maritime fringes of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Russia lurched
from one side of its Eurasian cage to the other, first to the west,
then to the east; but in the nineteenth century it could be held within
that cage with reasonable economy of force, as the Crimean and
Russo-Japanese Wars indicated. And the Western Hemisphere emerged
as a soecial sphere, closely related to but still separated from the
major power game by, the Monroe Doctrine and by the complex implicit
understanding with Britain hich gave it vitality.
In the three decades after the Civil War the four great areas-.
Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States--whose coming to maturity
was to determine the world's balance of power in the first half of the
twentieth century were at stages which did not lead to major aggression.
The world balance of power which emerged after 1815 was being rapidly
undermined; but this fact could largely be concealed except from those
professionally concerned with the problem of force .and potential force.
After the Franco-Prussian War, Germany settled down under Bismarck to
consolidate its political position and to move from a remarkable
take-off into economic maturity. Japan, after the Meiji restoration,
took about a decade tn consolidate the pre-conditions for take-off,
and, less dramatically than Germany, moved into the first stages of
sustained economic growth. Russia also slowly completed its pre-conditions
and, from the 1890's forward, moved into a take-off bearing a family
resemblance to that of the United States a half century earlier.
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The twentieth century arena, clearly beginning to form up in
the latter decades of the nineteenth century, assumed, then, this
form. Stretching East from Britain were new major industrial powers
in Germany, Russia, and Japan, rith Germany the most advanced among
them. In the face of this phenomenon, Britain and France were moving
uncertainly towards coalition, with Britain also beginning to look west
across the Atlantic for further support. And, poised uncertainly
on the rim of the world arena, groping to define a position consistent
both with its tradition and with its new sense of world status, was the
enormous young giant, the United States, its econbmic maturity achieved.
But the sweep of industrialization across northern Eurasia was
not uniform. Eastern Europe and China did not move into take-off.
They were still caught up in the early, turbulent, transitional
phases of the pre-conditions; and they were to provide peculiar difficulty.
Why should this have been so? Each of these two regions, if
attached to any major power, had the geographic location, population,
and long-run potential capable of shifting radically the Eurasian
power balance; but, lagging behind their neighbors in the growth
sequence, they lacked the political coherence and economic strength
to defend themselves.
In the end, it was the relative weakness of Eastern Europe and
China when flanked by industrially mature societies--their vulnerability
to military, political, and economic intrusion in their protracted stage
of pre-conditions--which provided the occasion fir the great armed
struggles of the first half of the twentieth century. Put another way,
it is unlikely that the world arena of competitive power would have
yielded major continental struggles to the death if colonial stakes
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and the impulses for local and regional aggression alone were at work.
It was the structure of Eurasia, where the control over Eastern Europe
and China threatened to determine the destirW of all the major mature
states, that primarily shaped war and diplomacy after the turn of the
century.
But in t he 1890's the implications of the differential stages of
growth in a competitive world area were still latent. Despite occasional
gunfire from the Yalu to Cuba, from South Africa to Manila Bay, it was
not too difficult to view the world as still held in balance by a
British relationship to Eurasia which prevented any one power or
coalition from dominating or threatening to dominate that area.
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Intimations of Change in American Diplomatic and Military Polic
The Pacific and the Caribbean
While forces in the world arena began to stir in many new directions
and the foundations of the existing balance of power were being altered
by the locus and pace of industrialisation in Eurasia, the United
States was primarily absorbed in bringing a continental economy to
maturity. Nevertheless, as with other sectors of the nation's life,
diplomacy and military affairs were marked by a series of events in
the 1880's and 1890's which forecast the break-up of the nineteenth
century pattern of American performance.
The diplomatic events which in later perspective take on significance
were the Samoan affair, in which the United States was willing to take
some military risk to assert its rights in the islands but (for the
decade 1889-1899) was unwilling to accept direct imperial responsibility
in a share-out with Britain and Germany; the annexation of Hawaii,
accepted in 1898 after five years of acute (and almost half a century
of chronic) vacillation; and the Cuban insurrection. The latter, which
had stirred the United States irregularly since 1868, moved the nation
into war with Spain when a powerful set of forces converged between
1895 and 1898: a peculiarly cruel suppression of insurrection; the
generation of widespread interest and heat through the popular press;
the bloving up of the "Maine"; a sluggish Spanish diplomacy; and an
American President both weaker than his predecessor and burdened with
a higher proportion of expansionists in his party.
All of those events had in cowmon four elements. First, the
nation's sentiment or prestige was caught up in the area by old ties
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of commerce or missionary effort. Second, there was an actual or
potential challenge from an imperial power, raising the question of
a vacuum which some potentially unfriendly (or competitively commercial)
power might fill if the United States remained aloof. Third, there
was an ardent and articulate minority urging that American duty,
American interest, and American destiny all required the acceptance
of new responsibility. Finally, both before and after the event,
the nation confronted and openly wrestled with the problem of reconciling
its new responsibility with its abiding commitment to the principle of
national self-determination. An American commercial interest was
present in each case; but in none does it appear to have been decisive.
When the ideological concepts of the new imperialism clashed with
those of t he old virtuous hemispheric isolation, M1cKinley successfully
defended the new empire with a negative rather than a positive formula:
"Don't haul down the flag."50 And, however cynical the Teller Amend-
ment, disclaiming intent to annex Cuba, may have been regarded by some,
the self-denying ordinance built into American history and values which
it represented was to prove immensely powerful in the subseouent half
century.
To the diplomatic incidents in the Pacific and Caribbean can be
added the early suggestion of a possible new American relationship to
Britain resulting from the rise of Germany. The vigor with which
the German consular and naval units played the game in Samoa in 1889
for the first time defined Germany as a potential threat to American
interests; and, although the Berlin negotiation ended the affair in
reasonably good order, the flare-up left some memories in the United
States. In July 1895 Cleveland and Olney asserted an American right,
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under the Monroe Doctrine, to insist on arbitration of the boundary
dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana; and they did so in
language designed at least as much to assert a general rise in
American power via a via Britain (and to outflank Republican exoansion-
ists) as to achieve a successful resolution of the dispute. The long-
delayed reply from London brought about a flare-up of anti-British
feeling in the United States which was evidently dangerous to the peace.
Moderate$ on both sides were aided, however, by the Kaiser's famous
telegram to Kruger which, by reminding Britain of the growing preten-
sions of Germany in Eurasia, made easier the acceptance of arbitration
in Latin America,
The emergence of the possibility of armed clash with Germany forced
on both sides of the Atlantic a re-evaluation of the contemporary sig-
nificance of Anglo-American relations- which helped prepare the way
(certainly in Britain, perhaps also In the United States) for the
alliance of the first half of the twentieth century,
Milita Policy
In 1875 a naval officer was dispatched to Europe to survey the
state of naval architecture.51 His report in 1877 posed a vivid con-
trast between the rapidly evolving European navies, using the new
technology permitted by steel, and the American coastal fleet made up
primarily of wooden sailing vessels of Civil War construction. For the
next two decades successive administrations and the Congress were torn
between an instinct to maintain some kind of naval parity with the
European powers and a concept of the nation's strategic position in
which coastal defense was virtually the only abiding naval task the
Congress was prepared to acknowledge as legitimate. The upshot was
a series of expanded naval appropriationb, starting in 1883, which
permitted the United States to have in hand a fleet of five capital
ships at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.
Over the fifteen years between 1883 and 1898 there was some accept-
ance of the concept that the Navy's usefulness might extend beyond a
rigid adherence to coastal defense. It was acknowledged, in pale
reflection of Mahan, that the fleet might be required to protect
American citizdns and commercial interests abroad; and, indeed, during
the 1890's the new longer-range vessels moved about the hemisphere and
the world, Dewey being at Hong Kong when war with Spain began and
Roosevelt s standing order was exeouted.
Nevertheless, the development of the new American Navy in the
1880's and 1890's reflected a considerable gap between professional
and popular thought* The first American battleships were rationalised
and initially presented to the public as instruments for coastal defense
wholly consistent with a national commitment to isolation; but the post-o
Civil War generation of American naval men felt themselves ready to
assume a place of professional and technical equality beside their
European counterparts. They studied European naval trends with
attention. Lagging Sherman's creation of the advanced training school
at Leavenworth by only three years, Luce set up the Naval War College
at Newport in 1884.
Aside from Captain Mahan, the men advocating a new navy were not
primarily interested in I new American military and naval strategy based
on a new concept of the American national interest, They were interested
in being firsterate operating professionals, part of a first-rate show,
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playing a role of dignity on the world scene. They sensed, vaguely
but surely, that the self-evident maturing of the American economy
would (and should) somehow result in the nation's taking its place
among the great powers, and that this required (and justified) an
enlarged and modernized navy at the earliest possible moment. But
their concerns were primarily tactical and technological rather than
strategic; and their primary goal Was enlarged appropriations. Stephen
Luce could argue in broad terms the case for a Naval War College; but,
one suspects, it was that part of his argument which hinged on the
"revolutionary" implications of "steam and the telegraph" that carried
the day.52
The Congress and the public were by no means prepared to support
a prompt transition from coastal defense to oeacetime status as a
major naval power in the 1880's and 18901s. They were prepared,
however, to stretch a little the old concepts of naval defense of the
United States and the hemisphere. In this setting, a combination of
ardent support from a purposeful minority, a vague tolerance for a
somewhat bigger and better navy within the Congress, and the self-
evident need to replace obsolescent vessels yielded the Great 14hite
Fleet.
Thus the trends which made a naval victory in Manila the most
striking engagement in a crusade to free the Cubans from Spanish
oppression were discernible well before the event; but, on the whole,
the evolution of modern technology probably accounted as much for the
vitality of the navy at the close of the century as the emergence of
new doctrines of the national interest and of the navy's role in
protecting it.
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Like the naval officer, the professional American soldier emerged
from the Civil War knowing that he had met with success a test at the
limits of modern war. He resented the rapid collapse and subseauent
neglect of the military establishment; and, like his fellow American
scientists and scholars, his mind and aspirations were stirred by
post-1865 developments in Europe-notably the rise of Germany and the
General Staff concept.
In Upton the army produced not a Mahan but a professional who
carried forward ardently the organizational principles of Washington's
"Sentiments", and in Colonel Wagner an officer who gave vitality and
distinction to the new, essentially tactical school at Leavenworth.
Unfortunately for the soldier, however, there was no technological
development in ground warfare equivalent to steel, steam, and the
torpedo; there were merely a new rifle and smokeless powder. There was
no ground force equivalent for the navy's elastic claim for an enlarged
order of battle to cover commercial interests abroad. No ground force
enemy could be identified in these decades except the Indian; and by
the 1890's even the Indian Wars were over. In consequence the Army
entered the Spanish-American Var grossly unprepared and served with
little distinction-but it emerged with enlarged permanent garrison
responsibilities in the new American empire,
Whereas the Navy of the twentieth century got its start in the
romantic last twenty years of the nineteenth century, the beginning of
the modern American Army dates from the appointment of Elihu Root as
Secretary of Var in 1899 and his response to the dour set of practical
problems in administration after the fiasco in Cuba.
Mahan and Mahanism
The strand of naval romanticism was important and powerful because
it was associated with the articulation of the first new concentions
of the nation's relation to the world since Washington, in which orocess
the writing and influence of Captain Mahan played a unique role. Mahan's
work developed from the requirement of teaching naval history at the
Naval War College, and he used the occasion of preparing his lectures
to present a whole series of propositions about sea power: nystical,
geo-political, economic, strategic, and tactical.
rahan-'e mixture of themes, generally presented ex cathedra or as
lessons to be drawn from history or contemporary situations, struck
responsive chorda in the emerging generation to which the Civil Var
was a part of recorded history rather than an inescapable personal
memory and fixation. Those whose thoughts were stirred or crystallized
by Mahan's writings came generally from the East and from a background
of advanced intellectual training and extensive transatlantic experience.
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt were his two most
famous and influential disciples; but among those concerned with the
nation's external affairs a knowledge of his doctrines spread through
magazine articles, congressional references, and word-of-mouth as well
as through his series of historical volumes.
The principal elements in Mahan's thought can be rearranged and
summarised in the following sequences
1. The balance of the world's power lies in the land mass of




2. Although the balance of world power hinges on the control of
Eurasian land, the control over the sea approaches to Eurasia has been
and can be a decisive factor, as the history of mary nations, most
notably Britain, demonstrates.
3o In t he end, naval power consists in the ability to win and to
hold total dominance at sea, which, In turn, requires a naval force
in being capable of meeting and defeating any likely concentration of
counter-force. A naval power must, therefore, maintain as a concentrated
tactical unit at readiness an adequate fleet of capital ships with adequate
underlying supporta
4. Support for such a force includes forward bases, coaling stations,
a merchant fleet adequate for overseas supply, and, perhaps, certain
territories whose friendship is assured at a time of crisis. It follows,
therefore, that a naval powmer should be prepared actively to develop
an empire as well as a substantial foreign trade and pool of cornercial
shipping.
5. The United States stood at a moment in its history and in its
relation to the geography of world power when its full-scale development
as a naval power was urgent.
6. The pursuit in times of peace of the prerequisites for naval
.power would have the following aneillary advantages: the challenge of
commercial and imperial competition would maintain the vigor of the
nation; acceptance of responsibility for Christianizing and modernizing
the societies of native peoples within the empire would constitute a
worthy and elevating moral exercise; and the 1whole enterprise would be
commercially profitable,
13-9
Before 1900, at a time *en te Oermans had still not moved
seriously towards continental doarsaos, and when the Japanese had
not yet defeated the Russian fleet, it wes difficult to dramatize the
underlying shifts in power within the 1!rasian land mass that were
teing place; and it would haLv Lbe evon more difficult to make
Americans accept consciously the nAion that the build-up of naval
strength was ultimately require ia erder that American influence be
exerted not merely defensively in Oe Atlantic and the Pacific but
also on the structure of pwer within Brasia. In Mahan's own writing
the full significance of propositions 1 and 2 were thus obscured and
slighted; for, if they were taken seriously, what was called for was
not 'an exuberant American effort to assert itself unilaterally an the
world scene but an expansion in its total military power--Army as well
as Navy--in alignment with those other natious which shared its interest
in avoiding a dominant concentretion of power on the Eurasian land mass.
Mahan was, it is true, steadily an advocate of Anglo-American underm
standing, and later, as the First Wlwd War approached, he helped articu-
late the nature of the American e interests in its outcome; but,
generally speaking, propositionm O Through 6 became detached from 1 and 2,
leaving Mahan, in his not influeno% mainly a propagandist for the expan-
sion of the American Navy and its frwvard bases, for the creation of the
Isthmian Canal, and for the onoontration of the battle fleet rather than
a consistent philosopher of the natute of the American interest and
expositor of its strategic position on the world soene.
Projected out into national pdloy the comfortable ambiguities
left in the exposition of MahaN and his followers had an important
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consequence. Whereas the technical requirements of the American strategic
position called for the rapid development of the concepts and attitudes of
alliance, the new doctrine was shaped to fit the mood of national assertive-
ness which welled up towards the end of the nineteenth century. Not only
such figures as Senator Lodge but also many key American naval officers
permitted themselves, for example, the luxury of being both advocates of
Mahan and twisters of the lion's tail,
The ambiguity between Mahanism and a correct interpretation of
Mahan's principles was crystallized, in a sense, by the somewhat ironic
role of the American Navy in the First and Second World Ware; when a
force who'e thought for long had been focussed around a decisive direct
engagement of battleships had to devote itself overwhelmingly to convoying,
anti-submarine patrol, submarine operations, and amphibious landings.
The aircraft carrier did, it is true, assume in the Second "orld Var
many of the old functions of the battleship; but the last American battle-
ship was put in mothballs before the first major battleship engagement
was fought.53 History in the twentieth century required, in short, that
the United States, in its own interest, exert power directly on the Eurasian
mainland with massive ground force units. The American Navy played an
indispensable and effective role in support of this process; and this
outcome was in no way inconsistent with Mahan's fundamental propositions.
But as Mahanism and the large view gained ground, towards the end of the
nineteenth century, there were no premonitions of the trenches of 1917-1918;
of the battles of North Africa, Italy, France, and the Pacific Islands of
1941 to 1945; or of Korea.
Nevertheless, despite the inevitable concealment of the full implications
of major power status for the nation in the emerging new world power structure,
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Mahanism was only partially accepted as national doctrine after the
Spanish-American War; and it appeared to be reversed with Vilson's
election in 1912, The Spanish-American War, and especially the
responsibilities that followed. it, ended--or at least radically deflated--
the mood of naval romanticism. There were hard and nasty problems to be
faced in the Philippines and elsewhere. But, more important, the advocates
of the Large View had to compete for public interest and attention with
the domestid yroblems and the pacific values brought to bear on them
in the Progressive period.
14
Continuity and Change in the National Style
The Shifting Balance of American Life
By 1900 the transition of the United States to industrial maturity
and the related shift in the balance of national life had a perceptible
impact on the national style. Some elements within it were reinforced
and heightened by the changes which took place; certain characteristics of
the national style persisted but their content and point of focus altered;
and certain quite new American performance characteristics began to appear.
The new elements by no means dominated the scene at the turn of the
century. The national style which emerged in the period between, say,
1815 and the Eastern railway boom of the 1840's proved reasonably aporo-
priate to the era of industrialisation. Neither urban nor industrial life
was a new feature of American society in the late nineteenth century.
Tocquevillefs characterization of the United States in the 1830's revealed
his awareness that there were already American qualities stemming from
substantial commercial and industrial activity; and his analysis included
a warning which would have sounded familiar to troubled reformers sixty
years later.54
"As the conditions of men constituting the nation
became more and more equal, the demand for manufactured comodi-
ties becomes more general and extensive, and the cheapness that
places these objects within the reach of slender fortunes becomes
a great element of success. Hence there are every day more men
of great opulence and education who devote their wealth and know-
ledge to manufactures and -who seek, by opening large establishments
and by a strict division of labor, to meet the fresh demands which
are made on all sides. Thus, in proportion as the mass of the
nation turns to democracy, that particular class which is engaged
in manufactures becomes more aristocratic* . . . The small aristo-
cratic societies that are formed by some manufacturers in the midst
of the immense democracy of our age contain, like the great aristo-
cratic societies of former ages, some men who are very opulent
and a multitude who are wretchedly poor...
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"The territorial aristocracy of former ages was
either bound by law or thought itself bound to usage, to
come to the relief of its serving-men and to relieve their
distresses. But the manufacturing aristocracy of our age
first impoverishes and debases the men who serve it and then
abandons them to be supported by the charity of the public, e 4 0
"I am of the opinion, on the whole, that the manu-
facturing aristocracy which is growing up under our eyes is
one of the harshest that ever existed in the world; but at the
same time it is one of the most confined and least danger6us.
Nevertheless, the friends of democracy should keep their eyes
anxiously fixed in this direction; for if ever a permanent
inequality of conditions and aristocracy again penetrates into
the world, it may be predicted that this is the gate by which they
will enter."
The problem posed for analysis by the United States at the turn of the
century is not that of a shift from a rural frontier society to an industrial
urban society but of a shift of balance within a society which throughout
contained both elements. Nevertheless, this shift of balance had identifiable
consequences for each of the three basic components of the national style.
Ideals and the New Dimensions of Nationalism
American ideals maintained their unifying function, but they were
brought to bear as a check and counter-weight to a somewhat new set of
special interests. In particular, the test of equality of economic and
social opportunity began to be applied to the now industrial combinations,
yielding as its main results, at the level of national policy, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Typical of the
general process whereby American ideals have been made effective, these and
other pieces of reformist legislation--national, state, and local-wrere
fought through in generally bitter struggles. On balance, the reformist
groups gathered strength in these decades as the gap between American
ideals of economic and social equality and the consequences of uninhibited
large-scale industrialism became increasingly clear,
On the other hand, for some the triiqtpant industrial achievements
of American capitalism led to a substantial identification of the nation's
ideals with the maintenance of a system of private enterprise free of
political restraint, As political life became centered on the form and
degree of governmental guidance, restraint, and control over the economy,
the concept of economic freedom as central to the nation's life was
reasserted with new force by those Aho saw no end to the new road of
reform short of the destruction of private markets and private property.
In addition to these contrapuntal applications of the nation's ideals,
nationalism itself assumed a somewhat new dimension. Down to the moment
when the flag was fired upon at Fort Sumter, American nationalism was a
limited and latent emotion. It had flared up on occasion; but there was
a sense in which down to the Civil War the United States maintained its
initial character as a somewhat precarious coalition among states and
regions sharing a glorious tale of how they came to live in freedom
but associated for few positive comeon enterprises. The victory of the
North in the Civil War and the willingness of the nation to expend so
much blood and suffering for its maintenance created at least in the
North and West a new and more conventional nationalism.
Both these new elements--a heightened concern with the maintenance
of economic and social opportunity and a more self-conscious and con-
ventional nationalism-were reinforced by the vast flow of inigrants
to the United States after the Civil War. Their initial attachment was
to the United States rather than to the regions in which they settled.
To them, as to the generation that had fought the Civil War, the national
flag became a powerful symbol. At the same time, the Iinigrant gave
increased vitality to the concept of the American nation as an ideological
rather than merely a geographical entity. Whereas the older stock
might come to take for granted the virtues and potentialities of conti-
nental democratic society, with its opportunities for social and
economic mobility, these opportunities had peculiar meaning to the
immigrant as he found his feet in American life and especially as he
surveyed the possibilities that might open for his children and grand-
children.
Finally the tentative and partial abandonment of isolationism with
the Spanish American War, the acquisition of the Philippines, and the
Open Door Notes posed, as it had not been posed since the 1790's, the
question of how American ideals should relate to the American military
and diplomatic performance beyond the Western Hemisphere.
From Agarian to Industrial Pragatism
The second characteristic of the national style--its absorption in
concrete, material tasks and the philosophic consequences of that absorp-
tion--was, in one sense, heightened by the experience of the post-Civil
War decades. The drama of driving the railways over the Rockids to the
Pacific, of exploiting the cattle ranges, grain lands, and mines along
the way, combined with the equal drama of pressing on to world supremacy
as an industrial power gave these years a peculiar physical intensity,
with a consequent lack of time or will for reflection.
The extent to which material pursuits were concentrated in industry
rather than on frontier and rural life increased. American pragmatism
moved, as it were, from a field of action focussed on the skills of the
frontier farmer to one in which it focussed on those of the railway and
mining engineer, the scientific farmer, and, as one moved to the older East,
those of the fundamental scientist, inventor, and philosopher.
At the expanding but still thin upper margin of intellectual life
the drama of American industrialization and the forces that it set in
motion produced refinements of thought and reflection--in harmony with
or in protest against what was taking plaoe.-..which Vere new to America-
at least since the initial generation of eighteenth century gentlemen
had passed from the scene, In philosophy there were Pierce, James, and
Dewey. The first Ph.-D, was granted at ew Haven in 1861; Eliot took over
Harvard in 1869; and the formidable ex periment in graduate education at
Johns Hopkins was launched in 1876. It was not only farmers meeting within
the Grange who contemplated the significance for American life of the rail-
ways-and who sought the- best way to reconcile their size and concentrated
power with the abiding values of a free society--but also, foom a somewhat
different perspective, the President of Yale.
In all this ferment, key Americans were stimulated by direct contact
with the life of Europe, not as observers, awed or arrogant, but increasingly
as equals concerned with similar issues. The spread of industrialization--
its techniques, problems, and institutions--was making the Atlantic vorld
more nearly kin than ever before. The underlay of feudal heritage in
the one case and of a still not extinct frontier in the other remained,
But it was significant of the times that Germany, the. new nation of Europe,
rather than Britain or France, was the most powerful direct influence on
the flow of American students and travellers who found congenial the German
emphasis on the practical applications of science and on the orderly energe-
tic pursuit of fact.
Thus, despite a new interest in abstractions larger than the American
scene or the terms of the immediate job, the center of gravity of American
life remained heavily empirical; and, despite Gibbs and a few other die-
tinguished basic scientists, American technology and science remained
continuous with the shrewd practicality of the style symbolized a century
or so earlier by Benjamin Franklin and Eli Whitney.
New Dimensions of Continuity and Success
The third basic element in the national style in the nineteenth
century was taken to be the fact of success achieved through the pro-
gressive -unfolding of relatively continuous processes. American problems
had generally proved capable of resolution by gradual change; and the
compromise solutions to conflict implicit in this method were cushioned
by visible material progress sufficient to provide rising standards of
welfare per head.
The post-Civil War sweep into industrial maturity fitted well this
aspect of the nation's operating style, confirming its validity, physically
fulfilling a destiny of continental completion and (in one limited dimension)
world primacy long latent in the nation's heroic image of its future.
The United States, as one of a special category of nations which benefitted
from the early fruition of an individualistic society in Britain, was not
forced to undergo a fundamental shift in political institutions, social
structure, and values before industrialization could take hold and
gather momentum. Despite alteration in scale, there was an underlying
continuity in the expectations of the nation and in its cumulative experience
from Hamilton's premature industrial experiments of the 1790's to the
status of world primacy in industrial output a century later ,
Embedded in the processes under way at the turn of the century were
certain issues for American life which in time were to alter its context
quite fundamentallywwthe ending of the frontier; the spread of large-scale
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bureaucratically organized institutions; the converging pressures, generated
at home and from abroad, to enlarge the functions of the national govern-
ment, But down to the turn of the century these changes in physical and
institutional environment, although recognized by a few, did not dominate
men's thought about the national scene. America roared into economic
maturity brushing the Grangers, Populists, and Bryan aside, Only then
the balance tilted, and the nation turned for a decade and a half to the
first phase of reconciling the conflicts in values which resulted.
Thus the national style which Tocqueville could define in the 1830's,
on the eve of the first great phase of American induStrialisation, was still
highly recognizable in the 1890's. The nation's commitment to strive for a
group of ideal solutions persisted and continued to serve as the principal
unifying force in a sprawling society which was absorbing immigrants at an
unprecedented rate, The direction of striving shifte4, and the Civil War
as well as the war with Spain added new dipansions of self-consciousness to
the concept of nationhood; but there was continuity in fact and in rhetoric
with a less urban and industrial, more isolated past. The tendency of
American life to be dominated by material pursuits was, on the whole,
heightened; and the nation's dominant philosophical cast was simply applied
on a wider range and articulated with greater clarity and sophistication
than before. Finally, the resumption of steady progress after the Civil
War, within the framework of old institutions and methods, dominated by
incremental change and compromise, made the period just before 1900 the
golden age of the national style in the nineteenth century. But, as in
other golden ages, the conditions for radical change were present and
observable just beneath the surface of affairs.
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Ideas and Reality: The Inevttable 'ap
Sir Lewis Namihr has written:
"A neurotic, according to Freud i a m-an doiniated by unconscious
memories, fixated on the past, and incapable of overcoming it-*
the regular condition of human zromunities,"
And Naier adds frua Tocqueville: "One is apt to perish in politics
from too mauch memory
Thu pace of ch~ange at homes and abiroad in the first four decads
of the twntieth century give these observations a srecial relevance-
The new element in the structure of American society generated in the
latter decades of the nineteenth century% <learly definable in the
18901S., came to dlominate the nation's affairsa, A homa the United
States had to adjust its economir lifO the underlying ide;ae of which
were based on solf -sdjusting Zaket prcesses of compeeting atomitic
units, to the roality of massive industrial :rd labor groupings; its
social life bap an to shift from the setting of the farm and concentrated
urban areas out to suburbs wtere the autonob;le be csme r central
tnstrument holding together vast metropolitar te ati ons tho
political process accumulated from many dircio ix: ew3 fonftione of
aoutrol az Llacation for which the rhetrorcAf noither Jefferson
nr H amiton sufficado A depremiog was ecounto e e deep and
introtable as to shak the nations confidance in propositlons abo-ut
the society r'iardy quest ioned n a hundred and itv years,
I
15-2
Fixations derived from the past, obscuring the character of
current reality, affected the course of domestic events in these
decades, much of the story of which cam be told in terms of an
effort to narrow the gap between instinctive responses and new
problem. But the most important gap lay in military and foreign
affairs,
The United States moved in the direction of a new view of its
relation to the world arena; but it moved at a pace which did not
conform to the rate at which new dangers and challenges to the
national interest emerged,, Memories from the century of hemispheric
isolation continued strongly to influence the nation's performance,
Aided by luck, the still limited nature of weaponse and the will and
strength of its allies, the United States did not perish from its
fixation on the past; but for it the nation paid a stiff price,
As the nation came to confront after 1900 a radically changed
external environment it was, indeed, to be expected th;t time wotld
have to pass before a wi~dely accepted set of ideas appropriate to
its new situation were developed. Such time lags are not unique
in the contemporary world. During the whole interwar period, for
example, Britain was haunted and rendered inefficient at home and
abroad by (somewhat inexact) images of pre-1914 normalcy. The
British Foreign Office persisted in a pattern of diplomatic per-
f'ormance based on inappropriate memories of the nineteenth cen-
tury balance of power in Europe which led to a tragic conflict
between British and French policies toward Germany, Eastern Europe0
anrd the European continent generally. France is to the present day
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still struggling to redefina its role in the world, imprisoned by
memories and conceptions which antedate 1870 at least. Where cloar
notions of the national interest develop and are translated into
operating military concepts they have generally developed out of
a long and recurrent 3nd usuaelr bloody national experience: for
examples the British senoitivity to the control of the Channel ports,
the French sensitivity to the avenues for German invasion Russian
sensitivity to the mailitary control of Poland. It is not surprising,
then, that a nation .hCh had lived successfully for over a century
under the banner of continental isolation should require some de.
cados of bitter experience before creating and accepting a new
concept of its interest and role on the vzorld scene and translating
that concept into a stable military policy--notably since its new
role was more demanding than the old.
A second reason for this lag is, again, general and obvious
enough. American domestic society offered its citizens an exciting
and rewarding set of challenges and tasks. Moreover, the values
pf American society placed a high premium on success at these dom-
estic tasks, and, relatively , a low premium on those associated
with military life and diplomacy in times of peace. The United
States is by no means the only modern democratic society which
turned from war to 2ace with excessive zeal and which during
Peace failed to devote serious and sustained thought and energy
to clarifying the abiding hature oft the national interest and
adting in c sttasined way to support it with Vigorous diplomadyj
d Xlitary strendh in B nge *' m d t ther derei-Oratic
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societies in this century, the American confusion about the nation-
al interest may have been more profound and its degree of uhprepar
edness extreme; but its indifferent military performance between
wars was not unique,
Thare is a third element, however, in the American experience
of the twentieth century which is unique and which accounts in sub.
stantial part for the acuteness of the nation's difficulty; the
problem of finding csalternative to the concept of continental is-
olation as an agreed definition of the national interest. The con-
tinental concept had united in a quite specific and delicately bal-
anced way the power interests of the nation and the ideological
image of its domestic commitments in relation to the world. In
the twentieth century the nation did not merely have to adjust to
a new constellation of power; it also had to redefine the relation
of its domestic values and aspirations to those of the rest of the
world.
There are, tius, two strands, related but distinguishable, in
the nationoa searc:h to protect the national interest over the per.
iod from tha Span:.sh-American War to the definite break-up of isos
lation and i1solat.onism with the Fall of France: the problem of
finding and articulating a concept of the national interest that
would relate the i.nstinctively felt power and ideological interests
of the nation; ancd the problem of assessing accurately the nature
of the concrete dngers which the nation faced as a result of the
changing contours of power in Eurasia,
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Tho story traced out here-of the nation's domestic evolution
and of its mili.tary and foreign policy performance between 1900
and 1941-is bcth the story of a nation wrestling with its history-
its image of itself-and the story of a nation seeking to understand
sr-d to cope witl& an increasingly threatening world arena of powere
II.~ n _Tg DToDmas~t,Aranitleim; alf a.._S A.M.3gdl
Aze ofQCorumersaDrbe
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The U22.1i tL o29 EI.atdin
The accommodation of American society to large-scale industrial.
ization has been accomplished by methods wholly in keeping with the
national 3tyle which emerged as distinctively American in the nine-
teenth century. This underlying continuity exists because the prob-
leis posed by industrialization were in fact new and heightened ver-
sions of conflicts built into the f oundations of a society dedicated
to the greatest good for the greatest number when the power to define
that good is left to reside to ihe maximum possible with the individ.
ual citizen.
To operate societies on the principle that i ndividul n&1
are the best judge of their own interest-the individualist-utilit-
ar!.an creed--is a powerful and pervasive comitment; but it poses
as many problems as it solves. The concept that each man, a unique
soul sovereign in taste and preference stands equal before God,
the law, and the society's opportunities for self-expression0 immed-
iately sets up conflicting criteria for public policy
Cn the one hand, the individualist-utilitarian creed sets up
a vtrong presu-4ption in favor of a copetitive economy guided by
consumers preference, allocating monetary reward on the basis of
irdividual performance in the market, guaranteeing the security of
private property-in short,, a presumption in favor of private cap.
it alism as the dominant mode for maximizing the general welfare,
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On the other hand the same premises immediately raise quite
aside from those which derive from the imperatives of military
security in a world of sovereign nation states.
1. To what extent is it legitimate to interfere with a free
market econory in order to maintain equality of opportunity:
negatively through inheritance taxes and the control of monop-
oly; positively by mobilizing income in the hands of the state
for purposes of education, public healthetco 7
2a To what extent should the state act in order to perform
those economic functions necessary for the general welfnre
which the incentives of a private economy do not necessarily
induce on a proper scale and at the proper time: for example, the
construction of roads, canals, railroads?
3., To what extent should the state interfere in private mar-
kets to accolerate or to cushion processes of structural change
judged either necessary or harmful to the general welfare:
for example, by tariff protection or other forms of subsidy,
by efforts to control the general level of prices,, by a counter-
cyclical po.icy to deal with excessive unemployment?
4. To what extent should the state Vecognise that the most
natural (if psychologically ambiguous) assumption is that it
is possible to compare satisfaction as between individuals;
that the law of diminishing relative marginal utility applies;
that a dollar of income means less to .a rich man than to a
poor man; and that, therefore, the general welfare may be
increased by the transfer of income, through progressive tax=
ation0 from those relatively rich to those relatively poor?
In addition, cther values within the common 'Western creed
counsel simple human compassion, raising the real but quantita-
tively lesser question of the extent to which the state (as opposed
to individual charity) should allocate resources to the poor, the
a;ed, the overworked, the insane, and to others in need from what-
ever cause.
In certain matters the problem of balance was already familiar
In pre-revolutionary times--for example, the inflationist bias of
back.country formers set off against the hard money interest of their
urban creditors And key elements in the problem were, of course,
at the center of thought and controversy over the American Constit-
ution, which sought both to preserve a stable legal environment for
private capit lism-in whose markets powr could be acquired accorde
ing to talent eneryr, and luck.-and, at the same time, to give
acceptab~le meaning .o an individualist political system in which
each man had one vote. From that time forward reconciliation by
compromise remained the central theme of American polities, moving on
from one range of concreto issues to the next as the scale and tech-
nical method of the society gradually altered specific solutions
being found after protraoted debate and experiment and struggle,
In polities as opposed to abstract analysis and prescription
Jeffersons eptane as Prosident of the ma-jor Hamiltonian instit-
utions set the initial frame of national Copomise, which soon
embraced M arshall's concept of judicial review as well. And down
to the period of accelerated industrializati n that settlement
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(leaving slavery aside) left only three major areas of conflict:
the tariff, the National Bank, and the role of the state in financing
public improverents or social overhead capital as they would now
be called. These were good big political issues, capable of gener-
ating strong feeling; and they posed significant problems in pol~
itical rhetoric. In the case of South Carolina and the tariff
there was even a touch of danger to the unity of the nation. But
the conflicting regional interests, which lay behind these contro-
versies were an old American story in the second quarter of the
century and (excapting slavery) clearly compatible with the society's
basic presuppositions. The Jeffersonian vision of a nation avoiding
acute conflict between an atomistic electorate and concentrated
economic power by remaining predominantly a society of land-owning
farmers, of mechanica, and competing merchants maintained its
vitality.
With the surge into mature industrial status after t~e Civil
War, the problem Jofferson feared came fully to life. A whole range
of major issues of imbalance emerged and were increasingly recognized:
the concentrated power of the railroads and of the emerging new in-
dustrial combinations; the protracted vicissitudes of the comercial
farmer when caught in a downward trend period of the world trading
3.'
area; the unequal status of the industrial worker when forced to
bargain individuAly with a large scale modern enterprise; the lapping
over of concentrated economic power into the courts and legislatures
and even into the executive branches of state and national govern.
ments; the inappropriateness of a tariff policy designed to protect
infant industries in an age of American industrial primacy; the
inadequacy of a fragmented banking system the criteria of which
centered on the expected profitability of the individual loan to
cope with the aggregate financial problems of a modern continental
economy the parts of which interacted with increasing intensity
on each other and responded to the cyclical and trend movements
in the international economy.
Poets and politicians, journalists and novelists, preachers
and newly emancipated women, immigrants and college presidents spoke
the nation's uneasiness as it watched the day-.to-day performance
of the society and its institutions drift steadily from the creed
to which the nation was supposed to aspire. Powerful interests
could be rallied 'behind some of the measures of the Progressive
period; but it was a majority consensus that reform was in order,
What the reformers were saying was this: The mere expansion
of output was not enough; a society as rich as the United States
had become had the duty not merely to unfold the productive poss.
ibilities of a mature industrial economy but also to make the soc.
iety of which that econory was a part decent and livable ih terms
of non-economic c'iteria. Above all, the doctrine of equality of
opportunity had t, be reasserted in the face of the new concentra.
tions of power; and the political powers of the stt-te were an
appropriate instrument for bringing about this new balance.
The reformers were in abstantial neasure to have their way;
but meanwhile the economy itself moved on, driven irregularly for.
ward by the oower of compound interest; and the individual American,
voting through the market plecd as well as at the polls, decided
how these more or less regular additions to output should be used
in ways at least as revolutionary for the society as those brought
about by the reforming politicianso
Frm2M-ndstrial Etiritv-toLEonsumotion
The high level of income per head (relative to Western Europe)
which had always characterised the resource-rich American continent
and the consequent bias towards the abundant use of machinery in
manufacture combined with the scale of the American market and the
egalitarian mood of the society made it natural for the United
States to be the first notion to move beyond economic maturity into
the phase of growth centered on expanded mass consumptiono
As income expand a, men seek not rerely better food, shelter,
and clothing but also greater security (in the form of higher sav-
ings), the machines which make life easier and more mobile, and the
enrichment of life for themselves and their families through educ-
ation, travel, entertainment, and leisure. This drive for quality
and refinement in comsumption and for more non-material satisfaction
on a mass basis had profound material consequences. It gave added
momentum, for example, to the automobile, radio, moving picture,
and rayon industries, the growth of which reinforced the tendencies
which fostered their initial expansion by altering the composition
and distribution of skills in the working force.
The proximate basis for this self-reinforcing transition-
partly cause, partly result-can be seen in the changing character
16-7
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Class Divisions in the United States., 1870-1940
(in thousands)
I Farmers 34100 6,l32 5,6
IIe Working class 6035 19v730 29 v518
III. Middle class-old 1v532* 3,261 3,863
Middle class-new 756 5,609 12,769
IM. Upper Bourgeoisie -240
V. Total 110423 34,732 510655
"This tremendous growth of the new middle class is an integral part
of basic economic changes in the structural set-up of capitalism:
1. T-ae growing technical-scientific nature of industry, which calls
for constantly greater numbers of technical employees.
2. The increasingly complex nature of production and distribution,
and the separation of ownership from management in collective enterprise,
which calls for constantly grenter numbers of managerial employees.
3. The growing amount of planning, regulation, and control within
industry, and theconsequent need for more administration, which calls for
c6nstantly greater numbers of clerical employees.
4. The multiplication of -oods and leisure, which calls for more
employment in distribution and trade and for more 'ersonal and professional
services, the performers of which are primarily members of the new middle
class. The proportion of people employed in the production of physical
goods fell from around 75 per cent in 1870 to 50 percent in 19400 If
incomes and leisure go up again, as they can, it will mean more employment
in the performance of services.
5. The growth in the economic functions of government and of
public services, which has brought the grand total of all public employees,
rederal, state, and local, from around 175.000 in 1870 to 3,100,000 in
1930 and 3,200,000 in 1940, exclusive of relief workers. The small in-
crease shown in 1940 over ten years earlier was due to contraction in state
and local employment; federal employees rose from 580,000 in 1930 to
1,000,000 in 1940. Around one-third of public employees are workers
(including mail carriers); the balance of two-thirds are technical-managerial,
professional, and clerical employees."
* Estimated.
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of the working force in the early decades of the twentieth century,
exhibited in the following two tables which compare 1940 with 1900
for major categories of employment and 1940 with 1910 for the level
4
and character of skills.
The disproportionate rise of employment in utilities, trade
and services in support of an expanded level of consumption per
head clearly emerges, as does the concentration of increase among
professional persons, white collar workers, and the semi-skilled.
Grouping the census figures by class division. Lewis Corey
has dramatized the rise of what he describes as the new salaried
6
middle class in the following calculations,
Within the categories of manufacturing the shift to automobiles0
high grade foods, textiles, and other items of casumption emerges
from the following table showing relative growth rates in physical
7
output between 1899 and 1937 for major industrial sectors.
American society thus shifted not only from a farm to a city
base but also from unskilled labor (rural and urban) to white and
blue-collar jobs, the latter increasihgly in highly mechanized light
industries*
The Rise of Research and Develouent
The shifting structure of American industry yielded a new
dimension in its organization. and posed a new administrative problem,)
that of systematic research and deve3opment. Two rapidly unfolding
sectors of the economy, electricity and chemicals, were directly
linked to rapidly unfolding branches of science. In fact, General
16-10
Electric and Westinghouse originated as research units rather than
as manufacturing companies, and DuPont had long mait.tained orderly
and respectful relations with the world of chemistry. The automobile
industry in its first phase of growth was dominated by rifted mech.
anics and it has continued to bear this mark of its origI ns. Nevers
theless, with Sloan's reorganization of General Motor, 10 1920, a
new pattern was set, embracing a research department. Ard the example
spread into other branches of the economy. During tht Interwar years
the industrial research 1-boratory became an increasinily common
feature of the national scene. The first generation of Inventors
and brilliant gadgeteers gave way to a flow of competent profession-
ally trained engineers who both staffed the laboratories md, follow.
ing Sloan's example, rose to posts of executive responsit lity
carrying with them the tools and perceptions of organised innovationo
Outside of the chemical and electric industries the averag quality
of industrial research was not high, being directed mainly o short.
term commercial objectives. But the concept and hanbit of k inging
the fruits of science and engineering to bear on practical 1bleme
spread, and along with it the beginnings of systematic colla ration
between research conducted in industry, the universities, and
8
government.
There is, in retrospect, a real measure of structural conti.,,
uity in the period 1900-1940 centered on the creation of the weli re
state and on the development of the potentialities for consumptioi
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unfolded, however, in stages which can -e distinguished from each
other in both their economic setting and their political ar soi
mood: The Progressive period, roughly dated from Theodore Rooav
9
accession to the outbreak of the First World War - 1917-1929, t
years of the First World War and of the subsecuent decado of pros
perity and relative respit1 from reforn; and then, fin4y, the
prewar decade of depression and New Deal.
I
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The Seouenee of D omestic Evoltion
The Proressive Period
The Progressive period translated into national poli'cy the critical
attitudes and concepts, the dissident political pressures which had been
building since the end of the Civil War. But it was also an interval
marked by quite distinctive economic trends.
The quarter century starting in 1896 was colored by a chronic rise
in prices and, especially, in the cost of living. From the 1890's to
1941 Douglas estimated the rise in living costs at some 40 per cent;
10
measured to its peak, in July 1920, the rise was 195 per cent. This
rise, disproportionately centered on food prices8 had two powerful effects.
it gave to agriculture and the farmer' a sustained phase of relative pros-
perity, reversing the trend of the three post-Civil War decades; and it
placerd industrial real wages under chronic pressure.
Despite the rapid increase in total output, there was no increase
in the full time earnings of labor between the 1890's and 1914; and in
manufacturing there was a net loss of about 5 per cent between 1900 and
1914. It was not until 1921 that the purchasing power of a full-time
week's work in manufacturing rose above the 1890-1899 level. The rela-
tive sta-nation of real wages resulted not merely from rising costs but
also from a rapid increase in the working force derived from relatively
unrestricted immigration, which ran at a high rate down to 1914. The
pressure on real wages was, it is true, mitigated by the rise in real
wages outside of manufacturing and by shifts in structure of the working
I17-2
force in favor of higher income groups. l'oreover, during these the
average hours of work decreased, as did the average size of familiese
Nevertheless, the restraint on urban real wages was a serious fact of
American life; and it had the consequence of encouraging the urban citizen
to look outside the market place for means of redressing a balance in
income distribution which appeared to be chronically unfair.
Thus in the first two decades of the twentieth century the
relative importance of the rur-al element in the American reform move-
ment somewhat diminished, the role of the urban working man and his
11
aspirations increased. The farmer, increasingly skillful at making
his power felt as an organized minority group at the close electoral
margin between the major parties, maintained a strong influence; but
it is no accident that it was in these years that organized labor
rapidly expanded in the more mature industrial nations of the world.
And in Britain as well as in the United States the income tax was
passed into law. The Progressive period was much more than a response
to pressure on urban real wages; but it was given some of its political
strength and cutting edge from that fact.
Politically, the Progressive oeriod presents son'ethin of a paradox.
There is no doubt that in these years a sense spread through the country
that the nation must set goals for national policy independent of the
workings of the market place and that the national government must insure
that the workings of private capitalism did not violate iolitical and
social values. There is no doubt that the controversy between Progressives
and conservatives was deeply felt. couched often in terms of what was, for
American political discourse, ideological extremes. On the other hand,
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the legislative fruits of this ardent period-notably at the national
level.-were modest: a mild reduction in the tariff, a linited exemption
of labor from prosecution under the Sherman Act, an overdue central banking
system of limited power, a cautiously administered Federal Trade Commission
and so on. It is indicative of these years, do#inated rather more by
strong moods than strong policies, that the most important of the reforms,
the income tax, rejected in a bitter struggle as unconstitutional in
1894, slipped through the Congress quietly under the administration of
President Taft in 1909, to be ratified four years later. Put another way,
at the level of national policy, the Progressive period translated its
mood into significant precedents rather than into powerful new institu
tions. At the level of state government there was variation in progress-
ive strength and initiative; but in some cases legislation went far
beyond that accepted nationally, providing experience anid precedent
for later New Deal efforts.
The Wartime Exerience
The concept that the nation had larger objectives to which the
market econonr must conform was applied in new directions with great
force in 1917-1918. The contentious debate on the balance of domestic
policy (trailing off, in any case, since 1914) was dropped or suppressed;
and the nation's full powers of organization were used to mobilize re-
sources around a common task. Mianpower, agriculture, and industry were
geared to the requirement of developing, equipping, and supplying mass
arnies. A high proportion of the American war effort never had impact on
the European battlefields because of the timing of the war; but the
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experience of mobilization for war, including the experience of business-
men in government, cross-cutting as it did the peacetime image of the
state's proper relation to the world of affairs, left a mark on the
nation's thought and performance characteristics which was in its way as
profound as that of the Progressive period.
The_ 1920's
The next major stage into whic : the nation's evolution in this
century falls is that from 1920 to the onset of the depression in 1929-
the famous twenties, the exploration of the literature and mores and the
politics and personalitibs of which has already yielded a vast library.
Economically, the trends reversed which had dominated the years since the
mid-1890's; that is, agricultural prices tended to be low and falling; 12
but the industrial real wages surged forward. Under these circumstances
the industrial working force was relatively complacent 0 and trade union
membership, after its sensational rise in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, ceased to expand. Once again the American farmer..
notably in the basic crops-was in a reformist mood; but lie failed to
rouse the country sufficiently or to control the political balance in
such a way as to force Coolidge~s hand on the remedial legislation which
he could still exact from Congress but was regukarly vetoed.
The aktion remained essentially complacent with regard to the
economy, The most significant initiatives were those of the confident,
constructive Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, who sought to use
the powers of the government actively to improve the setting of bus.
iness decisions and busineds life in general. It is in these years that
'r
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the cheap automobile, the electric ice-box, the radio and the familiar
durable consumers goods of the twentieth century became mass phenomena;
and, structurally, the industries which produced them or which (like
petroleum and rubber tires) were closely linked with them surged for-
ward. And the process of suburbanization accelerated to match the
range and flexibility of the automobile; the peak rate of urban growth
shifted in the 1920's from the zone 0-5 miles at the center of metropol-
itan areas to the 5-10 mile zone, which remained the zone of maximum






Per Cent Change of Popula tion in the
United States, in Metropolitan Areas,
and in the Area Outside of Metrpoplitan
Areas, 1900-1950
1940- 1930- 1920- 1910- 1900-
Type of Place 1990 120 1910
Total United States
Population 16.5 7.2 16.1 14.9 21.0
All Metropolitan areas
reported 22.0 8.1 28.3 26.9 34.6
Central cities 13.9 5.1 22.3 25.2 33.6
Satellite areas 35.6 15. 44,o 32.0 38.2
Area outside metropolitan
areas 6.1 6.5 79 9.6 16.4
Number of Metropolitan
areas -08 140 97 58 414
Per Cent Change of Population in
Standard Metropolitan Areas, by typ
of place and distance from central
city, 1900-1950
Standard Mtropolitan Areas
1940- 1930- 1920- 1910- 1900--
Distance Zone 19o, 20. 1920
All areas 19.7 8,0 24.9 214.5 29.1k
Central cities nl..8 5.1 21.4 25.9 3145
Satellite areas 31.6 12.6 31.0 2262 26.0
0-5 miles 23.6 10.4 26.3 29.3 27.9
5-10 " 36.3 15.0 41.2 23.14 9.
10-15 " 32.2 11.6 25.A4 20.3 24.9
15420 " 32.9 13.4 32.7 21.8 22.9
20-25 " 30.6 13.5 34.9 20.8 24.1
25-30 " 23.2 9.6 24.2 19.0 23.7





The decade of depression after 1929 poses tvo key qaestionar
Why did the slump go so deep?O Why did the upswing fail to yield
reasnably full employment? Unemployment was an unprecedented 25 per
cent of the eivilian labor force in 1933; it was still 17 per cent in
1939, after six years of purposeful effort by the government to excpand
the level of employment.
Despite the profound influence of the economic collapse of 1929-
193 on the nationa- history, the analytie literature on the problem
is relatively thin; and almost two decades later there exists among
profesrional economists no agreed answer to the two questions.,
Mtr own view on these issues, which relates directly to one of
this book's basic concepts-- the stages of growth-- is as follows.16
The Background. The American business -expansion from 1921 to
1929 was essentially a normal trade cycle expansion. The fact that it
was not marked by an inflationary rise in comodi'y prices was (contrary
to the contemporary view) quite normal for an expansion taking place
in a downward trend period. Like all cyclical expansiols, it was rooted
in certain specific leading sectors appropriate to the stage of growth
and profitable at the time-rnotably, housing, automobiles, and the
industries and facilities associated with their- rapidly expanded use
(including roads), electricity, and electricity.using consumer goods. 17
The leading seotcr of the United States in the 1920's differed from
those of the past '(for example, railway construction, the application
of steel in ship-building and aachine construction, eta.) mainly in
their relatively direct dependence on an expansion in consumers'
ineove and on consumersl confidence. Installment and mortgage credit
underlay the expansion in good part; and the areas of expansion in
consumption were substantially postponable if not actually non-9ssential.
Although marked by a financial boom and crash of peculiar ampli-
tude, the downturn of 1929 was in no way unique and in no way determined
in itself a depression as deep and intractable as that which followed.
But given modern history, a period of depression was to be expected
after so prolonged a boom. If nothing else, the waning of the postwar
housing boom (fzom about 1925) made likely, if not inevitable, some
form of downturn and rechanneling of enterpriset.
Why So Deep? The depth to which depression proceeded was due
primarily to three special circumstances, each of which resulted in the
breakdown of fundamental economic institutions. in the course of the
slump; and each breakdown in turn drove the process of depression to
new low levels--both because incomes were lowered and because the con-
fidence of men in one another and in the economic institutions of
which they were a part was damaged0
First, the farm situation. The First Wr ld War drove farm prices
and output, as well as farm values, to le vels which could not be sus-
tained in the 1920's; and the slump after 1929 hit agriculture at a
moment of chronic over-supply as well as financial vulnerability, The
fell of farm prices, income, and values in the period 19294933 was
thus quite abnormal, leading not only to severe reduction in effective
demand from that quarter but also to severe damage to the credit and
banking structure that hinged on the market value of basic crops.
I
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Second, the financial system in general. Starting in the second
half of 1930v a series of failures occurred in the badly fragmented
and vulnereble American banking system, each of which further damaged
confidence and contributed to still lower levels of employment. Sim.
ilarly, the progressive decline in stock and real estate values lowered
consumption outlays based on high expected yields and, more generally,
damaged confidence and the willingness of man to accept the riska of
long-term enterprise.
Third, the international system of finance and trade. The inter-
national trading system became dependent after 1919 on a flow of Amer-
ican loanas, notably to Germanyd These dollars permitted reparations
and war debt comitments to be honored-after a fashion; and, more
generally, they supplied to the international system an infusion of
dollars which was necessary for convertibility, given limitations on
dollar-earning capacity. American capital exports began to decline
as early as 1928, funds being kept at home to exploit expected high
rates of return in domestic industrial investment and stock market
speculation Under depression conditions American capital flows were further
reduced, notably from 1931 when the international financial structure
broke down with crises in Central and Western Europe. In Britain,
Scandinavia, and the sterling area generally recovery can be dated
from the last quarter of 1931; but Germany and the United States
spiralled into a further year of depression.
Confronted by a depression which was breaking through basic insti-
tutional floors and spiralling to progressively lover levels, govern-
mental authorities in Washington (as in Berlin) made no determined
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effort to reverse the course of economic events as opposed to cushioning
certain of their consequences; and unemployment rose to a level close
to the likely aimn (in a system not yet actually chaotic), given the
limits set by the proportion of income spent on consumption and by tech-
nieal limits on the possibility of runsing down inventories and consu-
ing capital.1
Why So Long? Why was there still 17 per cent unemploymnt on the
eve of the Second World War, a decade after the depression had begun?
Although many ancillary forces undoubtedly played a partq the cen-
tral reason for the intractability of the depression was that the lead-
ing sectors of this phase of American growth-the automobile, suburban
hoe-building, road-building and the extension of the automoblie end
other durable consumers goods to an increasing proportion of the total
population-required full employment and an atmosphere of confidence
to become reactivated on a scale sufficient to induce expanded invest-
ment in the industries which served these consumption sectors. When,
in earlier stares, the momentum of growth hinged on the continued extei-
sion of railroads or on the introduction of cost-reducing industrial
processes or new products, investment could be judged profitable even
at low current levels of effective demand. This could also be true
of circumstances in which a postponed demand for basic housing or the
expansion of acreage for grain were the leading sectors. But when
investment came to center around industries and services based on'
expanding consumption, full employmnt was needed, in a sense, to
22
sustain full employments for unless consumption levels press outward,
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capacity in consumer goods industries and those supplying them will
be under-used, and the impulse to invest will be weak. The housing
boom of 1921-1925, with its special dimension of requirements post-
poned by war, lifted the economy to a relatively full employment level;
and the expansion of real incomes, supported by expanding installment
and mortgage credit, held it there to 1929 even though support from
housing waned.
- Thus once depression had been permitted to proceed to the depths
of 1933, a much larger and bolder government program of income expansion
than that undertaken by the New Deal would have been required to react-
ivate the leading sectors which sustained the American econoMr in the
1920's and were to do so agan (with certain modifications) a quarter
century later in the decade after the Second World War. The Second
World War pulled the American econory beck to full capacity as no
other f orce could so easily have done,
If this view is correct, a downturn about 1929 was, in some mean-
ingful economic sense, inevitable; but there was nothing economically
inevitable abont the depth of the depression or the intrattable char-
acter of the slump. In the fece of a decelerating population increase,
a fall in inaigration, and a recent housing boom, the mintenance of
relatively continuous full emplcmient would not have been easy, It
my well have required quite massive government intervention or subw
sidy, for example, with respect to slu-rrclearance and to low income
housing. But the basic problen did not lie in the nation's economic
setting. It lay in its thought about the economy.
17-12
The nation was neither intellectually nor politically prepared
to deal with unemployment on the scale required in the per$ od 1929-
1933. The business cycle had been present over the whole of the
natin's life; and it had been accepted as a rhythm outside the
scope of public policy to correct-..even though the fortunes of Amer-.
ican politicians had been intimtely tied to that rhythm.
From the first decade of the twentieth century an increazsing
amount of research on the business cycle had been proceeding on an
orderly academic basis, with suggestive, if occasionally odd, proposals
from the nonprofessional wings; but it had yielded no coherent general
view of the dynamics of the economy and no persuasive concepts for
22public policy. There was no consensus, no framework of accepted
ideas and institutions, within which Americans could bring the national
gift for operational vigor effectively to bear on a major depression.
The theories that were brought to bear both by Hoover and by the New
Deel on the problem of recovery were an extremely confused mixture.
Hoover was committed to the doctrine that the econory would right
itself, as it had often done in the past, if its central processes
and private institutions were not tampered with and if the government
helped from the sidelines with a posture of confidence supplemented
by advances of credit to cushion the impact of deflation on certain
major business institutions, Aa compared to some in his Cabinet
(notably, Mellon), Hoover was an activist, as indeed he had been
during his period as Secretary of Commeree; but he feared that the
occasion of depression would be used by refcrmrs unsympathetic to
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capitalism as he understood its institutions and working mechanisms to
make radical change in the notion' s economic and social life and in
its values. Under these circustanCes it was inevitable that Hoover's
posture ouli appear negative and the actions undertaken by the national
government le te and inadequate, although he felt at the time and has
continued to feel that his administration acted boldly end with vigor.'
Hoover's dilemma was similer, in a sense, to that of the German demo-
cratic politicians who were his contemporaries, men so deeply marked
by memories of post-1918 inflation that they were rendered incapable
of dealing vigorously or whole-heartedly with deflation, and who thus
helped substantially to prepare the way for Hitler, In both aSses men
of less strength and integrity, more opportunistic and less confident
in their understanding of the economic process, night have been more
effective agents of their nationes interestso
The New Deal
Frustrated by this ideological semi-a relysis, the nation responded
positively to Franklin Rooseveltes statement in 1933 that he recognised
the existence of a major national crisis and proposed to act with vigor
and confidence in the face of it. So far as unemployment was concerned,
he lacked a program, nobably since he had campaigned on the principle
of a balanced budget; Pnd his program was vague in other directions
as well0  In a deeper sense, however, the concept of a program of action
had quite concrete reanng given Roosevelt 9 s administrative method;
fcr he gathered around him in the Etecutive Branch-and released in
the Congressional Branch--every variety of activist. There was no
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national. plen; but there was a competitive contest to apply every
partial insight or national experience which seemed relevent to the
nation's cr8isis, Rooseveltts first term is a climactic bringing toi-
gether--an orchestretion--of men, ideas, orid policies formed over the
previous half century's naticnal debate, study, experiment and exper-
ience.
The New Deal broadly combined the mnood and heritage of the Progress-
ives and that of the War Industries Board of 1917-1918. Looked at
closely, however, one can detect more particular elements -- from the
Grangers and bi-metallists to labor leadergy from the disciples of
Veblen and Wesley Mitchell to those of Irving Flsher, fro social work-id
ers to bankers, Men who learned how to opeate in the setting of
state capitals, who had operated in Wall treet, who had never operated
before outside a college campus and academic politice, who had never
before held a job -- all were put to work side by side in the fever-
ish setting of Washington in 1933.2 Roosevelt released and organ!
ised in the New Deal the national gift for action in the fece of pal-
pable problems guided by ad hoe theories of linited generality
in two specific respects the New Deel can be regarded as a major
sucCeEss of the national style. Iaving the problem of massive anem-
ployment aside, the nation made a series of limited, specific innova-
tions, each with a substential history of prior thought, debate, and,
in some cases, state-level experiment behind it. This was so with
respect to farm policy, social security legislation, ben king and
securities legislation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and even the
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enlargement of labor's rights to organise and bargain collectively.
Behind what sometimes appeared the hasty and casual labors of the
Executive Branch end the Congress in New Deal days were men with long-
acountilted knowledge and concrete particular purposes which were
shared by substantial constituencies and backed by serious staff work.
It is for thatreason that so much of the legislation passed in a
flood during the first New Deal phase proved, with minor modification,
acceptable in the subsequent generation. The New Deal altered the
balance of power between the Federal -Government and the private markets
and among the major social groups competing for shares in the national
income along linea that conformed to powerful trends of thought and
feeling which-the depression of 1929-1933 having occurred--could have
been further frustrated only at increasing danger to the society's
stability
Technically, the Now Deal performed successfully a second task
It strengthened the ihatitutiohal foundations of the econoer in such
a way that it was likely to be less vulnerable to a cyclical downturn.
The government became comitted automtically to cushion declines in
farm incomes as well as income losses due to unemployment; the banking
structure was given an adequate insurance basis; and the capital markets
were put under rules and a surveillance that were to prove wholesome.
The institutional floors within the United States which had caved in
during the decline of 1929-192 were not only reimpaired, they were
also strengthened. The measures that accomplished their repair were
also, of course, measures of reform; and as such they involved the
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alteration or extension of faniliar institutions or the creation of
institutions lorg canvassed. Here, too, then the New Deal was at
home with its problems, and it could draw on concepts, men, and exper-
ience directly relevant.
With respect to the problem of recovery policy there was no equiv-
alent body of experience or consensus. In his 1933 mood of mixed deter-
mination and profound intellectural uncertainty Roosevelt reached back
to the last greet netional crisis the nation had faced, the First World
War, and created the National Recovery Administration on analogy with
the War Industries Board. Its underlying conception--that price stab-
ility and wage increases achieved by negotiation w ould stinmlate re-
covery-was incorrect, tending to raise the costs vithout in fact
increasing the level of effective demand. The NR absorbed and disai-
pated in the course of 1933 a good deal of the nati on's initial emotion-
s1 'response to the new President's mood and probably slowed down the
prooess of recovery. It was removed from the scene by the Supreme
Court in 1935, leaving behind the Wagner Act and.a substantial addition-
al heritage of reform, but otherwise only relief that the way was
cleared for a more rational and effective approach to revival. (rad.
ually, however, out of the maze of debate and experiment it did emerge
that the central task was to increase effective demand; and the national
budget was used in various ways to this end. The powere of government
were never used, however, on a scale and with a conviction capable of
bringing the economy back to full emnploymtnt,2 6
As the 1930's wore on governmant and private economic institutions
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appeared to settle into a kind of acceptance of substantial unemploy-
ment as a way of life. With no clear understanding of the deflation-
ary impact of current government policies, and with J per cent still
unemployed, leaders in and out of Washington appeared to panic in 1937
at a modest tendency of prices to rise; and the nation plunged into a
sharp recession from which it had not fully recovered by September
193827 It tock the war-and the war in its most desperate stage (1942-
1943).-to make the nation rediscover its full economic potential and
to alter the dour expectations on which private investment decisions
in the 19302a appear to have been made.
The Depessionk the National Style and the National Interest
The New Deal exercises in employment policy--a pr oblem requiring
radical innovation in a short period of time.-thus saw the American
style yield a quite mediocre result0
American society was, however, sufficiently unified on essentials
and sufficiently resilient to carry the burden of chronic unemployment
without fracture; and the existence of a high level of unemployment
at the outbreak of the Second World War made the relative burden of
the war economy light; for increased military output could come sub-
stantially from increased employment rather than decreased consumption
If one were to apply merely the criteria of domestic performance to the
American experience of the Great Depression., one might pay that this
shocking affair was successfully weathered and the American style vin-
dicated; for out of the New Deal experience, the Second World War, the
growth of conceptual knowledge, and a gathering popular conviction
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that severe unemployment was unnecessary there emerged a remarkable
postwar consensus both as to the character of the employment problem
and the techniques for dealing with it by public policy in a political
democracy.
But from at least 1917 forward an assessment of American domestic
poiicy has an extra dimension; for the manner of solving or failing to
solve domestic problems cam increasingly to affect the world euviron-
ment of American society and ultimately, the American national interest
From this perspective, in all its many ramified consequences through-
out the world and back on th the United States, the confusions of the
Hoover and Roosevelt administrations in dealing with the problem of
unemployment proved costly. The national style failed to grip and to
solve promptly a problem in radical innovation
III. The Third Transition. World Power Status
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The National Interest in Concept and -Actions 1898-1920
The Rise and Decline of the Large View
The American wars down to the SpanishAmerican War fitted well
into the ideological (as well as the power) framework of the conti-m
nental policy. The concept that the United States had a mission to
pioneer in North America a democratic society different from and
better then those of Europe gave& moral sanction not only to the Rev-
olutionary War and to the War of 1812 but also, to some extent, even
to the Mexican War and to the progressive decimation of the Indiane.
In the North the ruling rationale for the Civil War as articulated by
Lincoln also conformed to a persistent image of American purposes;
that is, the notion that a Northern victory was required to demonstrate
that a society based on the American democratic creed c ould survive
on a unified basis.
Of course, none of the American wars, even the Revolution, was
fought out wholly in terms of such high and fundamental motives. An
element of civil and class strife ran through the Revolution; and the
enterprise was decisively supported by the alliance with autocratic
Franme. New England by and large opposed both the War of 1812 and the
Mexican War on grounds wh ich united local economic interest and a
measure of idealism The Northern war effort during the Civil War
was maintained only against a powerful drag of antiwar sentiment,
and it was supported by regional economic and political interests
quite distinct from large ideological objectives. Such a mixture of
motives, some converging, some at cross-purpones with large national
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conceptions, attend all human affairs. it is, nevertheless, true
that the military engagements of the United States from the Revol-
ution down to 1898 converged with the nation's ruling conception of
its destinyr to protect a unique experiment in the organization of
free men by dominating this continent and hemisphere and maintaining
a distant and detached relation to the rest of the world.
The Spanish-American War was a different case, despite the wave
28of feeling evoked against Spanish imperialism in Cuba, Among the
forces which led to that war was a vaguely expressed and widespread
sense that the United States was emerging into a world power status
28 The dilerna of a conservative, in the cool tradition of Quincy Adams,
on the eve of the Spanish4merican War, is well illustrated by Elihu
Root's statement:
, ., .Fruitless attempts to hold back or retard the enormous
momentum of the people bent upon war would result in the des.
struction of the President's power and influence, in depriving
the coutry of its natural leader, in the destruction of the
President's party.. . . I deplore war. I have earnestly hoped
it zlight not come. I deny the obligation of the American people
to make the tremendous sacrifices which it must entail, not only
of the treasure but of life, for the purpose of aiding the Cubans
or snr other people. I agree with the President that it is not
his duty to aeardfice his own people for the benefit of others,
but I cannot doubt that if the American people wish to make war
upon Spain because of her acts in Suba, if they are willing to
make the sacrifices required, they 'hie a moral right to do so.
The Cuban cause is just. The Cubans are exercising their in-
alienable rights in their rebellion. .. . - When we take up their
just quarrel we are doing no wrong to Spain and violating no
law divine or international, I prefer that we should not do it;
I don't think we are bound to do it;- I would prefer it if I
could; I think the President has been right in trying to prevent
it; but if it is to be done, then every American ought to be for'
the war heart and soul, and first and foremost and without the-
slightest question should be the President of the U. S. "
P. Jessup, lihu Root, New York, 1938, Vol. I.,, po 197.
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which transcended the limits of the Monroe Doctrine; and the course of
the war was affected if not determined by a quite precisely defined
set of strategic concepts and tactical objectives held within a smel
well-placed group of Americans who had come to think of the American
naval interest and responsibility in the Atlantic and Pacific along
lines laid down in the Mahanist doctrine.
The so-called Large View was not without its ideological conpon-
ent, Mahan himself had deep religious convictions, and through his
writings runs the theme that mutually beneficent mdral results would
flow from the new American imperialism. It is hard to read Mahan
without feeling a sense of happy accident which united a Christian
mission, economic advantage, and American military interest. But in
the late Victorian Anglo-Saxon world, Mahan vas not unique in views
which his biographer sumarizes as follows:
It was a short step from his philosophical imperialism to
the humanitarian imperialism involved in the concept of the
"white man's burden." Mahan ephasized beneficence to the sub-
ject peop3e. "Materially," he said, "the interest of the nation
is one with its beneficence; but if the ideas get inverted, and
the nation sees in its new responsibilities, first of all,
markets and profits, with incidental resultant benefit to the
natives, it will go wrong."
This Christian expansionist saw involved in the nation's
answer to the call to assume the burden of beneficent imperial-
ism its possible growth or decadence. Said her "To right
what is amiss, to convert, to improve, to develop, is of the
very essence of the Christian ideal; . . . comparative religion
teaches that creeds which reject missionary enterprises are
foredoomed to decay. May it not be so with nations?" After
the signal acquisitions by the United States at the turn of the
century, Mahan wrote, "What the nation has gained in expansion
is a regenerating idea, an uplifting of the heert, a seed of
future beneficent activity, a going out of self into the world
to commnicate the gift it has so bountifully received,"
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Such a sense of paternalistic responsibility undoubtedly had
meaning to some of those who first undertook the American administra-o
tion of the Philippines; and, although imperialism was vigorously
opposed within the couhtry, Bryan was wrong in thinking that resist-
ance to the annexation of the Philippines was a sufficient force to
turn the election of 1900. Nevertheless, the deeply rooted concepts
which determined the American view of the nation's role in the world
ran counter to Mahan's vision of the United States as a paternalistic
imperialist power. The nation was always somewhat awkward as a keeper
of colonies on the British model. It evaded full responsibility for
the administration of Cuba by 1905; and, although the United States
stayed in the Philippines, it was within a clear and urgent comitment
to Philippine independence and a chronic sense of uneasiness and
even of failure at home.
However, in the first decade or so after the Spanish-American War,
the Large View was not dependent either on any particular conception
of the American interest or on an American version of the imperial
views of Joseph Chamberlain and Rudyard Kipling. It arose from a
widely held and widely expressed judgment that history-in some
indefinite. but meaningful sense--had moved the nation towards a met-
urity which required a new and more professional approach to military
and foreign policy.
Elihu Root, perhaps more then any of his contemporaries, reflected
this instinctive workmanlike acceptance of now tasks and ,responsibilities
without an elaborate or precise rationale. Up to 1899 Root exhibited
a minimal interest in foreign affairs. Unlike Lodge, Mahan, ard
Roosevelt, he had not shared either in fact or in sympathy the adven-
ture of the Spanish-American War, He was brought into the War Depart-
ment by McKinley as a competent and widely respected lawyer to take
over an establishment which had left a trail of scandal as well as
victory behind it in the Spanish War and which was charged with admin-
istering the Philippines. The latter proved a tesk not merely of
great difficulty but of some political unpopularity as well.
Root studied the War Department afresh, without initial concept or
prejudice beyond those which arose from his experience as architect
of certain large business mergers in the 1890's. In four years he
carried out mjor reforms which left a permanent imprint on American
military administration:3 0 the substitution of Chief of Staff for
Commanding General, the subordination of the bureau chiefs to the
Chief of Staff, the creation of a General Staff, the founding of the
Army Wer College, the creation of an Army-Navy Board, and, above all,
a memorable assertion of the overriding responsibility and authority
of the civil authorities in the executive branch (the President and
Secretary of War) over the Army, The experience of this reorganisation
and of administering the Philippines during these troubled years
left a deep imprint on those who shared it.
Root was the fore-runner of many A.ericans in the twentieth
century who, called from civil to military tasks, entered into them
with -a sense of discovery as well as responsibility Above all, he
left in Stimson a link to mid-century America and its problems; and
Stimson in turn introduced and indoctrinated almost a whole new genera-
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tion of Americans who were prepared to accept civil responsibility
for the conduct of military affairs.
The issues of foreign policy and military administration did not
dominate national thought in the early years of the century; and the
underlying humane and hopeful objectives of the Progressive movement
clashed with Mahan's dour perception that the armed struggle of rival
powers was an unavoidable feature of international life which the United
States must come to accept. Although the nation went along with the
Spanish-American War and the exercises in global foreign policy
conducted by Theodore Roosevelt, the new concepts of Anerica as a
world power and a serious concern for the scale and organization of
the American military establishment were confined to a relatively
small group of Easterners-- in political terms, mainly to one wing of
the Republican party.
Down to 1914, building a navy, fighting the Spanish-American War,
administering the Philippines, and dabbling in the great power pol-
itics of Europe and Asia constituted a somewhat shallow national
experience. These exercises were not expensive in either blood or
treasure. Although there was much that might have been learned, the
nation could accept them almost as an observer without altering in
any fundamental way its outlook on the world scene or its basic
priority for domestic tasks and problems; and as the first decade of
the century wore on, even as an observer the nation became bored. 3 2
"While America was- under the spell of expansionism, an
inflated national ego, infused with a crusading ardor, sustained
a certain popular interest in the advantages to be reaped from
playing the game of power politics. However, that interest
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proved to be insubstantial aid largely emotional. 14 collapsed
when nationalistic exuberance waned end idealistic professions
became difficult to reconcile with seemy deeds. Theodore
Roosevelt stirred up the ashes of netional self..assertiveness,
but he could not revive the flame. To change the metaphor, his
success in prolonging the thrill of imperialism was a tribute
.to his preaching rather then his teaching. he carried the
national congregation with'hivi, but he failed to inculcate
the basic lessons of international politics. At that, he
dramatized Americal' enlarged role in world affairs not so much
by an exhibition of aggressive energy as by striking two well-
publicised blows for world peace. It was a sign of the times
that the man who had been distinguished for his bellicosity in
1898 was awarded the Nobel Peace Pri2e In 1906.
"American imperialism continued, but it continued because
of public apathy, not because of popular enthusiasm. As high
expectations of commercial and strategic gain failed to ma-
terialize, it became increasingly difficult to justify in-
perial holdings on grounds of self-intereat; and national
philanthropism, unsupported by self-interest. or bellicosity,
was rapidly absorbed in the inertia of less extreme and, in
the long run, more compelling ends and motives of national
conduct.
'By the end of Roosevelt' s first term imperialim had lost
its claim to moral leadership and had gone on the defensive.
Henceforth the proponents of empire were to direct their argu-
mentis not toward expanding national poter but toward preserv-
ing its outward manifestations. The fire had gone out of the
old champions.
Wilson's Crusade and Its Failure
In 1912 the nation elected a president who acknowledged his lack
of experience in foreign affairs and whose New Freedom was a wholly
domestic program. Wilson's general view of foreign policy was domin~
ated by a conviction that America was great and creative only when
it was true to its highest ideals; that, in a sense, the values of the
Progressive program at home were a sufficient basis for the nation's
foreign relations. Bryan, his Secretary of State, was a confirmed
anti-imperialist -whose view of the American destiny as a moral forde
on the world scene, disassociated from the politics of power, paralleled
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Wilson's. If Wilson had a positive opereting foreig'n policy, it
was initially one which looked to arbitration treaties, intressed
trade, and a general American posture of benignity on the wcrld scene
rather than to the harsh clarity of Mahan's concepts of the world power
system, Wilson had viewed the Spanish-American War as a legitinate
manifestation of American idealism but deplored efforts to capitlize
on victory for lesser American purposes.
In formal pronouncements Wilsom sought to disassociate himself
from the imperialist positions and attitudes built up under the two
previous administrations. But the imperatives of the American posi-
tion in Latin America were not so easily denied by an administration
that bore the full weight of dey-to-day responsibility. American
commitments were, in fact, maintained or extended under Wilson in
Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic; and Wilson countenanced,
as well, the punitive mission against Pancho Villa. The conflict
between Wilson's aspirations f or the projection of American ideals on
the world scene and the political realities was thus evident before
1917. Caught in this dilemma, he foreshadowed the conception of
democratic crusader which he was later to seize as the ultimate sol-
vent; he would "teach the South American republics to elect good
men,"3
When it dame time to go to war and then to make peace, Wilson
formulated the American position in terms which almost wholly by-passed
the power concepts developed by the Large View group in the two pre-
war decades, and which by-passed as well the concepts which some of
his closest advisers brought to their assessment of the situation in
Europe and the American interest in it.
The United States, in fact, went to war in 1917 because unres-
tricted German submariMe warfare challenged the historic neutral claim
to freedom of the seas and because it threatened Anglo-American control
of the Atlantic and the allied position on the European Continent.
German policy thus simultaneously heightened the case for supporting
actively the Allies and weakened the purely nationalist case for contin-
ued neutrelity. The balance of opinion tipped sufficiently in favor
of belligerence to make a declaration of war possible if not overwhelm-
ingly popular.
But Wilson did not present the war as an American struggle to
preserve American power interests either in the Atlantic or on the
European mainland. lie characterized it as a crusade to make the world
safe for democrecy. Reaching deep into the American past and into his
own previous formulation of its meening, he evoked the sense of ideo-
logical mission toward Europe and the world which had always been
latent in the American view, which had found many outlets in mission-
ary work end in the private expression of Americans, but which had
been suppressed or rigidly limited in the nation's formal diplomatic
behavior. And when Wilson came to the peace table he again evaded tli&
issues of power and the problem of linking them in an orderly way to
moral principle. He nailed his own and the netion's flag to a form-
ulation of a postwar world in terms of the high abstract principles
rooted in the American creed and in an interpretation of that creed




The Wilsonian principles are prejudices formed in the Age
of Innocence, in the century of American isolation,. Wilson
wished American isolation.0 Wilson wished America to t ake its
place in a universal society. But he was willing to partici-
pate only if the whole world acted as the United States had
acted when it enjoyed isolation during the nineteenth century..
The- United States had then no need to arm, no need to find
alliances, no need to take 'strategic, precautions; Wilson's
principles were a demand that the whole world take voas to live
for ever after on the same terms. He supposed that international
relations could then be conducted verbally by meetings at Geneva,
.Military power, strategic positions and connections,
alliances, the unity of historic states axnd their spheres
of vital interest--all these instruments of international
life--have, no doubt, been used frequently for aggression and
domination. And that is why the Wilsonian gospel seemed at
first to be the promise of salvation itself. But the gospel
did not bring salvation. It was followed by, and it had a
lar ge part in bringing on, the terrible paralysis of the
democratic nations.
The two new conceptions which related America to the world--
the Large View and the crusade f or world order -- came into mortal
combat in Wilson's struggle with the Republican leadership in the
Senate; and in a major tragedy for the United States and the world
they both foundered. On any objective reckoning a reconciliation of
Wilson's and Lodge's views of the appropriate postwar role for the
United States on the world scene should have proved compatible. More
than that, the evidence on the balance of political opinion in 1920
is that the nation was prepared to accept an increase in its res-
ponsibilities which transcended this hemisphere. While the League
in itself was not an issue capable of swinging the election of 1920
to the Democrats, there was nothing in the balance of opinion in
both parties that would have precluded American entrance, if Wilson
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and Lodge had not exercised their powers of leadership as they did,
In the upshot, however, the views represented by both Lodge and by
Wilson were largely lost and discredited in the 1920's. Borah and
his neo-isolationism was the victor over both.
There were, of course, progressives who were prepared in a part
of their minds to acknowledge the reality of power, the reality of
the national interest in military victory over the Central Powers, the
need to under-pin the League of Nations with a continuing structure of
effective power, the need to make a working compromise with Lodge and
all he represented; and there were Large View Republicans who were
profoundly moved by Wilson's vision of a peace which would bring to
the world the principle s of liberty under law translated cirectly out
of the nation's experience of continental federalism. But the fusion
of idealism and power, the acknowledgment of both good and evil in
human relations, to be both faced and built on, did not occur. The
great act of innovating leadership was not brought off. It failed in
part beeause Wilson acted in terms of a moralism which, in the national
style at its best, was diluted, tempered, and fused with respect for
harsher facts of life; and because Lodge acted in terms of the harsh
logic of domestic political power which, in the national style at its
best, was tempered by an awareness of larger national interests and
purposes. Thus, by placing in conflict rather then balance two abiding
strands in the national style, Wilson and Lodge frustrated their own
aspirations, the nation's interests, and the world's hopes.
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The Ambiguit About Eukasia
While in the first two decades of the centuwy the nation sought
to redefine the relation between its interests and its mission on the
world scene, it also faced the narrower, mre technical problem of
assessing the extent and meaning of shifts in power on the Eurasian
continent. The solution to this second problem was made difficult
because the nation had been somewhat spoiled by the diplomacy of the
nineteenth century, when it generally confronted major powers on
issues they regarded as secondary. After 1898, when American dip-a
lomacy undertook initiatives beyond the Western Hemisphere, it met
other major powers on issues to which they attached primary import-
ance. American diplomatic victories could no longer be achieved simply
as a by-product of major power clashes. An American diplomacy not
backed by force was no longer likely to be effective.
The gap between American policy and the conditions of force
required to make it effective was clear-but not widely understood--
in the situation which developed soon after the enunciation of an
American intent "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
entity," incorporated in the Open Door notes of 1899 and the circular
of July 3, 1900. Kennan describes the aftermath as follows:3
As for Hay himself, in December, 1900, only five months after
his proclamation of devotion to the principle of upholding
Chinese territorial and administrative 'entity,' he secretly
instructed our minister in Peking to try to obtain for the
United States a naval coaling station at Samsah Bay in the
Chinese province of Fukien. But when, a few weeks later, the
Japanese, alarmed by the increasing pace of Russian encroach-
ment in Manchuria, inquired politely whether the United States
would be inclined to join them in using force to assure the
observance of the principles it had enunciated, Hay replied
that the United States is 'not at present prepared to attempt
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singly, or in concert with other Powers, to enforce these
views in the east by any demonstretion which could present a
character of hostility to any other Power.'
There is every reason to believe that the Japanese took
the most careful and attentive note of the significance of this
statement. They were interested then, as always, in real
military allies, not half-hearted ones. One year later they
signed the Anglo-Japanese alliance on which their security
was to be based for many years to come. Three yeers later they
took up arms and threw the Russians out of Manchuria. In
doing these things, they neither expected our aid nor feared
our opposition. Had not Hay said that our views about China
were not ones which we would enforce by any demonstration which
could present a character of hostility to any other power?
The prompt Ameriona statement of unwillingness to enforce the Open
Door did not, of course, end the matter. The nation's commitment to
"Chinese territorial end administrative entity" went deep both in
American sentiment toward the Chinese people and in an instinctive
sense of where the nation's interest lay. Despite Hay's .uwillingness
actively to check encroachment on Chinese sovereignty--and in this Hay
was to have a long line of successors in American diplomacy--the Open
Door concept remained a powerful force in American diplomatic behavior,
It was, however, from the beginning a confusing touchstone for American
diplomacy because it mixed up inextricably two elements: an ideological
and sentimental American espiration to see the Chinese people develop
into a dignified modern nation, and a sense that American security as
well as economic interests would be endangered should the vast and
strategically located area of China fall under the influence of another
36power, A China standing on its own feet and protecting its own borders
was a serious American security interest; for such a China would make
difficult, if not impossible, the development of a power coalition
capable of dominating Eastern Euresia. But the romantic vision of
naval power which flowed from Mahan's influence--although not sanctioned
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by his underlying analyses--concealed the extent to which the nation's
interest lay on the Eurasian mainland.
The gap between profession of national intent and objective and
day-to-day performance which opened up so promptly in the wake of the
enunciation of the Open Door symbolised much of the nation's diplom-
atic problem in the twentieth century. It was some time, however,
before the full consequences of this gap were to be revealed; and, in
the meanwhile, the Open Door appeared to be a successful American
initiative. And so also with certain other diplomatic enterprises of
the first decade of the century.
Theodore Roosevelt's apparent success in two major diplomatic
interventions in the Eurasian balance of power without the use of
American force strengthened the illusion fostered by the Open Door
incident that the United States could participate in large and
distant affairs without deep comitment and steady assumption of re-
sponsibility.
At Portsmouth in the summer of 1905 the United States appeared
as the peacemaker between Japan and Russia; and it is possible that,
to a degree, Roosevelt's intervention limited the extent of the Jap-
anese victory and prevented the balance of power from shifting a
bit further against Russia than it did. In fact, the interrity of
China was not substantially advanced by this American initiative.
At that moment the balance of forces in the world was such as to
permit the United States to act as an arbitrator and to influence
merginally the; terms of the agreement without the use of American
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force or the comitment to use it; but, given the clash among Japan,
Russian, Britain, and Germany then under way in Northeast Asia and the
seriousness of the interests (notably Japanese and Russian) at stakeo
the steady presence of American power would have been required to have
made stick a balance of power concept built around the Open Door.
Whatever the long-run educational value to the nation of observ-
ing its President negotiate on American soil a temporary settlement in
a chronic Eurasian struggle, the superficial success of American dip-
lomacy at Portsmouth almost certainly did herm by permitting the Ameri-
can public to believe that American interests in Eastern Eurasia could
somehow be maintained over a period of time without a willingnass to
apply force there. The Portsmouth exereise encouraged the United
States t o sustein the illusion thot on the Eurasian continent, where
major power interests of the first order were at stake, continued
easy diplomatic victories might prove possible.
Something of the same may be said of Theodore Roosevolt's inter-
vention in the Algeciras Conference of 1906. Just as the American
weight had been thrown marginal-ly against Japan and for Russia at
Part-mouth, the weight of American diplomacy strengthened to a minor
degree the French hand against Germany at Algeciras. Once again,
however, the equilibrium symbolized end confirmed (rather than created)
by negotiation proved short-lived0  Between 1906 and 1914 the United
States did not pursue the interest implicit in its Algeciras role--
namely, to avoid a degeneration of the European power struggle into
major war, But that transient Amrican appearance on the scene and
its apparent success may have further encouraged the notion that
American diplomacy could usefully be applied tothe major power struggles
of Europe without serious national connitment.
There was, indeed, a legitimate rationale for the Amrican inter-
ventions at Portsmouth and Algeciras. The United States had a triple
interest in Eurasist an interest in the preservation of peace, an
interest in the avoidance of a shift in the balance of power such that
a single potentially hostile power or power grouping dominated either
Western or Eastern Eurasia and an interest that the area not be dom-
inated by societies organised around doctrines incompatible with
democratic principles. In progressive stages, each of these interests
dominated American policy~during the First World War.
In the period 1914-1916, somewhat in Roosevelt's earlier tradi-
tion, Wilson's objective was to use American good offices (backed by
American economic power and military potential) to bring about an early
peace acceptable to both sides. The course of battle, however, did not
make this a possible policy; in fact, the military situation in 1916
led Germany, in a mixture of hope for early victory and fear of defeat
by attrition, to attempt all-out submarine warfare. The effects of
submarine blockade, as estimated by the German Navy, would be so moift
American military force--still essentially unmbilized--was not judged
a decisive factor in Berlin's calculue.
This German decision confronted Wilson squarely with the second
question: that is, the character of American power interests in rela-
tion to Eurasia, He had to decide whether or not it was an American
I
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interest to see a major European power other then Britain develop such
stature as to be able to challenge Anglo-American control of the
Atlentic. It was essentially on this issue of power, dramatized by
unrestricted submarine warfare, that the United States went to war.-a
step made easier by the fpct that the U-boat was a direct challenge to
the nation as well as to its implicit alliance with Britain and France,.
Once the comitment was made that Americans would fight and die
in Europe, the third strand-American ideological interest--was rad-
ically elevated in national policy It had helped determine American
sympathies before 1917; but now it was heightened for two reasons0
When battle is joined, men vish their sacrifice to be associated with
the highest and most permanent values to which they are attached. In
addition, the United States, as a belligerent, had to clarify its
objectives in the subsequent peace. Thus, given the nature of war
and the national tradition it was inevitable that ideological con-
siderations would be heightened as the United States became a belli..
gerent and assumed a measure of responsibility for Allied post-war
objectives. It was not inevitable that these considerations exert
the peculiar weight they did. Wilson, with a considerable range of
choice open to him, articulated the nation's long-run interests and
purposes in extreme ideological terms which were not meshed with the
realities of the Eurasian power structure abroad and the political
process at home.
Specifically, Wilson failed to understand that the maintenance
of European peace-inside or outside a League of Nations.-required in
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the first half of the twentieth century a structure of organized rela-
tions on the European Continent that would make Eestern Europe effect-
ively independent of both Russia and Germany; and thet this objective
could not be achieved simply by applying in that area the principle
of national self-determination. What was required was a major American
commitment to guarantee the military security of the area--against both
its great neighbors--combined with a sustained effort to help modernize
its economy and its political life es part of a viable Europe. As in
the case of China over the previous two decades, the nation underesti-
mated, at Versailles and afterwards, the depth of its interests in
Eastern Europe and the seriousness of the problems of political and
economic development on the solution of which those interests depended.
Thus the First World War was for the United States a less matur-
ing experience than it might have been. The nation failed to find the
balance between power and ideological interests on a world basis needed
to establish an effective policy; and it failed to understand the
meaning for the national interest of the disruptive forces still gather-
ing strength on the Eurasian mainland in 1920. If the First World War
is judged to have been caused by situations arising from the rise of
Germany and Russian relative to the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the one
hand and Britain and France on the other, the outcome of the war and
post-war events ih no sense ended the possibility of a recurrence of
struggle for the Eurasian power balance. That possibility was, in fact,
increased by the active groping of still weak China towards a nationhood
which aroused the hopes and fears of the Soviet Union and which Japan
was strongly tempted to forestall. Formally, the application df nation,
al self-determination in Eastern Europe and the Nine Power Treaty of
1921 protected the two soft spots of Eurasia; but these were barrivrn
only as strong as the American understanding of their strategic meanirg
for the American interest and the Aerican will to make ther effiv,
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The National Interest in Conce and Action, 1920-1940
The Illusory Equilibrium, 1920-191
From 1920 to- 1931 no netion or group of nations sought actively
to seize the Eurasian balance of power, which lay unconsolidated in the
hands of the quickly separated victors of the First World War; and,
despite the interim character of the Versailles settlement, for more
than a decade the world enjoyed peace of a sort. Thus primary American
interests were not put to the test; and the nation proceeded with
apparent success on the world scene despite its withdrawal from any
serious commitment to ensure either peace or stability beyond American
shores0
The defeated nations were preoccupied with the rehvbiliatation of
their domestic life and the internal problemn of restoring the basis
for major power status, Germany, exploiting Anglo-French crossopurposesq
inflation, and American capital and good will, shook its reparations
down to easily tolerable levels; and, after 1925, it rebuilt its econ-
ony and established a position of respectability in the councils of
Europe. Beneeth the surface, exploiting especially links with the
Soviet Union, it laid the basis for rearmament; but this development
did not reach serious dimensions during the 1920' s. The Soviet Union,
after two postwar' years of revolution, unsuccessful allied interven-
tion, and bitter civil war, turned to a period primarily of domestic
preoccupations: the building of a totalitarian bureaucracy, economic
recovery, and the post-Lenin power struggle in which Stalin triumphed
by 1928. It easily broke the cordon sanitaire envisaged at Versailles
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and emerged, along with Germany, as an active but not dominant or
even threatening European force in the period 1925-1929, In Asia,
under Soviet tutelage, the Kuominteng found its feet and created a
Nationalist China at least superficially unified under a central gov.
erinent; but in 1927 this unity gave way to a progressive internal
struggle as Chiang kiai-shek eliminated the Communists from the Kuo-
mintang but did not destroy their organization and they entered their
long period of insurrection, The Japanese did not at this stage seek
with force to stem the rising tide of nationalism in China, occupying
themselves mainly on the stage of formal diplomacy as a new major
power,
Exhausted, disillusi oned, or both, in varying degrees, Britain,
France, and the United States did not press forward their victory in
war to achieve new power objectives or even to hold firmly the lines
laid down in 1919. Japan was held loosely in check by the moderated
who wielded power at home, by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and by the
various multilateral undertakings Japan accepted abroad., The emer-
gence of the Soviet Union as a limited diplomatic force was tolerated,
except by the United States, the least enthusiastic of the interven,
tionist powers which sought to throttle Bolshevism in its cradle but
the most persistent in maintaining nonrecognition. The German balance
of power maneuvers between the Soviet Union and the West were accepted
as inevitable and not imminently dangerous; and the multiple states
of Eastern Europe created out of the postwar settlement pursued their
uncertain ways with relatively little sericus attention or concern from
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Britain or the United States.
The world of 1925-1931 was in a kind of balance. The limited
initiatives of the more ambitious states did not appear greatly to
threaten the generally passive or preoccupied victors of the First
World War; and the moderete politicians in these states presided over
a situation of sufficient economic and diplomatic progress to justify
to their peoples their commitment to the concepts and the instituitons
of the post-Versailles world. Technically, the Versailles and post.
Versailles Prrangements blocked Japan from hegemony on the Chinese
mainland end separated Russia from Germmy by a barrier of Eastern
European states which, so long as they remained independent or linked
to the Western allies, kept the European end of Eurasia also in balance0
The outlook of Frence was, to a degree, an exception to this gen.-
erally quiescent mood among the allies. France remained acutely aware
that it could no longer regard itself as a match for Germany; and it
did not view the events of these yeers with the complacency of London
and Washington. It actively sought a policy that would continue to
conma ui rmany on the European continent. With the United States
withdrawn as an effective military force in Europe, the French turned to
the British to support them in a post-Versailles policy of actively
holding the continental balance against German resurgence. Britain
failed to make the restraint of Germany the centrel feature of its
continental policy; and, in particular London did not support Paris
in its occupation of the Ruhr in 1924. In fact, Britain turned away
from the Continent and, to a degree, withdrew within itself, undergoing
its own form of isolationism. The upshot was that in the 1920's the
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British gave relatively little serious attention to the course af
events on the Continent; and, perhaps more important, Britain became
confused concerning the character of its interest there, developing
relations of chronic irritation if not cross-purposes which inhibited
the making of an effective Anglo-French policy in the l930's , ten
matters turned more serious.
Over these years American diplomacy was active in four aresso
The Nine Power Treaty, of 1921, by cefining and confining the status
ap apparently clarified the relations of the major powers to each
other and to China in the Far East, formally internationalizing the
Open Door. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 (and the short-lived
London Treaty of 1930) settled the terms on viich the victorious Allied
powers (Britain, France, Japan, and the U.S.)37 would live together
without a naval armaments race. The Dawes and Young Plans (1924 and
1929 respectively) kept the tangled flows of international capital,
reparations, and war debts moving without complete breakdown. Kellogg,
goaded on by Borah from the Senate end by Nicholas Murray Butler end
James Shot well from New York, initiated the Pact of Paris (1928)
outlawing war as an instrument of netional policy.
Formally, then, the United States operated as a major poer on
each of the principal overt issues of the period: the balance of
power in northeast Asia, the level of armaments, the post-Versailles
status of Germany, and the keeping of international peace. Down to
1929, at least, it appeared that the nation had emerged successfully
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from the First World War and its aftermath. It had asserted its
freedom of action, disavowed Wilson and the League of Nations, and made
a separate peace; but it had, nevertheless, played a role of leader-.
ship and dignity on the world scene. As Stimson has said of the
nation's postion when he took office under Hoovers
o a . The country had defied reality in 1920; nine years
later there had come no punishment for this folly, and the
people were thus more confirmed than ever in their determination
to avoid foreign entanglements. Narrowly considered, American
foreign relc'tions between 1920 and 1929 .had been highly suc-
cessfulo
It took the sequence of internat-ional crises from 1931 to 1939
to demonstrate that the mixture of isolationist concept and limited
diplomatic intervention in Eurasia which characterised American policy
in the decade after 1920 was an illusory solution to the nation's
foreign policy problem.
The Process of Disintergration
The 1920's was a deceptively easy time for the United States
to play the role of major power without strain or substantial cost,
Germany was temporarily weakened; Russia temporarily weakened and with-
drawn; Japan, without allies in the West, had no realistic alternative
but to accept status as junior major power in the club of former allied
whose membership could reflect reality for only a little while at
best. But those results of the First World War could be only tempor-
ary. They constituted only a brief ihterruption in the evolutionary
changes taking place in the structure of world power, the onward
movement of which had been gathering momentum since the 1860's. As
it happened, the Great Depression after 1921 put the post-Versailles
system to a cruel series of tests and smashed both it and the comfort-
able illusion of successful American participation in world affairs
which it had fostered. But even if the Great Depression had not
occurred, the locus of power in Eurasia would have shifted in the course
of the 1930's as Germany found its feet and Russia regathered momentum
after the post-revolutionary decade of slow recovery and institutional
reorganization, and the United States would have had to frce up to the
fact that there would have to be an enlarged American military and
foreign policy effort if peace and a stable balance of power in Eurasia
were to become realities.
First, in Japan and then in Germany the world-wide depression
broke the prestige and power of those moderates who had been prepared
to press their national interests within the limits of the post-1919
settlement. Simultaneously, by creating grave internal problems within
the United States, Britain, and France, the depressicn weakened the
energy and cohesion with which, individually and together, they con-
fronted the new challenges. For the extremists in Germany and Japan
(and for Mussolini as well) the depression both cleared the path to
more ambitious policies at home and weakened effective opposition
abroad.
The breakdown of the national and international equilibria which
had been achieved in the period 1925-1929 and the discrediting of the
concepts and men who had created them proceeded in a progressive,
interacting process. In Britain, France, and the United States the
depression posed critical questions which absorbed political energies
and drained away attention from the international scene; and, in a
quite technical sense, it broke up the curious system of international
trade end capital movements which hed come to hinge on the American
economy in ways that even the wisest Americans did not then perceive.
The retraction of American capital in 1929 and the Smoot-Hawley
tariff of 1930 were substantive as well as symbolic acts of consequence.
In Japan, the economic crisis, focussed around problems of foreign trade,
had a triple effect. It weakened the moderate men in power; it made
increasingly attractive an economic solution based on the development
of a unilateral Japanese position on the Chinese mainland; and it
symbolized the increased weakness and vulnerability of the major powers
standing in the way of the militarists who had been crystallizing
their objectives and plens in the 1920's. In Germany a similer con-
vergence occurred. There the moderate governments of 1929-193?,
dominated by men whose economic thought had been rigidly fixed by the
experience of postwar inflation, were peculiarly incapable of initiating
policies to deal with depression. Extreme levels of unemployment, the
complete breakdown of the international economy after 1931, and the
evident domestic preoccupation, if not bankruptcy, of will among the
victors of 1919 gave National Socialism its opportunity.
Economically, Britain began its revival in 1931, the United
States in 1933, France wallowed along, less hard-hit than others by
depression* The French were clearer than others about the growing
menace to the European balance of power, but France was incapable of
taking any effective ection without British or American support--and
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that was lacking, By the mid-1930's, when Britain and the United
States began to awaken to the dangerous deterioration in the balance
of power, the Japanese militarists end Hitler were firmly in the saddle.
Pandora0 s Bcox had been opened in the period 1931-1933; and it could not
be closed again without a major concerted initiative backed by
British, French, and American force. One opportunity after another
for such an initiative was lost until, at last, war released the Anglo=
American energies required for the survival of the Western World,
American Reactions to Crisis
For the United States the first and decisive foreign policy test
dame in 1931-33. In September 1931 the Japanese army proceeded to
occupy key areas in South Manchuria in flagrant violation of the
Kellogg Pact, the Nine Power Treaty, and the older American commitment
to the Open Door, The State Department under Stinson was fully alive
to the implications of the Japanese action and notably to the fact
that the stature and meaning of the postwar treaty and collective
security arrangements as a whole were at stake. After several months
in which the power of the Japanese moderetes over policy was tested
and found to be ineffective, the government confronted the question of
what the United States should do in the face of this primitive act of
defiance. President Hoover condistently took the view that the United
States had no interests in Asia justifying the use of force or the risk
that it might have to be used. He rejected any action, military or
economic, that could conceivably embroil the United States in an Asian
war,
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Hoover's position set an exceedingly narrow range f or American
diplomatic action. Stinson' s opportunities for effeciLve diplomacy were
further limited by the position taken in London in response to the
Japanese movement into Manchuria in September 1931. Britain, pre-
occupied at home, and with a strategic view in Asia that was somewhat
myopic north of Shanghai (or Hong Kong), dealt cooly with the State
Department's exploratory moves looking toward some form of common
response. The British regarded the Open Door and the Nine Power Treaty
as unrealistic in conception, given the actual state of Chinese nation-
al administrative unity0 They continued to think in terms of loose
Chinese regions which were still f air game for foreign zones of in-
fluence or control. Thus in British eyes Manchuria was, more or less
legitimately an area for the Japanese exercise of authority -- or
for Russo-Japanese rivalry; the South of China was still regarded,
almost a century after the Opium War, as a British zone of influence.
When, in January 1932, the Japanese invasion of Shanghai appeared
too close for comfort to British interests, the. British were willing
to put up a united front with the United States, a move which, combined
with a remarkaCle show of Chinese national cohesion and military co-a.
petence, finally led the Japanese to withdraw from the International
Settlement in Shanghai and to concentrate for the time being on the
consolidation of their Manchurian position. From this point, Britain
and the United States moved together, more or less in step, in a dip-
lomacy of moral condemnation of Japanese agggession climaxed by 'the
publication of the. Lytton report and the Japanese withdrawal from the
I
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League of Nations in 1933.
The interplay between Hoover' s firm refusal to contemplate the
use of force and Stimson's awareness of what was at stake for the
United States and the world in the Far East yielded a curious result.
The powers of the Western world, in this matter clearly following the
American lead, condemned and lefused to recognize as legal an act
proclaimed both as immoral and dangerous t o a "systen of orderly de-
velopment by the law of nations"; 3 9 but - also following the American
lead - they refused to apply their military or even their economic
strength to preserve that system at a vital point. The diplomacy of
1931-1933 - the reiteration of high moral principles without the will
to face risk or undertake sacrifice in their support - invited aggression
It opened the gates to German (and Italian) aggression and set in
motion the long slow process of defining the interests and principles
around which the United States and the West later rallied for their
desperate effort at self-preservation in the Second World War0
The gap between the American moral and legal commitment to an
independent China aid the American performance in Asia widened over
the decade that followed the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931
The United States was, in a sense, even less purposeful in its response
to the full-fledged invasion of China which began in 1937, Roosevelt
evaded an application of the Neutrality Act, which would have worked
against Nationalist interests, but as Chiang Kai-shek was driven back
on to Chungking, the United States aided him even less positively
than did the Soviet Union.
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It is easy to condemn a policy consisting of statements of ob-
jectives as profoundly umelated to action as were American policy
statements in the sequence from the Open Door to Pearl Harbor. It
is even possible to argue that American power interests might have
been better served over this period by a systematic policy of alliance
with Japan, if necessary at China's expense.40 What is clear as a matter
of fact, however, is that the diplomatic tradition inaugurated in 1899
with the Open Door notes, running through the Nine Power Pact and
Stimsonl a policy of 1931-1933, had long run substance, espite the lack
of effort and will to back it in the short run. The initiatives of
Hay, Hughes, and Stimson left a deep imprint on the nation; and, at a
later time of crisis, that imprint may have been more rather than less
powerful because the nations conscience was not clear toward China.
In October 1941 the Uhited States faced its decisive diplomatic
confrontation with Japan and was tempted by the possibility of an
Amrican-Japanese accord, to be negotiated in Alaska between Prince
Konoye and President Roosevelt. Such an accord conceivably could have
not only staved off a two-front war but also reversed the direction
which Japanese foreign and domestic policy had taken over the previous
decade. At the minimum the negotiation might have been so conducted
as to clarify American interests in checking Japanese aggression and
to widen a deep split in the Japanese government,, a situation which
Washington followed in extracedinary detail by man of intercepted
wireless messages. The story of the failure to seize this possibility
is extremely complexohl In the end Washington, against the advice
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of the Embassy in Tokyo, refused to negotiate. The Aerican governmntr
could not bring itself into a high level meeting without explicit
assurances concerning China's integrity which the Japanese clearly
could not and would not give before the event.
In his mannerly debate on whether a negotiation in the American
interest was then possible Feis concludee ". . .the records since
come to hand do not support the belief that a reel chance of main-
taining the peace in the Pacific--on or close tothe terms for which
we had stood since 1931--was missed."h 2  Grew has his final, respectful
reservation on this verdict.43 What is clear, however, is that despite
all the ntionss errors of commission and omission in the Far East,
"the terms . . of 1931" and the three -decades that lay behind them
ruled in the showdown. For good or ill or for both, the attachmient of
the nation to a general objective, linked to moral principles derived
from its domstic life and tradition, had great long-run force and
meaning despite the evident failure to match the national performance
with these principles.
The challenge in Chine to the nation's interwar policy, the
ineffectual American response, and the consequences of that response
for the subsequent deterioration of the balance of power in Eastern
Eurasia are all reasonably clear-out, There was no such easily
identifiable turning point in the deterioration of the balance of
power in the West, and no single occasion when the challenge was so
explicitly mde to Washington and Washington examined and rejected it,
In part this asymmetry arose fror the greater complexity of the
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European power structure, which was eroded in a progressive sequence,
not broken at a blow0 Before he felt safe to move, Hitler had to make
sure that he did not face a superior united coalition. Specificelly,
he would have been immobilized if the Anglo-French alliance had sue-
ceeded in uniting with the other. two non-German elements in the Euro-
pean power balance, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states
which France had sought to build into an effective Little Entenbe,
Aside from surviving without riposte the unilateral German denuncia-
tion of the Versailles Treaty--accomplished with the reoccupation of
the Rhineland and open German rearmaent- Hitler's task was first to
destroy the efficacy of the Little Entente and then to neutralize the
Soviet Union. Aided by the uncertainty of Britain, the weakness of
France, and Stalin's opportunism, all was prepared with the signing
of the agreement at Munich in September 1938, the occupation of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939, and the German-Soviet Pact of August;
an isolated Poland and an inadequately prepared Western Europe could
be dealt with in sequence.
In part the difference between the c ourse of events in Asia and
in Europe arose from the fact that the American commitment to China
was explicit and formally confirmed in treaty. In Europe no equiv-
alent basis existed for the American position after the debacle of
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Thus, in the dreadful sequence in the West of 1935-1938-Ethiopia,
Spain, the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia--at no one point did
the nation's formal obligations force it to take a cleqn-cut position
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as it did when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in September 1931.
The Congress, in a sense, had purposefully guaranteed that this would
be so in the Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937. There was not even an
occasion for enunciating a moral position equivalent to Stimson' s non-
recognition to which the nation could later repair. The United
States, having made a separate peace after the First World War, and
having tied its hands in the Neutrality Acts, left the task of holding
together the world created by Versailles up to Britain and France-
both split and weekened in the aftermath of the First World War, in
part Ly the feet of American abstention. Moreover, in its deeper
origins, the China comitment was a part of the nation's history
which antedated the experience of the First World War and wh ch struck
responsive chords in many who after 1920 firmly turned their backa
on the Old World and its recurrent tragedies. The invasion of Manchu-
ria and the Japanese assault on Shanghai instinctively stirred many
Americans as, say, the German reoccupftion of the Rhineland. in March
1936 did not,
The underlying fact, then, is that the United States behaved
over these years as if its rejection of the Versailles Treaty and the
League of Nations had ended the American national interest in the
European belence of power. As t he crisis in Europe deepened, the
Congress progressively reaffirmed an isolationist neutrality. The
climax came with the Decleration of Panama (October 3, 1939), which
established in the Western Hemisphere a "safety belt" around the
Americas south of Cenada from approximately 300 to 1000 miles in width
and warned the belligerents to refrain from naval. action within that
rea. In November 1939, having failed four months earlier, a cash-and
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carry policy of arms exports was passed by the Congress, offering some
concession to the Administration and tb American sympathies end some
modification of the previous neutrality legislation; but this was an
Act designed consciously to avoid the Freedom of the Seas controversy
which, it was then believed, had effected American entrance into the
First World War. In this extremity, the United States abandoned a
doctrine which it had irregularly maintained from the days of Napoleon,
the Barbery pirates, and the War cf 1812.
Some Reasons for Failure
There are conventional explrnations for the nation's performance
in the period 1935-1939-the coming to maturity of a new generation of
Americans trained to believe that American participation in the First
World War was a purposeless End costly error, the ye Committee's
false dramatization of the influence of munition makers and the
arms trade on war, the concentration of the nation's energies on
the problem. of domestic recovery and reform after 1933. But these
are only a partial explenation. There was a general pattern in the
nation's behavior during the late 1930's--mthe pattern of men caught
up in an unrealistic vision of the world and their reletion to it
who preferred to risk mejor istional interests rather thento acknow=
ledge error, men who asserted end reasserted their false vision with
increasing force as events rolled on to crisis.
The policy of the nation ten aciously reflected the vision of a
United States which had been led to participate in the First World
War out of naivete and idealism but now, wiser, knew that it could
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defend its interests and its virtue without the mobilization of force
and its application beyond this hemisphere, a United Stetes which could,
in effect, afford to ignore the course of the balance of power and
politics in Eurasia.
There was no sound basis in historyr for this view. There were
only distorted memories of life before 1900 and a rejection of what
had happened between 1898 and 1920. The nation's history from its be-
ginnings had been intimately bound up with the Eurasian power balance.
That relationship had changed its charecter, but it had never ceased
to exist as a major factor in the American evolution, Moreover, almost
every force at work in the twentieth century had increased the cpth
and importence of that relationship, notably by reducing the power of
Britain and France relative to Germary, Japano and Russia, by elimin-
sting the Austro-Hungarien Empire as a force for stability in Eastern
Europe0 In denying all this the nation failed even to act in the only
way that would have conformd to a retional isolotionism - namely, by
a vigorous defensive rearmament.
The American- performance f rom 1931 to 1940, and especially over
the last five years of that period, bears a family relation to other
neurotic fixations which led nations to cling to concepts divorced
from reality until that reality enforced a disaster, a change in
concept, or both; for example, the Tory policy toward the American
colonies in the vears before 1776, the policies of the French and
Russian courts before 1789 and 1917, Hitle rc s vision of GermanV2e
place in the world over the period 1933-1945, and French colonial
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policy in Indo-China and North Africe after 1945.
The following appear to have been the major underlying ingredients
in the peculiarly intractable American isolationism of the 1930's.
1. The discrediting of both the Large View and Wilson's policy
in the period 1918-1920. Theodore Roosevelt's education of the American
people in the period 1901-1908 had not prepared them fully for the
sacrifices of full-scale involvement in Eurasia; Wilson's idealism had
not prepared them for the harsh realities of international politics
and power. In the face of the challenge of 1917 the nation had
accepted the costs of war and had stretched to the limit of its aspi-
ration in backing initially a Wilsonian settlement; but the tough
bargaininr and detailed issues of power and politics which arose at
Versailles did not fit the nation's Wilsonian vision of what peace
would be like and were distinctly a shock. Even the Large View,
with its distorted naval ingredient, had not fully prepared the nation
for the serious, sustained commitments to the European Continent demanded
by the French and implied by membership in the League of Nations.
2. The sustained prosperity of the Americen economy in the 1920's
combined with the nation's deceptive diplomatic successes confirmed
the notion of an Pmerica capable of maintaining virtue and world
authority without effort, sacrifice, or sustained involvement in the
affairs of Eurasia. To Americans of the 1920's Theodore Roosevelt and
Wilson seemed, in retrospect, archaic crusaders. The men who ran the
nation cane honestly to believe that, if the United States concentra--
ted on business, the rest of its interests would take care of them-
selves with minima. applications of either force or idealism to the
wcrld scene.
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3. The shock of depression weakened the faith of the men who
had made national policy since 1920; and after the election of 1932 it
threw them on the defensive. The New Deal challenged their stature in
the community and the institutions and modes of life to which they
were attached. They were forced into oppositin. under circumstances
not conducive to a sense of national, let Plone international, respon-
sibility; and with them there temporarily disappeared from authority
men of the stamp of Root, Hughes, and Stimson, who had tempered the
isolationist winds of the 1920's.
4, Although headed by & man much of whose formative political
experience down to 1920 had been in military and foreign affairs, the
New Deal was a coalition primarily built around issues of domestic
policy. Matr of the younger men who worked within it had never known
the world before 1914. Their minds were focussed on issues of domestic
reform and recovery; and they believed the First World War a product of
European power rivalries in which the United States had no legitimate
interest and from participation in which it should have abstained.
They were uninterested in issues of international power and military
affairs, regarding them as somehow associated with the conservative
mind, In many ways the young reformer of the 19300 s was a more purpose-
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ful throw-back to the Wilsonian Democrats of 1912-1916. More import-a
ant, New Deel domestic support hinged on Congressmen and constituencies
representing areas and minority groupi that were distinctly isolationist.
In short, the New Deal was an awkward set of personalities and a diffie
cult political grouping from which to moutt a sustained international-
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ist effort in the 1930's.
Thus, just as the Republicans of the 19208a had moved away from
the concepts and precepts of the Large View, the influence of Wilson
on the Democrats had waned by the 1930'so Although their concept of
the nation's life end institutions might differ from that of the
isolationist Republicens of the 19990's, many New Dealers, their minds
filled with large domestic hopes and plans and struggles, and observ
ing the disorderly state of Eurasia in the lete 1930's, would have
been prepared to echo Herbert Hoover's retrospective statement that it
"was not isolationism"; it was a belief that "somewhere, somehow, there
must be an abiding place for law and a sanctuary for civilization."46
Here, then, was the old sen.e of moral superiority and world
mission, never absent since the nationes founding, having failed in
Wilson0 a great projection, having fallen back to empty moralizing
(in, for exaMle, for the Kellogg-Briand Pact), now turned in on it-i
self defensively and in desperation as the Axis moved to dominate a
Eurasia where the values of civilization appeared to be dead or dying.
There is a sense in which the United States regarded itself as an
innocent violated by the First World War and now belatedly protecting
itself from its own ardors and a wicked world by a chastity belt of
Neutrality Acts.
Franklin Roosevelt and the Road Back
In this setting, how did the nation's diplomacy move from 1933
to 1939 under a President and Secretary of State committed as individ-
uals to internationalism?
From 1933 to 1939 Roosevelt sought time after t im to free his
hands in such a way as to be able to apply the weight of Arerican
economic power and military potential against those seeking to unset
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the balance of power in Eurasia. He hoped to prevent war by re-creating
the image of coalition that would again deter those seeking primacy
in Eurasia from using force0 He was systematically prevented by the
Congress from moving effectively in this direction. His only recourse
was to seek to move the Congress by appeeling to the country over its
head, Here he was cautious and probing, fearing to lose his power
over policy=-domestle as well as foreign--if he overplayed his hand,
The Administration never ceased to assert the nation9 s ultimate
interest in the evolution of events in Eurasia, and it conducted a
sporadic effart at education; but its domestic interests and constito_
uency prevented it from attempting a full-scale test which, according
to every index of public end Congressional opinion down to mid-1939, it
would have lost. As Hull explained, his steady reiteration of the
fundamental principles of collective security (usually accompanied by
great caution in diplomatic and political practice) was purposeful.47
I had several purposes in mind in constantly reitering these
principles. One was to edge our owh people gradually away from the
slough of isolation into which so many had sunk, Another was to induce
other nations to adopt them and make them the cornerstones of their
foreign policies. Still another was to get peoples everywhere to
believe in them so that, if aggressor governments sought war, their
peoples might object or resist; and, if war did dome, such peoples,
having these principles at heart, would eventually swing back to the
right international road.
The pattern of frustration was set in the spring of 1933 when
Roosevelt sought to salvrge the Geneva Disarmament Conf1erence and take
the nation back on the road to collective security, France demanded,
as the price for disarmament, a pact which would guarantee American
support in case of aggression, Roesevelt proposed a consultative
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pect which would require Arerican desision in case of alleged aggres-
sion combined with a discriminatory arms embargo which would permit
the nation to throw the weight of its resources against a designated
aggressor, On May 27 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported
out a proposal which required an vrms embargo against all parties to
a dispute. Rather than tie his hands, Roosevelt dropped the initiative.
Germany withdrew from the Geneva (Cnference, which flatly failed. At
a decisive moment in Europegs history end et a moment of definition
for the new Administration, the image of the United Stetes created by
the election of 19?O and its eftermath was confirmed - above ell, in
Hitler's mind.
In 1935, as the League of Notions became seized of Mussolini's
invasion of Ethiopia, Roosevelt struggled to use the nation's weight in
a more specific demonstration of collective security. Fear of American
involvement led to the passage of the first of the Neutrality Pets
(August 1935) which made mandatory the imposition of an arms embargo
in case of war. This act, designed to limit the President's enterprise,
was a temporary measure, confined to six months. It was extended to
May 1, 1937 after the Senate refused to act on amendments proposed by
the Administretion which would have given the President a degree of
flexibility in embargoing raw materials important for war making.
The nonlegislative events of the latter months of 1935 had not
encouraged the cause of collective security. In October the President
applied the Neutrality legislation; and he warned that sele of mater-
ials other than arms could be undertaken only at seller's risk and
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without normal diplomatic protection. As the League of Nations faced
the question of an oil embargo on Italy, Hull, on November 15, included.
oil explicitly in the Adminitration's supplementary "moral embargo0 "
The League failed to follow this lead on November 18; and in December
the Hoare.Loval Pact was published. The American oil gesture was
insufficient to move Britain and France into a stronger stand; and the
cause of collective security was damaged on both sides of the oceano
In Europe, the lack of Arerican presence in the League was a strongly
felt weakness at a decisive moment of testing; in the United States,
the Administration appeared to be left out on a limba more activist
against Italian eggression then even Britain and France,
The strict application of neutrality legislation in the Spanish
Civil War further confirmed the image of American nonparticipation on
both sides of the Atlantic. Here, the apparent Communist support for
the Loyalists .and the support of important elements in the Catholic
Church for Franco compounded the more general difficulties in moving
the nation from its isolationist posture. As Rauch points out, these
factors almost certainly gained strength from the fact that the Spanish
Civil War broke out in July 1936, the summer of an election year,
By the time Japan's full-scale attack nn China was launched, the
1937 Neutrality Act had been passed, giving the President a slightly
larger flexibility in throwing the nation's weight than the Acts of 1935
and 1936. 1t was now up to the President to decide when "a state of
war" existeds he hed the choice of declaring an arms embargo or an
arms embargo plus an embargo on war meterials. In any case, American
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vessels could not engage in military traffic, and credits were ruled
out to belligerents. The Congress was now thoroughly seized of the
theory that trede in arms and war materials, credits to allies, and
the participation in the carrying trade had caused Ameriern entry into
the First World War. The maximum American assistance to Nationalist
China permissible under these circumstances was achieved by the Presi-
dent's refusal to declare "a state of war" between Japan and China, a
position made a shade less preposterous than it might have been by the
lack of declarations of war between the belligerents.
The dead-end nature of the Americen policy with respect to Nation-
alist China was reinforced by the meeting in Brussels (October-November
1937) of the Nine Power signatories (excepting Japan, but including
the Soviet Union) to define their position ot the Japanese invasion of
China. This meeting followed Roosevelt~s femous "quarantine the aggres-
sors" speech (October 5); and the American position at the Conference
was weaker even than it might have been because the Adinistration
judged that the public react-ion to that speech hpd been generally
negative. Given the feebleness of the Arrican position and Britaints
intent to minimise its burdens in Asia, the choice before the Confer-
ence narrowed to: an American proposal that the Conference bring Japan
and China into a direct negotiation to end hostilities; or a British
proposal that Britain and the United States serve jointly as intermed-
isries in an exploration of terms between the belligerents. Japan
rejected the first proposal, the United States the second. The American
refusal, echoing Stimson in 1931 and foreshadowing the refusal to
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negotiate with Japan on China in 1941, arose from Hull's unwilling-
ness to permit the United -States to take explicit (as opposed to
implicit) responsibility for a corruption of the Open Door concept and
the Nine Power Treaty
The cross-purposes of Britain and the United States at this
stage reached a climax when, early in 1938, Welles sounded out the
British (with Roosevelt's tentative support, against Hull's opposition)
on the possibility of a Washington conference of the major powers
designed to halt the trend to war. Formally, disarmament would be the
central issue; but the conference would also consider the general issue
of aggression and measures for "economic pacificeation through equal-
ity of treatment and ppportunity6" This was, at bottom, a psycholog-
ical proposel to break through the Neutrelity cAts, dramative the
weight of the United States in the power balance, and arouse the
peoples everywhere, including the United States, t o the need for come
mon action to stop the drift to war. To thoughtful Britons it looked
like a lest chance to bring an effective Anglo-American coalition to
life; and on these grounds the British Ambassador supported it and
Eden resigned on Chamberlain's refusal to accept it, Hull believed
Welles' proposal involved an American responsibility which could not
be backed by Americen politicel forces then anywhere in sight; atnd
he was sceptical of the psychological dynamics Welles and Roosevelt
envisaged. As exchanges proceeded in January between Washington and
London, the issue centered not on the large political forces which
such a conference might conceivably set in motion but on the possic
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bility of achieving an agreement with Hitler end Mussolini. Chamber-
lain believed no fruitful negotiation could result unless Britain and
the United States were prepared to Tnake substantive politicel-that
is, territorial--concessions to Mussolini in Abyssinie and, possibly,
to Hitler in Austria and Czechoslovakia. These, in the end, the
United States was not prepared to envisage* Thus the bold gamble was
not attempted and Chamberlain plodded along the road to Munich.
Although the Administration may have slightly strengthened the
British and French hand in the Munich negotiations by the Presiden-
^1al message of September 96, 1938, essentially the die was cast. The
effort to produce from the American political and diplomatic process
an image of effective strength sufficient to alter British end French
policy and to check Hitler had failed. Ironically, the shock of
Munich began to release certein of the restraints on the Administration;
for example, modest credits to Nationalist Chine were arranged at the
close of 1938, and the first war-planning which included the possi-
bility of American participation in a European war began. In his
State of the Union Message in January 1939 Roosevelt made the danger
of war his central theme and proposed measures designed to prevent war
by increasing American military strength and permitting the United
States to throw its weight against aggression by "methods short of
war," But in the summer of 1931 the Senete refused to remove the
mandatory arms embargo from the Neutrelity Act of 1937. And this
was the state of things as Molotov and Ribbentrop completed their
negotiation in August end war broke out with the German attack on
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Poland on September 1.
Only a United Stctes evidently prepared to mobilize and actively
to use its weight in Euresia could have given the British and the French
heart, convinced Stalin that a deal with Berlin was not his best
move, and thus have deterred Hitler, The gestures and maneuvers of
American diplomacy from 1935 to 1939 did not suffice, notably because
they appeared to be precisely what they weret the moves of an Admin-
istration which had behind it a reluctant and unperceiving people and
a Congress determined in its opposition to active American involvement
in the process of preventing the deterioration of the power balance.
Britain and France alone did not present a f ront of sufficient strength
and purposefulness to persuade Stalin or to dissuade Hitler in 1939.
Accepting the central fact of the nation's monumental failure,
at a lower level of historical judgment all was not loss.
First, the Administration struck a posture which unlike that of
its opponents, experience tended progressively to confirm as correct.
As with Churchill in Britain, the coming of war and its evolution
strengthened Roosevelt's hand. The isolationists--like Chamberlain-
had clung desperately to the possibility that war would not come; and
although isolationist rear-guard actions persisted down to Pearl
Harbor, by and large the nation was able to unite around a leader
whose perspective had been confirmed by unfolding events.
Second, the intsistence on avoiding d compromises with
Japan, Italy, and Germany--following Stimson's formula of 1931--in
a sense preserved the nation's sense of conscience end, to a degree,
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its ability to lead-although the problem of matching a virtuous object-
ive with political reality and with American forfe was to recur in
China and elsewhere even before the end of the Second World War.
Third, Roosevelt's long struggle with Congress, centered on the
right of the United States to throw its support behind its allies in
moves short of war, yielded naturally, once Congressional opposition
weakened, a sequence permitting American weight to be brought to bear
by progressive stagear from the cash-and-carry legislation of October
1931 down through Lend-Lease and a shoot-at-sight policy in the Atlan-
tic in 1941. It is, indeed, argueble that the American interest in
the Second World War would have been better served by a further and
earlier commitment of the nationis military weight. But accepting
this as beyond what Congress and the public would have accepted, the
concept of a purposeful gearing of American supplies into a battle
where American interests were engaged proved a useful device of
compromise and transition, the foundations for which were laid in the
Neutrality Act struggles of 1935-1939.
Finally, the very thoroughness of the isolationist victory of
the 1930's--while it did not prevent post-1945 controversy on the
question of whether Roosevelt consciously maneuvered the nation into
an unnecessary warw-persuaded a substantial majority of Americans that
it had been an error t o abendon collective security in 1920. Given
the mutually destructive behavior of Wilson and Lodge, perhaps a per-
iod of isolationist ascendency and clear-cut failure was the only
way for the nation to find its way back to the road it had taken in
the first two decades of the century.
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Franklin Roosevelt and the American Tradition in Foren Poli
Franklin Roosevelt inherited naturally and incorporated in his
thought both the Large View and the Wilson traditions. He was not
only a Roosevelt but rlso a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy who
had known Mahan personally. He was ar-ong the smell bond of American
civilians who had shared the pre-19?O experience of groping toward a
new concept of the American power role on the world scene end of
fighting a major coalition war. He wes elso, in pert, a loyal Wilsona
ian who understood and cane graduelly to feel the political reality of
international ideelism as a working force in American behavior, and
who believed with Wilson that some way must be found to order the intera-
play of national power in order to avoid war.
As a junior member of Wilson's administration Roosevelt had been
ardently for early preparedness, vigorous in supporting the use of
force against Mexico, and a bulwark of the Navy's capital ship program
both before American entrance into'the First World War and immediately
thereafter. Caught up in the affairs of a. military service, there
was little Wilsonian idealism in his thought or action until the war
was over.5O
In the post-Armistice period he backed Wilson fully on the League
of Nations issue and helped take the issue to the country as Demeratic
candidate for' Vice. President., But even in this period of identifica.
tion with Wilson's policies, he "clung tenaciously to his fundamental
trust in adequate armament, or, failing that, in any training the
public would accept."51 And he even pressed for the creation of a
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joint planning body which would have brought the State, War, end Navy
departments together,
Between the Democratic defeat in 1920 and the victory in 1932
Roosevelt took positions over a wide range in foreign and military
policy. These positions reveal on the one hand an expedient recog-
nition of the deterioration in public support for either national
security or collective security measures and, on the other, a desire to
find formulae to set the United States back on the road it had reached
by 1920.
Under the converging force of cumulative isolationism and pre-
occupation with major depression Roosevelt's initial policies as Pres-
ident were highly isolationist. But as the Axis threat unfolded he
began to lead the nation back toward preparedness and collective
security.
The rebuilding of the American Navy under Roosevelt began as
early as 1933. And from the Chicago "quarantine" speech of 1937
forward Roosevelt undertook with great caution a re-education of the
nation as the danger of war increased, a war which he never doubted
would put in jeopardy fundamental American security interests, The
extent to which the interwar generation had rejected b oth the Mahan
and Wilson traditions steadily restricted his arena for action and
initiative. Down to Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt conducted his policy
with an acute awareness of the mood into which the country had fellen
between wars, taking each step toward American defense and the protedt-
ion of the national interest on a tentative practical basis in the
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face of specific urgent situations. Only in January 1941 in his
address to Congress defining the Four Freedoms and in the August 1941
meeting with Churchill which yielded the Atlantic Charter did he permit
the Wilson tradition to emerge as the United States asserted itself
and helped totegin to define Allied postwar aims. It was, however, not
merely the presence of Churchill and the British which tempered the
language of the Atlantic Charter and avoided specific commitments.
Throughout his period es President, Roosevelt lived in the consciousa
of on faiure, and incresingly so Ps the end of the war
could be envisaged. In P larger sense, however, in the image of him-
self end the nation he projected on the world scene Roosevelt recaptured
ich of the best in Wilsonts performance. As the American role expanded
in Wcrld War II, the old concept of the American mission regained vit-
ality, that of a great power exerting its influence for good purposes
because of an inner dedication to the values of its domestic society.
It was natural, against the background of American history- since
1920, that Roosevelt should seek in 1940 as Secretaries of War and
Navy men who had shared the Large View Republican traditiont Stinson
and Knox0 Such older men, metured in the pre--1914 world and having
played substantial roles in the First World War, were more at home In
the America of 1939-1941 than those whose meture experience was con-
fined to the 1920's and 1930's, when the spiral of rejection of Amer-
icon. internationelism, begun, in 1920, worked its way out. Between
Stimson and Franklin Roosevelt there were, for example, long memories
shared and common points of reference rare among American leaders,
largely concealed from their colleagues, even those close to them like
Hopkins, who took on the Second World War not as a variant on American
experience since 1898 but as a great fresh adventure.52
As war came to Europe end the allied position deteriorated, the
United States slowly returned from the costly isolationist deviation
of the interwar decedes. Step by step the nation found its way back
to a position which embraced, in a fashion, the partial realities
articulated at an earlier time by the holders of both the Large View
and the Wilsonian doctrine. But those act ons to protect the nation's
security were taken in response to an urgent and flagrant threat te>
the nption--not in a mood of reflettion on the abiding long-term in-
terests of the nation, The late but successful Amerieen reection to
the threat prcsented by the Axis did not end the problem of finding a
concensus on the nationel interest and translating it into an agreed
ar stable national military policy capable of guiding and controlling
American behavior in ieace as well as desperate war.
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Diplomat and Soldier: Instruments of An Uncertain Nation
George Kennan has written:5 3
"Essentially what the diplomat does is only to maintain
communication with other governments about the behavior of the
respective countries in ways that have reciprocal impacts and
are of interest to the governments, The diplomat writes notes
and holds discussions, under the President's authority, with
other governments, about America's behavior--he merely talks
about it, defines it"""explains it, listens to protests about it,
and expresses whatever urdertakings he is permitted to express
about its future nature. He is only the clerk and the recorder--
a secretary, of sorts--not an independent agent. For every real
pr omise or commitment he expresses to a foreign government
regarding the behavior of the U. S. on the interna tional scene,
he must have the sanction of some domestic authority which has
the corresponding real power and is prepared to back him up.
"When, therefore, the military used to sev to us: this or
that must be obtained by 'diplomatic means,' they were using
an empty term. Strictly speaking, there are no diplomatic means
divorced from the real elements of national power and influence,
which are all--in the U.S.-remote from diplomatic control."
Despite the intimate end inescapable relationship between diplom-
acy and force, the American diplomat and the American soldier-- the
principal executors of the ruling concept of the national interest--
-evolved separately in their respective professions during the early
decades of the twentieth century and maintained quite different
relationships to the making of policy and to American society as a
whole,
So far as the soldier was concerned, the pattern of experience
of the nineteenth century persisted. When war came, the corps of
military professionals, however ill-treated they may have been in
peace, autoratically assumed a high degree of responsibility. The
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President did settle the issue as between major courses of military
strategy, He generally chose his top comkanders, and he sometimes
(like Lincoln until he found Grant) exercised in some operational
detail his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief. The civilian Secretar-
ies of War and Navy, depending on their qualities and their relatiohs
with the President, played a lesser or g reater role in military opera-
tions and military affairs. Nevertheless, men who for years had been
junior officers became general officers and admirals; they took command
of large units, and they were placed in positions of grave national
responsibility uh ere the rewards and public prestige as well a s the
risks were theirs.
This was not true, under equivalent conditions, for the profess-
ional diplomat. On occesions when important national stakes hinged
on the conduct of diplopacy it was the national habit for the Ptesident
or the Secretary of State (or both) to assume direct operational res-
ponsibility and for them, in turn, to rely heevily for staff work and
the execution of policy on those outside the ranks of professional
diplomacy. It had been assumed from an early stage in the nation's
history that men experienced in national politics should take major
and direct responsibility for national diplomatic- action. Thus the
American diplomatic professional was generally an adviser to a pol-
itician or quasi-political figure rather than a major performer in
his own right. When the professional made policy--and he ofter did--
he made it in the guise of technical advice or through his special
function of defining the situation confronted,
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Congress, of course, intervened often in military matters. Its control
of appropriations set the chronically straitened operating framework
for the military. Congressmen steadily sought to ensure expenditure
of military appropriations in their districts. Congress wrote the
Militia Act of 1792, determining the character of the reserve arny'
for a century. And, from the Continental Congress forward, legisla-
tors influenced military operations and military strategy in more
was
direct ways from time to time. But there alsoga consistent tendency
for Congress to regard military affairs as an unfamiliar area of expert
specialized knowledge and therefore t o leave the professional soldier
considerable latitude within which to go about his business, making
his own decisions over a considerable range--at least until the situation
in the field went badly.
There was no such modesty on the part of Congress in regard to its
knowledge of foreign affeirs, which it generally viewed as a less prof-
essional and more femiliar terrain than military operations. The
markedly greater involvement of Congress with diplomatic than with
military affairs accentuated the relative limitation of the role of
the professional diplomat. There are several familiar reasons for
this, quite aside f rom the Senate' a constitutional relation to t he
making of treaties, In the nineteenth century regional interests of
direct concern to the voter were often involved in foreigh policy;
and in the latter decades of the period, as the flow in immigration
increased, voting groups emerged with strongly held ettitudes toward
particular foreign nations. From the Committee of Secret Correspond-
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ence created in 1775 forward, the detailed conduct of foreign affairs
had a Congrressionel dimension which tended systematically to limit
the range of authority of the professional diplomat.
Diplomacy was not only a less clearly definable professional
field then military operrtions (and one where the professional could
less persuasively justify a claim to be left on his own); in its trad-
itional context it was also a less operational field. A diplomat
reported the situations he saw: Pbout him in foreign areas and the
conversations he hed0 He negotiated on the basis of instructions
cabled or otherwise dispatched to him from Washington. When assigned
in Washington he considered what position the netion ought to take in
the light of its interests, the exact current situation in particular
foreign areas, and the current context of American politics. This
was a bookish sort of job: a job of reading, writing, thinking, and
talking to others like himself. A diplomst did not commrnd large
masses of men nor did he manipulate complicated machines. He repre-
sented a kind of activity which, in the spectrum of American values
(at least since the 1830's) had never been accorded the prestige of
jobs where things were produced or physically manipuleted, or where
executive responsibility was assumed over the performance of large
numbers of men. The soldier in the field, on the other hand, al-
though he may have done specific things that seemed strarge, was
exercising operating skills which were understandable end respectable.
The soldier was generally viewed by the public end the Congress es,
somehow, meeting a payroll. He was regarded as a man of action; the
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diplomat was not.
The somewhat remote and professional character of a diplomat's
business was given a further, equivocal turn by its central purpose.
By definition, the diplomat worked with fbreign countries under con-
ditions where the foreigner had some bargaining power short of uncon-
ditionel surrender. He was forced, therefore, to take sympathetically
into account perspectives which were unfamiliar, even contrary to the
Amerien interest; end, in the end, he hed to edvocate positions in
which a unilaterally defined American position was compromised. A
soldier on the other hend, was (or appeared to be) essociated with
the direct enforcement of the notional interest. He represented the
nation in action in its simplest and purest form. A diplomat, repre-
senting a less resolute defense of the national interest, was, therefore,
regarded instinctively with annoyance, if not suspicion or worse,
Further, the social life of the professional diplomst was different
from that of the average American in peculiar ways. He lived a cob-
siderable proportion of his mature life abroad, consorting with
foreigners. He lerrned to conduct himself in circumstances where
the ruling etiquette, derived directly from an era of aristocratic
hegemony, ran counter to the menner of normal intercourse among
Americans. When in the United States the diplomat was liable to be
bound closely to Washington and cut off in his movements and activities
from what appeared to be the major normal streams of American life
and activity. The military men, too, led e life different from that
of the average American; but that life was historically based mainly
on American soil. Even the most familiar form of entrance into the
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professional services-xTia Congressional recommendation and appoint-
ment to the military and navel academies--underlined the connection
between the military professional and the centrel patterns of the
nation's life; whereas the background and motives which led men into
the life of professional diplomacy were, for most Amerigens, remote,
more remote even than those which induced a reasonable number of
Americans to spend their lives overseas as missionaries,
Thus the professional diplomEt was never accorded by the nation
the status or the degree of responsibility to which a high-ranking
soldier might aspire; and, moreover, the diplomat had to deal with
both a chronic suspicion end with a willingness of the nonprofessional
to intervene from which the professional military was to an important
degree spared.
As the nation, responding at the turn of the century to forces
it did not fully understand and which it could not fully control,
moved out and, more or less, stayed on the world scene, the American
diplomat and military man were faced with problems new in character
and in scale. Each was forced to act his role as the instrument of a
nation unclear and vacillating about basie interests and purposes
beyond its shores. Each reflected (in different composition and bal.
ance) weaknesses and strengths of the society of which he was a part.
Each faced the challenge of trying to free himself from habits and
memories of the nineteenth century at a pace which might match the
sudden uprush of the nation's relative influence on the world scene.
At a few points the professionals in diplomacy and war met, or
at least, their activities overlapped: in their joint connection with
Root and Stimson, for example, who fostered the beginnings of a con.-
nection between them; in the abortive Navy initiatives of the First
World War and immediate postwar years to establish a Council of Nato
ional Defense, embracing civilians end soldiers or, at lerst, to
establish systematic liaison; to a degree* at Versailles; at the Wash.
ington Conference of 1921..1922, in its way a high point in American
diplomacy of this era; in the person of Franklin Roosevelt and his
interweaving of naval experience and diplomatic knoledgeability.
In general, hoiever, the two sets of professionals continued to
go their separate ways, each maturing after his fashion over the
first four decades of the century but emerging essentially unprepared
for a Second World War and a postwar era in which problems of force
and diplomacy would be inextricably intermingled,
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The Evolution of Prof essional Diplomacyw 90-9t
The Now Foregn Service
Elihu Root is the father of the modern Department of State as
wall as of the modern American Army. His reforms in 1905-1906 use-
fully mark the moment when the American professional diplomatic trad-
ition began to move off its insular base toward meturity. That trend
development legged behind the rise in de fact* American power on the
wcrld scene; and it was not accompanied by the development of profession-
al doctrines of the American interest, Until George Kennan' a post-19h5
analysis of the nation's problem in dealing with the Soviet Union, the
Foreign Service produced no Captain Mahan (or, even, General Mitchell)A
that is, no figure capable of articulating a national strategy based
on a clear concept of the national interest. Neverthelesa, the Depart-
ment of State and its Foreign Service was a quite different institution
on the eve of Pearl Harbor from what it was when Grew's youthful tiger-
shooting caught Theodore Roosevelt's imaginationa
By executive orders of November 10, 1905 and June 27, 1906 Elihu
Root put diplomtic and consuler positions on a civil service basis,
excepting Ambassadors and Ministers, who remained political appointees0
Examinations w ere required for entrance into the Yoreign Service, pro-
motions in the Foreign Service were placed on a merit basis, and the
civil service merit system was extended to the whole consuler service.
These reforms reflected two contemporary trends in the polit-
ical life of the nationt the civil service movement and the spreading
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notion that the nation was developing major and expanding interests
on the world scene which justified a more professional approach to
foreign affairs. Despite the fact that he failed to get the increase
in salary and allowances he sought from the Congtess, Root laid the
basis for a less political and more competent and professional dip-
lomatic service. It was partially under the direct influence of these
developments, as well as in common response to the deeper currents
which produced them, that George Washington University and Princeton
turned their attention to the problem of training men for the new
diplomatic examinations.5
The Diplomacy of War and Peace-Making
As war broke out in Europe and the United States assumed the
technically complex and demanding role of neutral, the slowly devel-
oping American diplomatic service was confronted with issues of a
new seriousness and delicacy. The vell-ordered amiable pre-war
routine gave way to the problem of getting Americans out of the war
zones, of minimizing friction with the British arising from neutrality
status, of pressing the Germans on the question of Belgian refugees.
In terms of policy-making President Wilson took atters thoroughly
into his own hands. Neither Bryan nor Lansing had an important voice
in the Administration's major decisions, although Lansing exhibited
first-class technical skill in the day-to-dey execution of policy.
On the whole, the tangled issues arising from American neutral-
ity in a major war were well handled, the Department of State being
the President's effective diplomatic instrument for these narrow
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purposes. When, however, the United States became a belligerent and
then assumed major responsibility for the making of peace, the Presi-
dent looked elsewhere for staff work and assistance. A special group
under Colonel House was created in 1917 to prepare for the peace con-
ference. Lansing acquiesced fully in this arrangement, which virtually
divorced the Department of State from the peace-making process.56 Wilson
consistently relied on his own judgment, using selectively Colonel
House and a few others outside the professional Oiplomatic service es
advisors and egents in major matters. But the separation stemmed also
from the fact that the American professional was ill-prepared to deal
with the issues on which the nation hrd to take positions in the after-
math of the war.5 The drawing of notional boundaries, the balancing
of deeply held British and French interests end perspectives towards
the Continent, and the creation of a League of Nations raised issues
for which the essentially consular American professional experience
had not prepared the Foreign Service.
In effect, then, the First World War end its immediate aftermath
did not significantly develop the Department of State as an instrument
of staff work or planning in foreign policy. It did however expand
the cumulative professional experience of the Department in the tech-
nical business of modern diplomacy- ; and the nation' a withdrawal
after 1920 brought the level of the nation' a problems and responsi-
bilities in foreign affairs back to the low but rising level of
State Department competence,
Perhaps the most important positive effect of the First World
War and its aftermath on the development of American diplomacy was
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to dra' into the Department of State a new generation of able men
whose imagination was caught by the, new service and who concluded
fror, the events of 1914-1920 that the American role in foreign affairs
wadld eventually expand, 8
InterWar Devel ents
The first major diplomatic occasion in which the Secretary of
State was the central figure end the Department of State supplied the
essential staff work was the Washington Disarmament Oonference of
1921-192P. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes dominated the
affair, and the career men, the technicians, and regional experts of
the Department were effectively used, Hughes devoted much attention
to building the professional service, his contribution being climaxed
by the passage of the Rogers Act of 1924, which he guided through the
Congress, This act united the consular and diplomatic corps in a
unified Foreign Service, providing also for rotation between field
posts and desks inWashington. Under Kellogg and Stimson the slow
growth in the quality, prestige, and maturity of the Foreign Service
proceeded. Despite the nation's isolationism, able men, later to a
assume major responsibility, entered the Department of State, among
them George Kennan (1926) and Charles Bohlen (1929).
The turbulent agenda of the 193008 raided new problems. Economic
affairs increased in importance, requiring somethinr more than the
conventional, essentially commercial reporting from the field and the
filing of dispatches at home. Herbert Feis was brought into the Der
partment as Economic P dvisor in 1932 and remained for many years a
center for sophisticated end sensitive analysis of the international
economy. From 1925 the Department undertook a part of the responsibil-
ity for the negotiation of the many reciprocal trede treaties which
Hull sponsored with such ardor. Divisions for cultural affairs and
international communications were set up to meet newly felt needs.
In addition, the Depertment part cipated in preprring the briefs for
the series of unsuccessful struggles with the Congress over neutrality
legislation and essumed responsibility from 1936 for licensing Ameri-
can treffic inarmso Undersecretary Welles and Assistant Secretary
Berle, both close to the President, participated in efforts to use
American diplomatic influence to prevent war in 1938; and after war
had begun Welles made his femous tour to Rome, Berlin, Paris C-nd
London in 1940 to explore the possibilities of an early peace.
Harding and Coolidge had given Hughes a free rein in the Depart-
ment of State, and, although Coolidge was more ective in foreign
affairs with Kellogr in office, still the Department of State was the
central instrumnt of foreign policy. Siilarlyy although Hoover
made the central foreign policy decisions of his administration,
Stimson was uniquely his agent. It is fair to tay that from 1920 to
1933, within the narrow limits of Amrican foreign policy, the pro-
fessional service developed steadily in stature.
The Revolution in Diploma under Franklin Roosevelt
With the Roosevelt administration there began to operate forces
which were radically to alter the role of the Department of State and
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the American diplomatic tradition.
Unlike his three immediate predecessors, Roosevelt was actively
interested in the details of diplomacy as well as broad foreign policy
positions. He was unwilling to delegate day-to-day operations to the
same degree as Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover; and like Wilson he was
not prepared even to regard the Secretary of State as his sole agent
in foreign affairs. Moley was his effective representative at the
London Conference of 1933. He maintained communications with certain
of his ambassadors (notably Bullitt) outside Departmental channels; he
maintained a relationship of confidence for some years with Welles,
the Under-Secretary, from which the Secretary of State was sometimes
excluded0 An increased proportion of the ambassadorships were given
over to patronage, diluting the authority and prestige of the Foreign
Service; and, as the war crisis developed, special presidential envo
were used to conduct major businesso
There is no doubt that Franklin Roosevelt, quite aside from the
vigor with which he assumed his constitutional prerogetives in for-D
eign affairs, regarded Hull as redponsible advisor over only- a lim-
ited area of foreign polciy and the Foreign Service as an instrument
of limited usefulness to him. It was Hull's position in relation
to the Senate that mainly commended him to the President. This was an
important link and increasingly important es the diplomacy of the
Second World War came to its climax, but the truly revolutionary fact-
or which progressively affected the role of the Department of State
was that the United States began to throw into the world power balance
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its military, economic, political, and psychological weight. In
early 1941 the United States began *ilitary and economic negotiations
with the British. By the time of Fearl Harbor or shortly thereafter,
the Department of State was surrounded by a Treasury pressing hard
distinctive lines of foreign policy, the land-Lease Administration,
the Board of Economic Warfare, and a White House group headed by
Harry Hopkins. In addition, those charged with war production and
shipping responsibilities had their hands on important levers of
foreign policy which tbhey often used with vigor on their own initiative.
Moreover, within the Department of State the Foreign .Service (of some
800 men) was all but engulfed by men on temporary appointmen who
were doing special jobs arising from the war effort,
The co-ordination of this sprawling new f oreign affairs empire
lay uniquely in the Presidentls hands. Although the Department of
State itself expanded greatly in the course of war years, and its per-
asonnel shared many of the adventures and enterprises of the time, its
monopoly position under the President was broken, never to be regained
in the post-war decade.
The diplomatic professional was not trained to an operator; and
the United States had begun to operete throughout the world. The fume-
tion of American representatives was not merely, as in the past, to
gather information about the world environment, to deal with it as a
given, or to negotiate with it, but also, as had never been attempted
before, to change it in ways favorable to the national interest.
On the eve of the Second World War the Foreign Service officer was at
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his best a man skilled in reporting and in negotiation with other
government officials. He was knowledgeable in the custoIS and history
of the nations of the modern world, and he was sensitive to specific
American interests and, occasionally, to the processes of American
government and politics; but he was generally ignorant of military
affairs, unskilled in detecting the political implications of mili-
tary operations, end diffident in asserting his professional interests
and responsibilities in the face of the military. Similarly, he was
not skilled in economics and the operating problems of war production
awd supply. The new fields of propaganda and covert operetions were,
for the most pert, alien to the gentlemanly American diplomatic trad-
ition; and, outside a limited range of subject matter and technique,
the diplomatic professional was an awkward amateur in the field of
intelligence collection and analysis. It was inevitable, therefore,
that when, in the days of the Second World War, he confronted not
only a formidable array of operators in these unfendlier areas but also
the ablest men the country could throw up, working ardently at the
peak of their energy and competence, the Foreign Service officer
instinctively sought to protect his most cherished preserves rather
than to take the offensive and ride herd on the sprawling new agen-
cies.
Looking back from the early days of the Second World War, the
American diplomatic trEdition can be seen to heve developed in three
phases. The first embraced the first century or so of the nation's
life. Then the nationgs foreign policy business was handled person-
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ally by the Secretary of State with the President in a series of well-
spaced treaty negotiations or pronouncements while the day-to-day
business of American diplomacy remained almost wholly consular. In
the second phase, down to the Second World War, the scale of American
involvement in the diplomacy of Eurssia expanded, and an American dip-
lomatic corps emerged after 1905. Except during the First World War
and its aftermath, however, this corps represented a nation which
refused to admit that it had persistent mejor interests beyond the
Western Hemisphere; and, in consequence, the American diplomatic
style between the wars was more nearly that of an observant wary imr
power, with no bargaining instruments to bring to bear, than that of
a major power. With the Fell of France in 1940 and the British demon-
stration of military viability in the autumn, the United States turned
to the task of bringing its assets to bear in relation to its interests
6n a world-wide basis; and thus was launched the third and truly rev-
olutionary phase of the American diplomatic tredition.
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The Evolution of the Americen Militaryt 1900-1L
Hier Staffs and Their Limits
Between 1898 and 1917 an effort was made to apply to the two
military services administrative concepts more appropriate to a
mature industrial society then the loose patterns of the nineteenth
century. The divergent results left merks which are clearly recog-
nisable down to the present day.
In achieving passage of the General Staff Act of 1903 Root won
at least limited victory in a battle to centralise policy command of
the ground forces in the hands of the Secretary of War, to whom the
Army Chief of Staff would serve as a personal administrative aid over
the whole area of army command. The technical bureaus of the aruW
were thus, in principle, effectively subordinated to a common policy,
and the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War were brought into an
administrative relationship likely to maximize their common interests
and personal harmony. Root's victory in 1903 was by no means total;
and it took a major showdown in 1912 with a powerful bureau chief,
General Ainsworth, to make clear that the Secretary of War (then
Heny Stimson) and his Chief of Staff (then Leonard Wood) were in
fact jointly in command of the Arm,
The Navy, after long controversy, adopted in 1915 a different
plan which was more nearly in harmony with the nineteenth century
tradition. The operating military functions of the Chief of Naval
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Operations and the supply and training functions of the Bureaus re-
mained essentially separate, with the Secretary of the Navy (in reason.
ably clear command of the bureau chiefs, but in a dilute and ambiguous
relation to the CN1) an uneasy arbiter. This looser competitive equil-
ibrium system was the ideological basis at least for the Unification
Act of 1947; and it continues to have its supporters. It should be
noted, however, that from Sims forward the Navy has hed distinguished
advocates of the Root system although it has not been generally pru-
dent for them to express that advocacy openly when on active duty.
The concept of the Army General Staff met greet resistance, and
the powers of the General Staff were sharply circumscribed. In the
first place, the technical and operating bureaus of the Army and Navy
resisted the creation of a strong unit above them which might deter-
mine their policies and control their day-to-day business. Secondly,
elements in the Congress not only feared instinctively the concentra-
tion of military men and thought which higher staffs represent in
the military establishment but also cherished the particular connec-
tions with the services (and elements in the services) which committees
could build up. Such ties gave members of Congress both power over
elements in the military and incresing bargaining power in patronage
issues involving the military.
The forces of bureaucratic and political interest converged with
general scepticism about the importance of military planning divorced
from day-to-day operations to keep the higher staffs, such as they were,
ielatively weak down to 1939.59 In turn, the la ck of strong Army and
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and Navy general staffs inhibited sustained constructive thought and
planning concerning the nature of the American security interest in
the world. Reflecting this aituation, the Army and Navy War Colleges
were more concerned with military technique than national military
strategy; and when high officers viewed the nation's security problem,
they did so mainly to deplore what they regarded as the nation's
obtuse and almost total disregard for its military security.
With the notable exception of Captain Mahan--and, in a sense, of
General Mitchell--the American military did not generate much serious
formal thought concerning the nature of the national military interesta
in the world. The best the Army could produce was Leonard Wood, who,
like Upton before him, advocated in the pre-1917 period a preparedness
rooted merely in a gencralised feeling that the nation's sie and
economic status made it appropriate for it to be prepared in a world of
competitive nation states. Wood advenced no persuasive conception of
the national interest from which could be derived any foreseeable
danger requiring large ground forces, Captain Mahan-accepted by the
Navy as a sport--transgressed the normal bounds of a professional mili-
tary man in his analysis and prescriptions for the national interest.
General Mitchell, although ostensibly court-martialed not for his
views but for his manner of advocacy, was doomed to be a maverick not
merely because he was struggling against powerful bureaucratic vested
interests but also because the nature of force and its relption to
the American interest were not popular themes-notably when the conclu-
sion emerged that American invulnerability to direct attack was rapilly
ending.
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When war came to Europe In 1939, there was no consensus in the
military concerning the character of the American interest in the
Second World War. Eisenhower notes in his Crusade for Europes 61
In early 1940, however, the United States Army mirrored
attitudes of the American people, as is the case today and
as it was a century ago. The mass of officers and men lecked
any sense of urgency. Athletics, recreation, and entertainment
took prededence in most units over serious training, Some of
the officers, in the long years of peace, had worn for them-
selves deep ruts of professional routine within which they were
sheltered from vexing new ideas and troublesome problems.
Others, bogred down in one grade for many years because senior-
ity was the only basis for promotion, had abandoned all hope of
progress. Possibly many of them and many of the troops too,
felt that the infantryman' s day had passed. . . .
The greatest obstacle wes psychological--complaceney still
persisted. Even the fp'.l of France in May 1940 failed to
awaken us-and by 'us'% I mean many professional soldiers as
well as others--to a full reali2ation of denger. The commanding
general of one United States division, an officer of long ser-
vice and hign standing, offered to bet, on the day of the
French armistice, that Englend would not last six weeks longer-
and he proposed the matter much as he would have bet on rein or
shine for the morrow, It did not occur to him to think of
Britain as the sole remaining belligerent standing between us
and starkest danrer. His attitude was typical of the great
proportion of soldiers and civilians alike. Happily there
were numerous exceptions whose devoted efforts accomplished
more than seemed possible.
The professional military, sharing the presupposition of the,
society of which they were a part, and reflecting its strengths and
weaknesses, were incapable of anticipating the problems the nation
would face and the response the nation would make when those problems
became real. As a result, higher planning in the American services
developed for the most pert out of a confrontation with specific
situations and dangers rather than from firm and widely understood
doctrines of the national military intcrest,
World War I and the Inter-War Cutback
The First World War and its aftermath appeared to do little to
alter that situation0 The United States played at the mrgin a deci-
sive role in the Allied offensive in 1918; but at the time of the
Armistice the American forces had not been brought to full planned
strength and their military experience vas still limited It would
have been in the offensives of 1919 that the American Army would have
operated in distinctive army groups; a serious allied strategic air
offensive, possibly commanded by on American, would have been mounted'
and fully trained and American-equipped forces would heve been at
their effective peak. The Armistice came, in short, at an intermed-
iate stage of the American build-up.
The First World War did, indeed, rive the United States and its
professional military an extensive experience of the problems of large-
scale coalition warfare fer from American bases. It trained the
American Navy in the problems of convoy in the face of submarines.
It gave the ground forces an extensive experience of modern logistics
and staff work; and it introduced the American military to two innova-
tions--the tank and the military aircraft--as well as developing dis-
tinctive American methods and doctrines of artillery employmnt. Bat
the formal return to isolationism after 3920 appeared to deny the
continued relevance of the First World War experience in coalition
continental warfare,.
At a deeper level, the First World War left its permanent markd
on a few key professional soldiers. Thus, when the problem of world
war recurred, a high degree of continuity with the earlier experience
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was built into Aerican military leaders and, through them, into
Americen military institutions. There was a greater linkage between
the two world wars than the interwar hiatus would suggest.
Looked at in terms of military strength and technical development,
however, the hiatus was real enough. The National Defense Act was
possed June 4o 19?0; the total regular army was set at a figure not
to exceed 280,000 officers and men; and Wilson recommended to Congress
that the long-term program of capital ship production launched in 1916
be resumed to give the United States for the long pull what was believed
to be the essential requirement for a navy equal or superior to the
British fleet. As Ganoe says: 6 2
It looked as though the United States at last had learned
its lesson-that we were going to quit ourselves like men and
be strdng. The erMy took on new hope of sufficiency and
progress. It also took on the labor and responsibility of
modernization.
New Services, such as air, chemical warfare, and tenk,
had to be placed on a firm basis. Other arms had to be revo-
lutionised. New weapons had to be more thoroughly understood
and properly assigned. The new army had to be welded into
large tactical and administrative units which would not only
take care of the United States proper and our island possessions
but be a source of inspiration and knowledge in the home
country.
But by 1923, as the weight of isolationism grew in the adminis-
'tration, the Congress, and the country, the armed forees were cut back
by about 100,000 men and army appropriations were drastically reduced, 6 3
These reductions violated the plans which had gone into the National
Defense Act of 19?0 and left the services without adequate resources
for experiment, innovation, and maneuver. A similar cutback occurred
in neval strength and appropriations following the Washington Naval
Conference of 1921-1922
The Sluggish Pace of Innovetion
In general, then, the Ahmerican military establishrents between
the wars felt themselves constrained by inadequate funds and their
energies were, in good part, devoted year after year to making a
losing case for their enlargement, within this difficult and dis-
couraging framework they did what can only be judged a mediocre
job with their major task: the building into the permanent mili-
tary establishment of the lessons of the First World War and of
keeping up with a military technology still in the process of evol-
ution.
As Bush has said:6
When the First World War ended there were thus in
existence nearly all the elements for scientific warfare.
The principal devices had been tried out in practice.
There were automatic guns, self-propelled vehicles, tankd,
aircraft, submarines, radio communiction, poison gases.
More important, mass production had appeared; complex de-
vices had been made reliable; the petroleum, automobile,
chemical , and communication industries had approached ma-
turity; thousands of men had become skilled in techniques.
The long process of applying scientific results, all the
way from the original academic theory or experiment to the
finished device, had become ordered. The world was fully
launched on mechanized warfare. For all the technical
devices that were later t o be used in the second war, except
only atomic energy, practically every basic technique had
appeared, waiting only for construction and development.
And this was in 1918.
What did the world do about it? It went to sleep on
the subject. In this country, a decisive factor was the
general atmosphere of isolation; here and elsewhere in the
world there was a feeling--closer to hope than to convic-
tion, but still a powerful feeling--that great wars were
over. Fundamentally lethargy gripped the techniques of
warfare between the first and Second World Wars. These
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who were familiar with modern scientific trends did not
think of war, while those who were thinking of war did not
understand the trends.
Some work did, indeed, go forward within the services on the
key problems of innovation . An Army Industrial College was set
up to work on problems and plans for industrial mobilization, re-
flecting the possibility of a second total national military effort.
The ground forces moved on to a supply system bases on motor trana-
port; and, after some vacillation, the tank was finally woven into
a sound conceptual structure of armored dividions. Important exper-
imentel work went forward on chemical warfare end in anti-aircraft;
and the Americrn artilleryman maintained the foundretions for his
primacy at rapid movement and concentrated fire, But this work
was conducted with inadequate resources and against much bureauctatic
resistonce--often by a few men dedicated to their pribate insight
at apparent cost to their professional careers.
In the Navy there were three major directions for innovation
each of which waE to have major significance in the Second World
Wars65 naval aviation, the technique of amphibious landings, and
the d evelopment of supply techniques for the pacific Fleet which
permitted sustained operations at vast distances from major bases.
In the Navy as well as the Army, however, policy was dominated not
by the requirements for innovation but by the conservative static
establishment--in this period one built on the capital ship, to
which most naval minds turhed with comfort after what was hoped to
be a transient concentration on convoy and anti-submarine problems
in the First World War.
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The First World War was regarded as a transient experience
because the Navy, like the nation, did not accept the concept of
a permanent Americr n interest in the haltance of power on the
Eurasian land mass. If that lesson had been drawn from Mahan
and the First World War--as well it might-:.the permanence and
priority of the problems of convoyng amphibious landings end
anti-submarine warfare would have logicrlly followed. But the
Navy returned to a purer concept of sea power and focussed its
attention on the balance between Japanese and Americ'n capital
ships.
The cut in funds nd in the scale of the armed services in 1922-
1923 had, then a general weakening effect on all forms of research
and development; End it served in a particularly acute way to exac-
erbate the problem of organizing an American air force. Cut to the
bone, the instinct of the Army and Navy as institutions was to
preserve what it had, to keep a minimum nucleus in reasonable trim
and order.
It is possiL.le, of course, that in peacetime, with the chal-
lenge and urgency of conflict removed, the services would in arg
case have lapsed into a rather conservative mood and policy. Inno-
vation in a peacetime military establishment which is not planning
to initiate war is aotoriously difficult, And, as the story of
the British tanks in the First World War indicates, innovation is
difficult enough even in war, when the pressure of urgent need
supports the innovetor's case against inevitable human and instit-.
utional inertia and vested interest. Innovation was, therefore,
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peculiarly difficult in a peacetime military establishment cut
30 or 40 per cent below its plannee level, lacking either the
intent to undertake the military initiative or any prevailing don-
cept of the nature of future operations beyond the defense of the
Western Hemir :ere and possiblya in the case of the Navy, a cap-
ital ship enf gement in the Pacific against Japan.
Only the stubborn sense of mission of a relatively few men
provided the American Arry and Navy with the innovational fundamen-
tals which jermitted the two services to move forward technologic-
ally as ripidly as they did in the Second World War. Although
Admiral %ixms cannot be regarded as typical, the military establish-
ments cratained and tolerated a sprinkling of men who lived and
66
workedI in the spirit of his injunctIon:'
' is not -'nly the privilege but the duty of army and navy
afficers to direct letters of constructive criticim to their
superior officers, and the officer who chooses to accept
personal comfort in place of responsibility for such criticism
is not only not worth his pay, but he is not worth the powder
to blow himself to hell0
Tfki Problem of Air Power
The one inescapable problem of innovation during the interwar
yrirs was air poier, where a degree of momentum was maintained.6 7
Ho:-, aIssues of military organization, prestige, rnd power inter-
wa- with questions of technical capability and with conflict over
ttrtical and strategic doctrine to nake air power, and its future
cganization and use in the military services, a chronic national
'scue,
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The rise of Eviation during the First World War as a serious
military arm ancillary to naval and ground force operations, was
a palpaLle fact; and strategic bombardment was sufficiently real to
have justified careful plans for the 1919 offensive, More than
that, within the Arngr a group of dedicated men emerged from the
First World War with an intense vision of their services future
to which they were powerfully and personally cotmitted. And in
William Mitchell they had a bold, even reckless leader,
There were severel quite specific separable issues which had
to be settled.
1., In tactical support of troops should aviation be used
simply to counter the enemy's air forces and for purposes of ob~
servation and close support, or were there distinctively tactical
missions some distance ILehind the lines on which tacticcl air should
concentrate? On this judgment hinged the question of whether, as
a tactical instrument, fighters and light bombers should be attached
to division, corps, arnr, or general army headquarterse
2o What was the military capability of heavy sombardwnt of
the enemr's industrial plant and its consequences for his will
to wage war: was air bombardment foreseeably an independent,
decisive instrument of war?
3. What was the capability of heavy bombarduent of the
eneTr's urban population centei-s and its. consequences for morale
and for his will to wage war: was air bombardment foreseeably an
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independent, decisive instrument of politics?
4. What were the implications for the Navy of bombing air-
craft aeide from the airplane's role in reconnaisance, spotting,
torpedo-carrying, anti-submarine patrol, and escort duty?
5. In the light of the emerging capabilities of aviation
how should the services be organized: should there be an indepen-
dent air force; should there be naval aviation distinct from an
independent air force; if the air force was not to be independent,
what importance, stature, and resource allocation should be made
to aviation within the army and navy establishments?
This proved a formidable cen of worms.
Between 1919 and 1934 there were fifteen public investigations
concerning the appropriate role of air power in the American armed
services. The cases for and against the role of air power as a
military, instrument were argued with a peculiar vehemence. Most
of these who advocated increased allocations and stature for avia-
tion were airmen who felt that they alone knew the meaning of air
power and its future; and this private insight converged with a
real sense of underdog persecution both for their service and in
many cases for themselves personally within the military hierarchy0
Those who argued against a substantial rodification in military
thought, practice, and organization in the light of air power had
on their side the limited supplementary role of air power in the
First World War. Moreover, they were protecting institutions -and
ideas to which their whole mature lives had been devoted.
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In the course of twenty years of running battle-foreshadowing
many of the air power issues of the Second World War and its
aftermath-the following answers were evolved to the key questions.
Tactically it was envisaged that some units would work intimately
and directly with ground commands at the corps level or lower, but
that self-contained general headquarters air force units might aid
the ground battle by indirect support some distance from the battle-
field, operating within an over-all ground support plan. With
respect to strategic bombing, the Air Corps was permitted to dec-
elop a long-renge bomber and bombardment doctrine--a task to which
in the 1930's the air force devoted in many respects its best men
and talents, straining Army directives to the limit; but at high-
er levels the issue of the future of strategic bombing was left
unsettled, and a ir f orce activities in this direction were partly
rationalized .as an effort to defend the United States against
naval attack The issue of precision attack on industrial in-
stallations versus area Uttack on morale was tipped towards the form-
er by a technical rather than a doctrinal decision; that is, through
the Air Corps' adoption of the Norden bomb sight and its concentra-
tion on a daylight heavy bomber. The Navy kept to itself a wide
range of air functions; and within the Navy a more muted battle,
parallel to that proceeding on the national scene, went forward
between the advocates of carriers and those of capital ships.
Spurred by the danger of air force competition, by the dramatic
test sinkings of naval vessels from the air in 1921-1923, and by
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68their own aviation enthusiasts, the navy despite its devotion
to the doctrine that the capital ship would remain the center of
effective naval power, nevertheless laid the foundations for car-
rier warfare and produced a fighting carrier force capable of stem-
ming the Japanese in the Coral Seas and before Midway in 1942.
In terms of organization the whole spectrum of possibilities
was canvassed: an independent air force modeled upon the RAF and
the British Air Ministry; a new caoinet agency on par with the
Arvy and War Departments; a single department of defense with coor-
dinate subdepartments for Army, Navy, and Air; the establishment
of autonomgy within the War Department for the Air Force equivelent
to that enjoyed by the Marine Corps within the Navy; and the crea-
tion of an air force assigned to army general headquarters. The
latter solution--minimal from the point of view of the Army airmen-
was adopted in March 1935, after about a decade's experience under
the transitional Air Corps Act of 1926. This solution had the ad-
vantage, for airmen, of permitting a concentration of command over
a substantial proportion of the air force; but it had the disad-
vantages of dual control. Some tactical units remained under com-
mand at Army corps level, and at the top of the air force, control
over training and indoctrination as well as procurement and devel-
opment were in the hands of the office of the Chief of the Air
Corps while the operational command of P ir force units in being
lay with the commanding general of the General Headqarters air
force. This clumsy dual arrangement was ended in March 193V, as
American rearmament was at last seriously considered
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The tactical and pperational doctrine developed by the Air
Corps between the wars bore a close relation to brsic end accepted
military principle. Tactically, air force operations were based
on concepts of attack, surprise, and concentration of massive air
strength against decisive tactical and strategic objectives. In
all this there was continuity with accepted Americen ground force
and naval doctrine. The revolutionary content of air force thought
lay in strategic bombardment; that is in the notion that air power
could by-pass forces in the field and at sea and strike directly
and decisively at the enery4s vital centers and his will to wage
war:69
But the advent of air power which can go straight to
the vital centers and entirely neutralize oz' destroy them
has put a completely new complexion on the old system of
war 0 It is now realized that the hostile main'army in the
field is a false objective and the real objectives are the
vital centers. The old theory that victory meant the des-
truction of the hostile main army, is untenable. Armies
themselves can be disregarded by air power if a rapid strike
is made against the opposing centers, because a greatly
superior army numerically is at the mercy of an air force
inferior in number.
Here was the persistent vision of decisive independent air po-
wer enunciated before the First World War by Douhet, developed by
Trenchard within the RAF and by Mitchell in the United States.
Both in their doctrines and in the building and planning of
their operations air power advocates drifted towards the concept
of precision bombing of militarily relevant industrial and trans-m
port installations, although certain pronouncements reflected a
continued reliance on the consequences of bombing for morale and
the national will to wage war, The Air Corps never settled the
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question of whether it would seek ir strategic bombing a milita:y
or a political decision.
War Planning
The whole controversy over- air pcmer between the wars was col-
ored and distorted by the ruling concepts of the national intere.st
aril the netiong a military proleom, Formally, tha United States
had return,'ed to the Monroe Doctrine and to a policy limited to
defense of the American continentso In suchi circum3tances the pro-
tection of the ocean approaches was the only clear, persistent mili-
tary requ-irement rd the threet of the Japanese Navy the only barely
realistic military problem on the horizon. And, in fact, the rost
professional and protracted military. plnning and wa.-gaing that
proceeded between the wars centered on a possible naval engagerent
with the Japanese fleetl
A realistic conception of the role of the Army vithir there
limits xas virtually impossible beyond the difficult problem of
defending the Philippines, whicha egain attracted considertble real-
istic thought0
Air force advocates couldl and did argue that the foreseeable
developmenti of air pcwer meant that the United States u ould become
vulnerable in time to direct strategic attack; but between the wars
the range and capabl-lities cf bombine aircriAt fe. fper short of
constitut'ing imminant threat 0  Practical men, faced with the p-O-
ble.m of -llocating srce resources ini annual budgets, wo:e no-;
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prepared to back fully the Air Corps vision. So far as the isolated
continent of the United States was concerned, the case for United
States strategic bombardment as a counterforce to an enemy air
commend was, over a reasonable planning horizon, weak. Nevertheless,
the case for long-rrnge bombers as a counternavel force, their
possible long-term potentiality for intercontinental warfare, a
degree of willingness to contemplate the possibility of war outside
the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, and a degree of concession to ar-
dent Air Corps sentiment permitted the development of the B-17 and
the Norden bombsight and the tactical and strategic doctrines assoc-
iated with precision bombing0
In a sense the big bomber advocates of the inter-war years
faced the same problem as the advocates of capital ships in the
Navy a half=-entury earlier: they could advance no truly rational
argument for their new weapon to a nation whose image of its mili-
tary problem was the defense of its coast lines. But, as with the
earlier revolution in the Navy formal isolationist doctrine was
softened to give the innovators some scope.
Despite some innovation at the level of military technology,
the nation's ambiguity about the character of its interests inhib-
ited realistic forward planning. In this setting, down to 1938,
the war planners of the Army and Navy concentrated mainly on the
question of Japan. The only coalition strategy envisaged until
the late 1930' s arose from informal discussions between officers
of the British and American navies begun in 1934, in which the
22-18
possibility of a primary role for the United States was envisaged
should war break out simultaneously in Europe and Asia. 70
In war-planning the Japanese problem, a degree of controversy
arose on whether the United States should attempt to hold a position
in the Western Pacific or simply defend the line Alaska-Panama-
Hawaii. After the passage of the Philippine Independence Act of
1934 the War Department generally took the defensive view; the Navy,
which looked to the possible necessity of defeating the Japanese
Navy decisively, was unprepared to envisage confining its opera-
tions East of Midway. In the years 1935-1938, during which Congress
refused to permit the fortification of Guam and Japan opened its
major campaigns in China, the Army-Navy controversy was compromised
without being resolved: the agreed planning directive eliminated
both references to the Navy's offensive mission and to the Navy's
limitation of movement east of Midway. After 1938, as war in Europe
became more likely, the planners began to consider action in rela-
tion to the European as well eas the Pacific theater. In November
1938, after Munich, the Joint Army and Navy Board sent the Joint
Planning Committee the following problem for study, the terms of
which represented a military definition of the nation's commitments
under the fundamentally isolationist assumptions of the time.7
. the various practicable courses of action open to
the military and neval forces of the United States in the
event of (a) violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or
more of the Fascist powers, End (b) a simultaneous attempt
to expand Japanese influence in the Philippines. . .
After 1938 the link between American interests and the fete
of Britain and France began to be acknowledged; but, faithful to
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the ruling mood and politics of the country, war planning at no
stage reflected the possibility that American interests might best
be protected by strong forehanded action designed to forestall the
disintegration of the Eurasian pow::r balance.
Like the nation, the military were dragged slowly from isola-
tionism by the march of events in the face of a succession of pal-
pable crises, for each of which the degree of prior preparation
proved grossly inadequate. This lack of preparation extended from
the ruling concepts. of the natiohal interest, through war-planning,
the state of military technology, to a grossly inadequate order of
battle.
Fortunately, the american professional tradition as of 1939
was adequate for the war the United States was about to fight. Its
leadership was guided by certain relevant lessons from the exper-
ience of coalition in 1917-18; it recruited a reasonable sample
of able men from the society; it indoctrinated them in the values
of the society as well as in the disciplined requirements of their
profession; it managed to select from them those most capable of
command in war; it incorporated strategic concepts of operations
and a tactical style well suited to the national temper; it devel-
oped a respect for logistics and a skill in supply which merged
with the capabilities of the society, the tasks of bringing Ameri-
can power to bear, and the needs of celerity in combrt. Down through
the Second World War persistent weaknesses in intelligence, research
and development, and in higher military thought aid planning could
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be borne without disaster, given the stage of history and of war-
making in which the United States was caught up; for in the first
half of the twentieth century the United States was, in fact, the
strategic reserve of the West, and its allies twice provided suff-
icient time for the nation not only to mobilize its skills and
resources but also to divest itself of the wishful illusion that




The United States on the Eve of the Second World War
What, then, was the state of the nation at the outbreak of
the Second World War?
In domestic affairs, national policy over the first four dec-
ades of the twentieth century, guided by the powerful, erratic,
but not insensitive force of the democratic political process, had
adjusted itself with reasonable success to the environment of -a
mature industrial society and to the potentialities of expanded
consumption.
The depression had not been fully conquered; but the nation
had absorbed, in continuity with its old political traditions and
methods, a massive dose of institutional reforms, Not only had
those reforms satisfied the dangerous frustrations and pressures
which developed in the early 1930's, but they had come also to be
widely accepted as a fact of life. Between, say, 1936 and 1940,
as the momentum of the New Deal waned and more liberal Republicans
moved towards leadership in their party, the domestic policies of
the two major parties-if not their cOnventional rhetoric-moved
closer together0 As a national community the United States had
weathered the 1930's without unbearable schism.
In military and foreign affairs the nation stood, moreover,
in a position where, once its will and energy were released and
its resources and talents put to work, a reasonably meaningful
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victory in the Second World War was still possible; tut the grop-
ing efforts to protect the national interest over the srtme period
can be regarded as successful only in the sense that the nation
still survived in 1940.
Indeed, there was something distinctly pathological about
the United States in the late 1930's. It was, after all, almost
a half century since the nation had slipped out from the restrain-
ing limits of the Monroe Doctrine and asserted status as a major
power on the world scene; but until the German victories in the
West of the spring of 1940 the Uhited States stood frozen and in-
active, clinging to distorted memories of a safe isolation long
since rendered beyond the reach of attainable policy. The best
that can be said is that, despite the national isolationist neur-
osis, much had happened since the turn of the century that had
prepared the nation, almost despite itself, to face the Second
World War and to shape a tolerable response to it.
Geographically, the old primacy of concern with the Western
Hemisphere had persisted but changed its meaning0 In the nineteenth
century, in the framework of the Anglo4merican mixture of stale-
mate and accord, the Western Hemisphere had been the sole major
active theater for American diplomacy except for occasional forays
in the Far East. The reasonably tough imperialist mood of Roosevelt
and Taft in Latin America had proved a transient phase, giving way
to more or less awkward, more or less successful efforts at creat-
ing a hemispheric at--osphere of good neighborhood, But in the
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1930's, as the threat of war in Europe became increasingly real,
and Roosevelt sought to assume the position of strategic reserve
for beleagured Eurasian allies, the Western Hemisphere took on
a new derivative role in Americrn diplomacy--the role of a rear
base the seburity of which is a minimum essential not merely for
a successful defense of the United Stetes but also for effective
forward operations in Eurasia. It was a foreshadowing of this
conception rather then simply the continued pursuit if hemispheric
harmony which determined Roosevelt's tightenigg of his ties with
Canada in the Kingston speech of August 18, 1938 and Hull's succesa-
ful struggle to extract from the Lima Conference of December 1938
a declaration requirinc; mutual aid in case of indirect as well as
direct agression from outside the Hemisphere. By 1940 the Western
Hemisphere had ceased to be a separate theater of more or less ben-
evolent American hegemony and had to become part of the general
American security problem of how to protect American interests in
relation to a Eurasia the latent threat of which to the United
States could not be contained b- Britain and France alone.
In Asia, the Open Door and the Nine Power Treaty lay in the
dust as Chiang Kai-shek retreated inland to Chungking, the bommun-
ists gathered strength in the countryside of the North, and the
Japanese dominated the cities and rail lines of the Chinese main-
land. But the nation hed proved unwilling to trenslate its bank.
ruptcy of purpose and policy in Asia over the period 1931-1939 into
a formal recognition of Japanese legal rights in China. On the
books of the Department of State and somewhere in t he nation' a con-
cept of its interest and destiny the Open Door was still alive,
In Europe there was no territorial concept equivalent to the
notion of an independent China, the Maintenance of whose territor-
ial integrity would hold stable the European structure of power,
As parent at Versailles of the multiple national states of Eastern
Europe, the United States might well have adopted some such Western
Open Door concept; and, in fact, there was a better foundatfon in
domestic politics for a persistent American concern with Eastern
Europe then with China. But that had not happened. Wilson's
advocacy of the national principle had never seriously penetrated
even professional American diplomacy, It seemed as though Wash-
ington's vision of Europe stopped at Berlin, Moscow being something
quite separate. American diplomacy in europe centered in the 1930's
on the effort to use Americ-n diplomatic and potential military
weight to maintain a peace reasonably favorable to what gradually
came to be acknowledged as the essential buffer area of Western
Europe, led by Britain and France.
The road from benevolent posturing at Algeciras to decisive
American responsibility at Versailles had been travelled too fast
or, at least, under leadership and *ircumstances the nation did not
sustain, As the crisis mounted in the 1930's, Roosevelt struggled
to establish a position somewhere between that of his kinsman at
Algeciras and Wilson's at Versailles - that is, a position where
the American weight in the eropean scales would be real and sub,
stantial, but one short of overt detailed American responsibility
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and leadership. The effort was antanachronism, At Versailles a
limited firm Americen commitment to support steadily a European
settlement might viell have sufficed, just as a limited Aericen
militery effort in 1917-191 sufficed to tip the scales in war;
but during the 1930's the world arena of power had so changed its
shape and bclance that only an effort for beyond any attempted by
Roosevelt would have broken the hopes and momentum of the Ans and
persuaded Stalin that loyalty to collective security was the most
attractive realistic alternative open to him, irhe rise of Japan,
Italy, and the Soviet Union coupled with the decline of spirit, con-
fidence, and unity of purpose in Britain and France between the
were drastically altered the terms on which the Arericen interest
in rdurasia could be protected. In concept, however, there was con-
tinuity in the American approach--to buttress the British and French
against the Germans; and this negative approach to the problem of
a stable European structure--implicitly lerving central responsi-
bility with the British and French--was to persist, in a sense,
down to 1947.
Roosevelt sough to define en tmericEn approach to Eurasia which
embraced both Large View and Wilsonian concepts, concepts of power
and persistent American ideals. He was, if anything, closer to
the Large View than to Wilson, building his primary cese on Amer-
ican self-interest in a world where aggression in Eurasia could
not but damage the nation's physical security. Given a people
and Congress disabused with crusades, this was the part of good
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politics; but it conformed also to Roosevelt's errly training,
experience, and temperament in international affairs, His clarity
and explicitness about the hard core of direct national interest
was, however, linked to grend Wilsonian themes. Typical of this
synthesis is the following passage from a speech of October 26, 1938,
which foreshadowed Roosevelt's later Wilsonian evocation in the
Four Freedoms:
It is becoming increasingly clear that peace by fear has no
higher or more enduring quality then peace by the sword.
There can be no peace if the reign of law is to be replaced
by a recurrent sanctification of sheer force,
There can be no peace if national policy adopts as a delib-
erate instrument the dispersion all over the world of millions
of helpless and persecuted wanderers with no place to lay their
heads.
There can be no peace if humble men and women are not free
to think their own thoughts, to express their own feelings, to
worship God.
And there is no doubt that,,in the end, popular support for
American aid to the allied cause proceeded not simply from a height-
ened awareness of nationalsecurity interests but also from a sense
of national interest and responsibility to defeat Hitlerism as a
way of life,
By the time the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor the rude founda-
tions for an Americen consensus in foreign policy had been laid and
confirmed: by the Lend-Lease debate, the acceptance of the risks
of a shoot-at-sight policy in the Atlantic, and the American role
at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941. An overwhelming major-
ity of the nation accepted now the existence of a national inter-
est--worth the expenditure of treasure end if necessary blood-
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in a system of collective security; and it accepted the commitment
to a measure of sustained responsibility for the shape of the
postwar world. Moreover, all this was rooted in concepts which
acknowledged the legitimacy of the national experience from 1898
to 1920--and which acknowledged error in the interwar years.
Backed by the weight of the nation's resources, managed by
military professionals whose essential skills had somehow survived
the desultory inter-war generation, the United States co-manded the
essentials for the role of strategic reserve to allies bearing the
brunt of fighting in a great Eurasian war. And the concept of the
national interest associated with the role of strategic reserve
proved a reasonably- adequate brsis for the guidance of American
policy so long as the Angle.-Soviet-American alliance was sustained,
But it was an inadequate basis on which to confront a world arena
from which the power of Germany and Japan had been removed, where
Britdin and France were too wetk to lead, and where, from the
center of Eurasia, the tightly mobilized force of Russia was being
thrust outward. The nation, having barely recaptured the will to
face the tasks of strategic reserve, was promptly forced to assume
responsibility--directly, in detail--from one end of Eurasia to the
other. Neither Mahan nor Wilson nor those who followed their leads
had prepared the United States for this role; and thus, as the
gap between inter-war isolationism and the threat represented by
the Axis was closed, a new gap opened promptly in its wake.
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